A.V. Petrovsky

STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY



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A.V.Petrovsky

STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY

The Collective and the Individual

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**ОЧЕРКИ ПСИХОЛОГИИ
КОЛЛЕКТИВ И ЛИЧНОСТЬ**

На английском языке

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From the Author

At first glance the title of this book, *Studies in Psychology*, may seem extremely wide-ranging to the reader, but in actual fact the book deals with only one particular field of scientific knowledge.

Psychology is perhaps one of the most popular sciences in the world today, at any rate among the humanities. It is not for nothing that the bolder futurologists, albeit a little prematurely, have christened the 21st century the century of psychology. It goes without saying that psychologists all over the world sympathise with this reassuring forecast and are prepared to spare no effort in order to make it come true. After all, is learning to read the human heart not an enticing and noble idea despite the fact that it is very difficult to achieve? It is so essential and important for a person to be understood by the people around him. A certain physicist once said: "Today we are in need of mad ideas." Happily no one has yet claimed that science is in need of the ideas of the mad. The concept of the future of psychology as a science in the front rank of human progress does perhaps belong to the category of mad ideas but (judging by its present state, at least) by no means to that of the ideas of the mad.

Thus, by its mere place in the system of contemporary science, psychology merits the reader's attention.

But still, the title *Studies in Psychology* does not give a clear idea of the contents. Theoretically the book could be about extraordinary psychic phenomena, about the minds of animals or about astonishing child prodigies. However, my plan in writing this book was different, though it, too, fully corresponds to the title. But to preclude

any misunderstanding, I have narrowed it down with the subtitle *The Collective and the Individual*. Thus, it is a number of essays on the psychology of the individual and the social group in which that individual is formed. In other words, I shall be dealing with problems of social psychology.

Each period in the history of specific science has had its favourite. For example, in physics the 17th century was the age of mechanics, the late 19th and early 20th century was the time of electricity, and since the mid-20th century nuclear physics and electronics have fascinated the hearts and minds of the most talented researchers. As for psychology, clearly social psychology in all its various forms is most predominant today: psychology of the individual, group dynamics, the study of small groups, management psychology, psychology of communication, organisational psychology, psychology of propaganda and advertising, group psychotherapy, etc. One cannot, of course, say that the old and time-honoured branches of psychology have gone out of favour. For instance, the veteran of psychology—psychophysics—the elaboration of which was begun over a century ago, still flourishes today. Fascinating research is being carried out into problems of perception, memory and thought. And yet, the rates of progress and the number of scientific works and scope of research in the sphere of social psychology are growing far more than in any other area of the science.

This is not surprising since social psychology is a typical product of the scientific and technological revolution. It is a happy combination of experimental and applied aspects and responds to the needs of production and management, medicine and education. It will help to guide practical workers in assessing the potentialities of a group that is faced with carrying out an important task, in taking a responsible decision, finding the optimal type of behaviour, or choosing a successful leader.

Does the psychologist always cope with these difficult problems? Does he always answer them on the basis of strictly scientific data or merely exchange esoteric smiles with his colleagues who are no better informed than himself?

The answer to this varies and depends on the general outlook of the psychologist in question.

The author has his own opinion on the development and

the present state of this branch of psychology. Together with my colleagues, I have elaborated a conception of the group and the individual within the group, which I believe is a special new way of understanding the phenomena of social psychology, and one which completely opposes the tradition in the main going back to American psychology. All the problems of the individual and the group dealt with in this book are illuminated and discussed from the standpoint of this conception. Discussion is based on psychological experimentation which will be used to prove or disprove the theoretical propositions made.

Marx points out that true research is detailed truth. It is research—both theoretical and experimental—which reproduces the process being studied under deliberately changed conditions, that makes it possible to discover the truth.

This book is devoted to solving this task in relation to the social psychology of interpersonal relations and of the individual as the subject of these relations. The reader will find out the views of one Soviet psychologist, the author of the book, but the latter hopes that through this visual prism of psychological facts, the reader will get a clearer view of the fundamentals of the theory of Soviet psychology as a coherent system of scientific knowledge. This is yet another of the tasks of these studies. Taking into account that the foreign reader, interested in the state of Soviet social psychology, may very probably not be acquainted with the general course of development of psychology in the USSR, the author has preceded the main part of the book with a brief historical introduction (Chapter I), thus including the problems of social psychology worked out by Soviet psychologists in the context of the development of world psychology, and elucidating the links between these problems and the main trends of the development of psychology in the USSR.

Professor A. Petrovsky

CHAPTER I

Soviet Psychology: Past and Present

Psychology in Russia on the Eve of the 1917 October Socialist Revolution

It is now over sixty years since the Great October Socialist Revolution. The research carried out over that period has not only greatly enriched psychology with practical material, but also ensured a decisive shift towards its restructuring on the principles of dialectical materialism. As one looks back over the historical course of Soviet psychology, one gets a clear idea of the exceptional importance for it of Marxism-Leninism, which has been the foundation of everything vital and progressive in its development. Immense difficulties had to be overcome, errors corrected and a vast amount of constructive work done, involving the joint efforts of many Soviet scientists, before success was achieved. In order to understand more fully the history of Soviet psychology, one should examine what preceded it.

The beginning of the 20th century was a period of intense development of psychology in Russia. It was then that experimental psychological laboratories began to operate in St Petersburg, Moscow, Kazan, Yuriev, Kharkov and other towns. Also major conferences of psychologists were held (in 1906, 1909, 1910, 1913 and 1916), and specialised books and journals were published. There was a noticeable rise in interest in psychological issues and a keen dispute developed about its most important methodological problems. What is more, psychology began to be taught again in gymnasia (from 1905), and applied branches, such as educational and forensic psychology began to emerge.

At that time, the extreme right-wing group in psychology was made up of philosopher psychologists (A. I. Vvedensky, L. M. Lopatin, N. O. Lossky) who were imitators

of German idealist philosophy and psychology. In their interpretation, psychology was a spiritualistic and introspective science. Exposing the method, typical for the time, of establishing psychological theories and systems on the basis of a priori reasoning, Lenin stressed that all such "theories" were worthless, simply because of their main methods and their completely and hopelessly metaphysical nature.

Philosophical speculative psychology was objectively opposed by a particular trend in psychology, related to materialist traditions of Russian natural science. This natural scientific trend was represented by I. P. Pavlov, V. M. Bekhterev, V. A. Wagner, N. N. Lange, A. F. Lazursky, P. F. Leshaft and others. It was founded by I. M. Sechenov. The natural scientific materialism when applied to problems of psychology created favourable conditions for opposing reactionary idealist conceptions, and helped to accumulate knowledge on the life of the mind. In the scientific schools belonging to this trend (Bekhterev's "objective psychology", or "psycho-reflexology", Lange's "real psychology", and Wagner's "biopsychology"), psychology became a special branch of natural science among its most important branches: general biology, physiology, medicine and the doctrine of evolution. Moreover, the natural scientific materialism accounts for the one-sidedness of these schools. The social conditioning of the individual was ignored or incorrectly interpreted, thus making it impossible to solve adequately the problems of character, emotions and motives for action. Although they justifiably criticised the subjectivism, introspectiveness and anthropomorphism characteristic of idealist psychology, the scientists who headed the natural scientific schools were unable to put forward a consistent programme for the theory of psychology because of the limitedness of the philosophical premises of their theoretical conceptions.

The position in between the speculative philosophical and natural scientific trends was held by psychologists who tried to separate psychology, as a field of empirical knowledge, from the philosophical dispute. They strictly limited psychological research to the study of "spiritual phenomena" without attempting to take the essence of the psyche into account, and refuted the possibility of philosophically interpreting the facts which they established empirically in their scientific research. Tending in their understanding

of the subject of psychology towards idealist speculative psychology, in particular towards neo-Kantianism, positivism and Machism, these scientists (G. I. Chelpanov, A. P. Nechayev, V. F. Chizh, and others) used methods of research borrowed from the natural sciences. Because of the duality of this group of scientists, their activity was constantly the object of sharp criticism both from the "left" (Sechenov, Pavlov, Lange, Wagner and others), and the "right" (S. L. Frank, A. I. Vvedensky and others).

Not one of the above-mentioned trends or schools was able to pull psychology out of its methodological crisis in that period. It was during these years that the main principles of the Marxist substantiation of psychology were being formed in Lenin's philosophical works. However, only Soviet psychology was to make wide use of the wealth of scientific ideas in Lenin's works.

The First Post-Revolutionary Years

The Great October Socialist Revolution brought about great changes in the minds of scientists. This was evident from the activity of many scientists who made a vital and fundamental revision of their ideology and theoretical views.

A regrouping of forces in psychology took place during the first post-revolutionary years. Philosophical speculative psychology lost its dominant position and its place on the right wing was taken by a group of experimental psychologists (A. P. Nechayev, Y. V. Portugalov and others) headed by G. I. Chelpanov, which stepped up opposition to the materialist trend by using subtler methods than the overt advocacy of spiritualism. Characteristic of this trend was Chelpanov's shift to the defence of empirical psychology. At the same time, the natural scientific trend (Bekhterev, Wagner and others) began to put into practice the theoretical programme of psychology. One can judge how this was accomplished from the work of P. P. Blonsky, who made a decisive switch in camps to the natural scientific trend and tried to reorganise psychology on the basis of principles close to the conceptions of Bekhterev's objective psychology (reflexology).

Blonsky was convinced of the need for radical reform in psychology and realised that its general trend was towards materialism. Despite the fact that he was the first

psychologist to point to the importance of Marxism for psychology, as early as 1920, Blonsky was nevertheless essentially unable to see any ways towards restructuring it on these principles.

In his early psychological works, Blonsky formulated the principles of "behavioural" or "objective" psychology, which were of primary importance for the initial post-revolutionary period of Soviet psychology.

Blonsky sharply criticised the view of a man as an invariable being, inherent in traditional idealist psychology, claiming that human behaviour is a changeable phenomenon and that the task of scientific psychology is to establish how and why human behaviour changes and how and by what it is conditioned. For Blonsky, human behaviour was a function of the behaviour of surrounding society. But, since society changes with time, social behaviour must in turn also be studied as a function of time: genetically, dynamically, as a process, i.e., within its historical development. Henceforth, the genetic (historical) point of view became the main principle of Blonsky's psychological outlook. It gave rise to his interest in the question of the origin of psychic activity and was one of the motives of his characteristic concentration on the problems of age development and of his extensive research into child psychology. His *Psychological Essays*, published in 1927 as well as his later works are permeated with the desire to approach each psychic phenomenon from the point of view of its history. In his *Autobiography*, written in 1928, he stated: "...The main thesis of my psychology: behaviour is understandable only in the context of the history of behaviour."[1] Not surprisingly, this idea became the leitmotif of the scientific work of another eminent Soviet psychologist, L. S. Vygotsky. Later on, in the 1930s, enriched with a knowledge of Marxist dialectics, Blonsky created models of the application and use of the genetic principle in psychology, having worked out a genetic (stage) theory of memory, and examined the formation of schoolchildren's thinking in the light of this principle.

Alongside L. S. Vygotsky, K. N. Kornilov and other leading scientists, Blonsky worked as a reformer of Soviet psychology, and we have much to thank them for. However,

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[1] P. P. Blonsky, *Selected Educational Works*, Moscow, 1961 (in Russian).

despite Blonsky's progressive role in the development of materialist psychology, it is impossible to ignore the narrowness of his method. Blonsky's very understanding of the subject matter of psychology which was close to reflexology and behaviourism, had a mechanistic character. His shift as a psychologist towards Marxism took place during the second half of the 1920s and the 1930s.

In the first five years of Soviet power a demand was growing in all branches and trends of psychology for a single theoretical platform that would serve as a basis for the theory of scientific psychology. K. N. Kornilov was the first in the history of world psychology to call for the application of Marxism in the sphere of psychology at the First All-Russia Psychoneurological Congress (January 10-15, 1923).

The idea of restructuring psychology on the basis of Marxist theory, first voiced by Kornilov, was the *first programme for creating Soviet psychological theory*. Kornilov stressed that psychic processes are a property of highly organised matter and that such an interpretation determines the solution to the question of the subject matter of psychology. His report contained a thesis on the need to build the methods of psychology on the basis of dialectical materialism as well.[1] Kornilov believed that the system of contemporary psychology should not be restricted to the narrow confines of individual psychology, but should also include social psychology, based on the theory of historical materialism.

In this period two methodological principles emerged, which were subsequently adopted by almost all the foremost representatives of Soviet psychology. The first principle—*materialism*—became the firm foundation of psychologists' scientific theories. The second (adopted by the great majority of psychologists) was the principle of the *determinable nature* of human behaviour. By determinism was presupposed the consideration not so much of biological as social and even class factors.

However, the mere fact of the recognition of materialism and determinism as the methodological basis of psychology should not in itself be identified with the reorganisation

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[1] Initially set forth in a very general form, this thesis was later developed further in Kornilov's report to the Second All-Russia Psychoneurological Congress in Leningrad in 1924.

of psychology on the basis of Marxism. Materialism in psychology would have remained mechanistic and metaphysical, and determinism would have been reduced to the mechanistically interpreted interaction of factors of heredity and environment had Soviet psychology not enriched its methodological resources with one other vital principle, by raising (even if not solving) the question of the role of the dialectical method in psychology.

In helping to free psychology from vulgar materialism, energeticism and empiricism, Kornilov came close to Marxism but was still far from mastering it. This was the cause of many serious errors to be found in the reactological conception of psychology which he put forward. It is essential to distinguish between the progressive significance of Kornilov's demand to apply dialectics to psychological research on the one hand, and his still formal outline for making psychological research "dialectic".

The problems in the development of Soviet psychology which became distinctly apparent during this period and which were intensified by a series of Kornilov's theoretical mistakes, by no means diminish the significance of his and his colleagues' debate against the idealism of Chelpanov, which was won by the former at the First and Second Psychoneurological Congresses.

Several young scientists (N. F. Dobrynin, A. N. Leontiev, A. R. Luria, A. A. Smirnov and others), who were attempting to put into practice a programme for elaborating Marxist psychological theory, grouped around the Moscow Psychological Institute and Kornilov, its head from 1923. A prominent role in this group was played by L. S. Vygotsky, whose intensive research work had already attracted the attention of Soviet psychologists. The group established broad contacts with the scientific establishments where Blonsky, M. A. Reisner and other actively pro-Marxist psychologists worked.

The first attempts to establish Marxist psychology were made in the second half of the 1920s. Despite the obvious fact that psychology could not remain a "science of the soul", Soviet psychologists still had great difficulty defining what exactly the subject matter of psychology should be. Thus was formed the mechanistic interpretation of it as a science of behaviour represented by the schools of reflexology and reactology.

The First Programme of Marxist Psychological Theory

The formation of Marxist psychological theory presupposed the defeat of traditional psychology which, until then, had been a buttress and a final refuge of idealism and metaphysics. Two main ways of carrying out the transformation of psychology—*reflexology* and *reactology* (the study of reflexes and reactions, respectively)—took shape in this period.

Reflexology was a natural scientific trend in psychology which developed mainly in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century, and which subsequently had considerable influence on the elaboration of problems of American behaviourism. The founder of reflexology was Bekhterev. An outline of his theory was contained in the article "Objective Psychology and Its Subject Matter" published in 1904 in the *Vestnik psikhologii, kriminalnoi antropologii i gipnotisma* (Bulletin of Psychology, Criminal Anthropology and Hypnotism), of which he was editor. The main principles formulated in this article were set out in Bekhterev's works dating from the last years before the revolution, in which "objective psychology" is renamed "psychoreflexology", and also in his post-revolutionary works, *The General Principles of Reflexology* (1918) and *Fundamentals of Reflexology* (1923 and 1926), in which he argued that reflexology was a special "bio-social science".

At the basis of the theory of reflexology lay the thesis, undoubtedly related to Sechenov's ideas, that there is no conscious or unconscious process of thought that is not objectively manifested at one time or another. Thus, all reflexes operating with the participation of the brain ("correlative activity") became the object of reflexological research. Reflexologists tried to use exclusively objective methods as a "firm base" for their scientific conclusions. By this they had in mind not merely the recording of reflexes but also their correlation to the external stimuli which initially caused the reaction. Terms used in subjective psychology began to be dropped (the term "memory traces" was used instead of "memory" and so on). In contrast to subjective psychology which separated psychic processes from the brain, reflexology strove to examine psychic activity in connection with neural processes, drawing for elucidation on material of the physiology of higher nervous activity.

Reflexology was elaborated by a large group of scientists in Leningrad (at the Psychoneurological Institute, later the Institute of the Brain), and in Kharkov (the Psychoneurological Academy), and in other towns. There were also journals on the subject: *Vestnik psikhologii, kriminalnoi antropologii i gipnotisma* and *Obozreniye psikhiatrii, nevrologii i experimentalnoi psikhologii* (Survey of Psychiatry, Neurology and Experimental Psychology) before the October Revolution; and *Voprosy izucheniya i vospitaniya lichnosti* (Questions of the Study and Education of the Individual) and others, after the Revolution. Initially emerging in the field of psychology immediately after the Revolution, reflexology also penetrated education, psychiatry, sociology and art criticism ("reflexology of pedagogics and orthopaedics", "genetic reflexology", "reflexology of the masses", "reflexology of art and creative work", etc.). The trend reached its peak in the mid-1920s.

Based on principles of natural scientific materialism, reflexology was a progressive trend in comparison to subjective idealist psychology and was the object of numerous attacks by the latter. However, though it opposed subjectivist psychology, reflexology could not overcome its mechanistic interpretation of psychic processes as epiphenomena (i.e. passive appendages) of behavioural acts. Reflexologists ignored the central component (the psychic element), making the third component (movement) the main element of the reflex act. By passing over the problem of the consciousness, reflexology cut itself off from the study of any complicated scientific questions. The main precondition of reflexology (the theory of "psychology without the psyche") constituted the inverted dualism of subjective psychology.

Owing to the fact that mechanistic materialism had become the main danger on the philosophical front, by the late 1920s scientific criticism of reflexology had considerably increased (L. Vygotsky, V. Nevsky and others). Reflexologists realised the incompatibility of the mechanistic principles of their theory and the new dialectical conceptions of the development of psychic activity being formed in Soviet psychology. But, of course, the rejection of the elaboration of reflexology, as a special trend in psychology by no means signified a rejection of the elaboration of the reflex basis of psychic activity. The reflex principle, which emerged in the 1920s, remains one of the

vital methodological premises of Soviet psychology

The second trend which reflected the initial stage of the search for a scientific methodology in psychology was reactology, founded by K. N. Kornilov. Like reflexology, reactology interpreted psychology as a "science of behaviour" of living beings (including humans). The central component of this theory was the concept "reaction". A reaction was regarded as a universal phenomenon, characteristic of all living beings (all response movements of organisms, including unicellular ones); as the response of the whole organism and not just one organ; and as a result of psychic processes (in the highest species of the animal world). The task of reactology was the study of the speed, strength and form of the course of a reaction, and the discovery of an increasingly complicated range of reactions (natural, muscular, sensory, choice, etc.) with the aid of dynamometric and other methods. The experimental data gained as a result of the study of reactions constituted a considerable contribution to Soviet psychology.

The new construction put upon the concept "reflex" to extend it to the category of "reaction" made it possible, so reactologists believed, to carry out a "synthesis" of subjective psychology which, while studying the psychic and subjective, ignored the analysis of movements and behaviour as a whole, and objective psychology (behaviourism, and reflexology), which, ignoring the psyche, was only concerned with the study of response movements. Reactologists saw this as the way towards dialectics in psychology (the subjective as the object of psychological study—thesis, reflexes, or acts of behaviour—antithesis, and reaction—synthesis). Despite the fact that reactology correctly grasped, described and criticised the one-sidedness of both subjective and objective psychology, this "synthesis" was both formal and artificial. Reactology was constructed by means of the eclectic combination of Marxist principles and certain mechanistic and energeticist ideas (such as the "law of unipolar energy expenditure"), first formulated in Kornilov's work *Studies on Reactions* (Moscow, 1921). As a result, a contradiction began to emerge in reactology between the tasks of the new psychology (creation of a consistent theory based on Marxist principles and promotion of socialist construction), and the actual poverty of its contents (the study of the speed, strength and form of reactions). This contradiction was disclosed in psychological discussions

(the reactological debate, as it was known) during the early 1930s.

The significance of the discussions on the main methodological problems of reactology and reflexology went way beyond the tasks set by the initiators of these two trends. Under the newly launched offensive of socialism, the philosophical debate, which was completing the struggle on two fronts (against mechanicism and idealism), together with the closely related debate in psychology, brought about a decisive change in the very foundation of scientific psychological theory: Soviet psychology broke with the remnants of idealism and mechanicism in its interpretation of the subject and tasks of psychology. The experience of all these debates helped immensely to develop constructive criticism and self-criticism.

Let us look at the vital theses which came out of the debates of 1929-1931.

A complete knowledge of psychic life is impossible without physiology (and above all without the study of conditional reflexes). Physiological research made it possible to discover material means with the aid of which the actual dependence of a subject on its surroundings is transformed into a psychic state. This thesis contained the accumulated experience of combining psychological research with the physiological study of the neuro-cerebral substratum, carried out by many psychologists over a number of years.

A psychic process cannot be reduced merely to its physiological description. The assertion that physiological or reflexological concepts should be used instead of psychological ones, hides a lack of belief in the reality of psychic phenomena. Physiology can only give an idea of the interrelation of humans and their natural surroundings. However, the human consciousness is determined not just by life in general, but by social life. The transposing of biological concepts and views into sociology inevitably leads to agnosticism and idealism. The socio-psychological views of reflexologists were a clear example of this.

The formulation of the question—reflexology or psychology—typical of the period 1925-1929, is unhistorical because by psychology, reflexologists implied the former empirical psychology and not the newly emerging dialectical-materialist psychology. Renouncing the idealism and subjectivism of the old psychology, reflexologists of all types

"threw out the baby with the bathwater". Regarded as progressive in tsarist Russia, the anti-psychologism of reflexologists was seen as reactionary under the new conditions of the transformation of psychology on the laws of Marxism. Such a formulation of the question (reflexology or psychology?) was also erroneous because it assumed that only idealist, subjective psychology could exist, and excluded the possibility of and the need for dialectical-materialist psychology.

The first thesis put forward by Marxists in their criticism of "behaviourism" as a scientific system is that the behaviour of the individual is not merely the object of psychology. A person's behaviour, i.e. the labour, political and social activity of an individual, cannot be explained exclusively by psychology. Equally erroneous is the claim that the object of Marxist psychology is the behaviour of "society as a collective subject of history".

The actual term "behaviour" only seems philosophically neutral. In reality, both reflexologists and reactologists avoided the psychophysical problem, smoothing over the sharp contradiction between idealism and materialism, by applying a concept supposedly indifferent with regard to the main issue of phylosophy: the behavioural act (and not the psychic act, which reflects the material world). What is more, reactologists and reflexologists, in regarding behaviour as the subject of psychology, ignored human activeness. The human being became merely a reacting automaton, which gave rise to a formula current at that time in the Moscow Institute of Experimental Psychology: "No activeness, only reactiveness". Consequently human activity was interpreted mechanistically.

The main significance of the theories put forward in 1930-1932, was that the consciousness became the subject of Marxist psychology. Declaring human behaviour to be the object of psychological study, the representatives of behavioural psychology (reflexologists and reactologists, even more so), nevertheless, did not altogether reject the psyche, but assigned it an auxiliary, secondary, role, believing it to be merely a part of the object under psychological study. It was obvious that it was necessary, on the one hand, to shift the focus in psychological research away from the sphere of behaviour towards the sphere of consciousness, having given it the correct dialectical-materialist description, and on the other, to reject the

false conceptions of the psyche which were then current among reflexologists and reactologists. The psychological conceptions which were formed during this period as a result of the integration into psychology of the principles of the Leninist theory of reflection and of the dialectical materialist doctrine of development (Vygotsky's theory of the historical development of higher psychic functions, the genetic principle of the interpretation of psychic processes of Professor Blonsky and others), soon outgrew the methodological premises which corresponded to the interpretation of psychology as a science of behaviour. This was acknowledged by the foremost psychologists. Vygotsky stated in 1932 that the very foundation of psychology should be rebuilt.

Because of fundamental and inherent faults, neither reflexology nor reactology were able to accomplish the task of establishing a Marxist psychology. By the late twenties and early thirties this had been acknowledged as an obvious fact, and was one of the important reasons for putting forward a new programme of Soviet psychological theory.

The Development of Psychology During the Late 1930s and 1940s

The new stage in the elaboration of psychology on the basis of dialectical materialism began in the 1930s and its fundamental aims determined the development of psychology in the 1940s and 1950s. The most important feature of the theoretical debates of 1930-1932, which laid the foundations for this development, was the establishment of consciousness as the subject of Marxist psychology. Basing themselves on the works of the founders of Marxism, Marxist psychologists gave new meaning to the terms "psyche" and "consciousness". While not rejecting the concepts undoubtedly related to certain traditions of subjective psychology and which the adherents of objectivism were making into a bugbear, Marxist psychologists outlined a programme to liberate the entire system of psychological concepts from extraneous, idealist features and to revise these concepts from the viewpoint of the Leninist theory of reflection.

Of exceptional significance in the elaboration of the main theoretical problems of Soviet psychology were the emergence and shaping of dialectical conceptions which contained a scientific interpretation of the origin, structure

and development of higher psychic functions. A prominent role in the establishment of these conceptions belongs to Vygotsky. Two scientific hypotheses lie at the basis of the historical approach to the study of the human psyche formed in the works of the Vygotsky school: that of the mediated nature and of the origin of psychic activity.[1] This historical method in the interpretation of the human psyche was further developed by A. N. Leontiev and his colleagues, who regarded psychic activity as a special form of activity—a product of external material activity which is transformed in the course of socio-historical development into the intrinsic activity of human consciousness. The genetic theory of the development of memory and thought, prompted by the principles of the dialectical approach, is formulated in works by P. P. Blonsky. The theory of attitude developed by Uznadze and his colleagues was a vital contribution to Soviet psychology: with the aid of objective experimental methods it became possible to study the complex forms of unconscious mental activity, determined by the specific content of an objective situation. A significant contribution to the elaboration of the most important theoretical problems of Soviet psychology was made by Rubinstein's work *The Fundamentals of General Psychology*, which summarised research material accumulated by Soviet and foreign psychology, and formulated a series of fundamental theses.

The transformation of psychology on the basis of the theory of reflection pushed the solution of the problem of the psychological structure of cognitive processes into the foreground. Much attention was focussed on the study of the transitions from sensation to thought and also of the intellectual mediation of sensation (Ananyev), the study of visual sensations and the increase of the sensitivity of the sense organs (Kravkov, Kekcheyev, and Teplov), and aural sensations (Teplov). Much research was done into skills (Schwartz, Gellerstein, and Guryanov), attention (Dobrynin), memory (Smirnov, Zinchenko, Rybnikov and Zankov), thought (Shevarev, Galperin, Zaporozhets, Menchinskaya, and Kostyuk), abilities and their development (Teplov), and feelings (Yakobson). Research into the problems of the history of psychology was begun by Ananyev and Rybnikov

[1] See: L. S. Vygotsky, *Selected Psychological Studies*, Moscow, 1965; idem, *The Development of Higher Psychic Functions*, Moscow, 1960 (both in Russian).

and the first joint textbooks for teacher training establishments were published (edited by Kornilov, Teplov and Schwartz).

Since 1931-1932, Soviet psychologists have adhered to the new interpretation of the subject of psychology. This conception of psychology as a science of the psyche, of the consciousness as a property of the brain and a reflection of objective reality, became possible when all forms of behavioural psychology as various manifestations of objectivism and mechanism had been overcome. Let me give a brief description of certain fundamentally important theses which had been established in Soviet psychology by the end of the 1930s and which retain their significance to this day.

Psychic activity is determined by the way of life and changes in accordance with changes in the way of life. Thus, the development of the psyche of animals is determined by the biological law of natural selection. The origin and development of human consciousness is determined by the laws of the development of the mode of production of the material life of society. The logical conclusion of this general materialist principle was the concept of the socio-historical nature of human consciousness which made it possible to push the study of the human personality into the foreground. Soviet psychologists saw in this a way to overcome abstract functionalism.

An individual whose development is determined by socio-historical conditions is not a passive object of these influences, not their epiphenomenon. An individual is characterised by activeness. The importance of this thesis is emphasised by the fact that over the entire period in question, the problem of the activeness of the individual remained an area of conflict between the conception accepted in empirical psychology of psychic activeness as one of the substantial qualities of the soul, and the desire to ignore activeness, characteristic of behavioural psychology. At this new stage in the development of psychology, it became possible to solve the problem of the individual's activeness on the basis of Marxist-Leninist ideas of the active (non-looking-glass) nature of reflection, the origin of consciousness in labour activity, the essence of man as the sum of social relations, the role of needs in the development of the individual, etc. The principle of the individual's activeness is firmly established in Soviet psychology: the problem of

selection, the formation of needs and the shaping of the individual (Makarenko); the problem of the individual's activeness and consciousness (Dobrynin); the purposefulness of the individual and the problem of the "passive-active" nature of needs (Rubinstein); attitudes as a modification of the individual (Uznadze); the problem or relations (Myasishchev); the problem of the formation of abilities through activity (Teplov), and so on.

The psyche of animals and human consciousness can be correctly understood and adequately explained only if they are examined in development. Thus, it became possible for the first time to realise Sechenov's idea that scientific psychology should be transformed into a series of theses on the history of psychic processes—that the development of the psyche would become not merely a field of study, but also the main principle of research in Soviet psychology. This was precisely the direction taken in the pre-war years by the Soviet psychology which was reflected in the conceptions of the development of the higher intellectual processes expounded in the works of Blonsky, Leontiev and others.[1] Revealing the continuity of the development of higher forms of the psyche on the basis of lower forms, and the qualitative uniqueness of these higher forms, Soviet psychologists traced the development of new forms of psyche in accordance with their essential laws that evolved in the struggle of inherent contradictions.

Consciousness and activity form a unity. This thesis was counterposed not only to the dualistic notion of the concepts' external antithesis, but also on the one hand, to the views of spiritualists who ignored activity and concentrated on the "pure act" of consciousness, and on the other, to the doctrines of behaviourists and reflexologists, who reduced the consciousness to activity. Rubinstein showed that consciousness is both formed and manifested in activity. "Activity and consciousness are not two opposite aspects. They form an organic whole—not an identity, but a unity."[2] Such an interpretation of the relationship of consciousness and activity allowed Rubinstein to establish the basis of objective cognition of the psyche: "By means

[1] See: P. P. Blonsky, *Memory and Thought*, Moscow, 1935; idem, *Development of Thought in Schoolchildren*, Moscow, 1935; A. N. Leontiev, *Essays on Psychic Development*, Moscow, 1942 (all in Russian).

[2] S. L. Rubinstein, *The Fundamentals of General Psychology*, Moscow, 1940, p. 10.

of a subject's activity, his psyche becomes cognisable for others."[1] The significance of this thesis for the substantiation of the objectivity of psychological methods is undeniable. This thesis helps to refute the assertion by subjective psychologists that another person's psyche is uncognisable, and the claim by behaviourists and reflexologists of the subjectivity of all psychological knowledge.

The concept of the "psyche" is broader than the concept of "consciousness", which then signified the higher level of psychic development that arises during work and communication, and which is realised in the purposeful relations of a person to social being. In this way, the sphere of the unconscious, or subconscious, was opened up as an object for study. The correctly formulated question of the relationship of consciousness and the unconscious was not actually solved at that time, although both the theoretical and experimental preconditions for such a solution had been formed, objectively revealed in the broad criticism of the Freudian conception of the unconscious (Blonsky and others), and in experimental practice of research into attitude conducted by the Uznadze school. At the same time, one of the main concepts used by idealists to denote the unconscious—an instinct, was given adequate interpretation in the works of Pavlov, Wagner and other scientists: an instinct reveals the dialectical unity of opposites such as the innate and the acquired, the expedient and the inexpedient, the stereotyped and the plastically variable, the exogenous and the endogenous.

In studying the structure of human consciousness, the psychologist reveals interfunctional links and relations and overcomes the functionalism of empirical psychology.

The interest in the junctional, interfunctional areas of psychology displayed by many Soviet psychologists is evidence of the desire to overcome functionalism in the interpretation of the fundamental psychological concepts. Rubinstein outlined the theoretical aspect of the struggle against abstract functionalism, pointing out the necessity for the study of the psyche in a specific activity. However, the task of overcoming functionalism set in that period was still far from being fulfilled.

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[1] S. L. Rubinstein, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

During the fifties and sixties, Soviet psychology was enriched by a number of theoretical works reflecting the fundamental problems of scientific research. Between 1957 and 1959, three books by S. L. Rubinstein were published: *Being and Consciousness*, *On Thought and Ways of Studying It*, and *Principles and Ways of Developing Psychology*. These theoretical works by the prominent Soviet psychologist deal with the problem of the psyche in its various forms, and reveal its place in the system of interconnections of the material world. Rubinstein's interpretation is deterministic: the psyche is considered to be conditioned by circumstances of life and, in its turn, to determine human behaviour (external causes act through inner conditions). Summarising the many years of research into thought conducted by his colleagues, Rubinstein concentrated attention on revealing the mechanisms of human creative activity.

In 1959, Leontiev's book *Problems of Psychic Development* was published, summing up many years of work by the author and his colleagues, related to the study of one of psychology's most important problems; the formation of the psyche. Despite the fact that Leontiev's monograph included research from different years, it possessed an undeniable wholeness: whether the author is talking about the phylogenetic development of the psyche or the formation of a child's mind, the problem of the essence of psychic development is always in the focus of his attention. The three sections of the book deal with the three vital aspects of the examination of the development of psychic activity: the problem of the emergence of sensations as elementary forms of the psyche, the problem of the relationship of biological evolution and the historical development of the psyche, and the problem of the development of the psyche in ontogenesis. In the book, Leontiev consistently implements the deterministic and historical approach to questions of the formation of psychic activity, and puts forward a number of constructive hypotheses: the hypothesis representing sensitivity as the highest form of irritability, performing a signalling function and orienting an organism in an environment; the hypothesis according to which the mechanism of sensory reflection is the "likening" of the dynamics of the processes in the analysers to the properties

of external influence, the "construction" of the adequate image; the hypothesis of the formation during life of psychic abilities and functions which have historically taken shape in human beings, and so on. In 1963, Leontiev's book was awarded the Lenin Prize.

A vitally important contribution was made to Soviet psychological theory by B. M. Teplov, whose book, *Problems of Individual Differences*, issued in 1961, was the result of extensive work. Teplov theoretically substantiated the psychology of individual differences. In his classic works on the study of the problem of the individual, and of abilities and gifts, Teplov carried out further research into questions of individual psychology. He managed to interpret dialectically the question of the formation of abilities so vital for educational psychology: "abilities are in their very essence a dynamic concept", they exist only in the course of development, but since development is achieved only in the process of activity, "ability cannot appear outside specific activity".[1] Abilities, he stresses, are not only manifested but also formed in activity.

In the 1950s and early 1960s, Teplov was occupied with research into the psychophysiology of individual differences. He gave a profound scientific interpretation of the concept "the type of nervous system" as a complex of its innate features, showed the difference between the genotype (temperament) and phenotype (character), and the groundlessness of the widespread concept of the "four" types of higher nervous activity, and rejected the assessment of certain psychological and physiological qualities as "absolutely" bad or "absolutely" good, etc. Teplov's theoretical principles were further developed by his colleagues.

Soviet psychology in the eighties is a many-branched science. Areas of particularly intensive development are child and educational psychology, which study the interconnection between teaching and mental development, factors affecting the success of teaching processes and the shaping of the individual, the psychological features of working with children who show deviations from normal development, and the psychological principles of work with the collective and the individual (Sh. A. Amonashvili, L. I. Bozhovich, P. Y. Galperin, V. V. Davydov, A. V. Za-

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[1] B. M. Teplov, *The Problem of Individual Differences*, Moscow, 1961, p. 14 (in Russian).

porozhets, G. S. Kostyuk, A. N. Leontiev, N. A. Menchinskaya, D. B. Elkonin, N. F. Talyzina, and others). The further theoretical and experimental study of attitude was conducted by Georgian psychologists (Sh. A. Nadirashvili, R. G. Natadze and A. S. Prangishvili). A number of research projects were devoted to differential psychology and psychophysiology, the study of a person's individual psychological characteristics—character, temperament and their correlation with properties of the nervous system and types of higher nervous activity (K. M. Gurevich, E. A. Klimov, N. S. Leites, B. S. Merlin, V. D. Nebylitsin, and others). Scientific and technological progress has stimulated the development of labour psychology, including such areas as engineering and space psychology (F. D. Gorbov, T. T. Dzhamgarov, V. P. Zinchenko, O. A. Konopkin, A. A. Krylov, B. F. Lomov, V. F. Rubakhin, V. D. Shadrikov and others). Management psychology studies the corresponding aspects of management activity in work collectives, the decision-making process, the implementation of leadership and the psychological questions of the selection, training and placement of personnel (A. I. Kitov, A. M. Stolyarenko, A. V. Filippov and others). Closely related to management psychology is the rapidly developing social psychology which is the subject matter of this book. In a number of psychological and medical centres problems of pathopsychology and neuropsychology have been elaborated (B. V. Zeigarnik, A. R. Luria, Y. F. Polyakov, E. D. Khomskaya, L. S. Tsvetkova and others), as well as problems of specialised psychology dealing with the temporary retardation of psychic development, psychology of retarded children and blind and deaf children (R. M. Boskis, T. A. Vlasova, Y. A. Kulagin, V. I. Lubovsky, F. F. Rau, I. M. Solovyov and others). Within the framework of general psychology studies were carried out of perceptual processes (V. P. Zinchenko, A. N. Leontiev, Y. N. Sokolov, Y. M. Zabrodin and others), of memory (A. A. Smirnov and V. Y. Laudis and others), thought and speech (A. V. Brushlinsky, N. I. Zhinkin, A. A. Leontiev, A. M. Matyushkin, Y. A. Ponomarev, V. N. Pushkin, A. N. Sokolov, O. A. Tikhomirov and others), and other psychic processes. Problems of psychological theory and history are analysed in the works of K. A. Abulkhanova-Slavskaya, L. I. Antsyferova, Y. A. Budilova, A. A. Smirnov, A. V. Petrovsky, M. G. Yaroshevsky and others.

The main centres of psychological research in the USSR are the Institute of Psychology of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the General and Educational Psychology Research Institute of the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences (now 73 years old), the Institute of Psychology of the Georgian Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Psychology of the Ukrainian Ministry of Education, the Research Institute for the Mentally Handicapped Children of the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, the Preschool Education Research Institute of the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences and the psychology departments of the universities of Moscow, Leningrad, Tbilisi and Yaroslavl.

Soviet psychologists took an active part in the work of the 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd International Psychological Congresses in Moscow, London, Tokyo, Paris and Leipzig, respectively. There have been six All-Union Congresses of the USSR Society of Psychologists since 1959.

CHAPTER II

Approaching Social Psychology as a Science

The Emergence and Development of Social Psychology

Interest in the processes of interaction of people in various human communities emerged in the early stages of social development. The first observations of human social behaviour—the beginnings of social psychology—were made in antiquity in the works of Plato and Aristotle, and later during the Enlightenment by Montesquieu, Holbach, Helvetius, Diderot, Rousseau and many other 18th century thinkers. Although they did not form any complete system of knowledge on the psychology of the individual in various groups, these observations nevertheless did awaken the need for an understanding of the laws of an individual's development in the society of similar individuals, and thus prepared the way for the first social psychological conceptions, dating from the mid and late 19th century. The positivism of Auguste Compte—a version of subjective idealism and agnosticism which reduced the task of psychological research to the mere description and systematisation of information received through sensation—served as the philosophical basis for the elaboration of these social psychological theories.

The first attempts to create a social psychological theory in Europe and America were made by Gabriel Tarde, Gustave Le Bon, William McDougall and Emile Durkheim. In explaining the laws of the interaction of the individual and society, and the functioning of the most varied human associations, the pioneers of foreign social psychology disclaimed the decisive role of class, social and economic factors and tried to find universal laws which would explain social phenomena exclusively from the position of psychology. For example, Tarde sought the explanation of the sources

of solidarity and cohesion among people in the categories of "imitation", Le Bon in "the law of spiritual unity" and Durkheim in "collective representation". In this way, they incorrectly substituted the laws of psychology for the laws of history, reducing all social phenomena to psychological phenomena.

The works of Georg Simmel and Charles Cooley greatly promoted the development of social psychology. They were the first to regard the individual not abstractly, in isolation, but to link his traits and peculiar features to the processes of interaction within groups and among groups. What is more, individual traits and features were presented as unique projections of the individual's interrelation with social groups.

According to Cooley, a person's idea of himself, the so-called self-conception, is a reflection of what the individual believes others think about him. How a person evaluates himself corresponds to what he believes to be the opinion of the people with whom he comes into contact in the course of interaction in different groups. Consequently, the "self-conception", according to Cooley, is not a constant value, but a function of relations with other people. The idea developed by Cooley of the "looking-glass self" has to a great extent determined modern American social psychological research.

Simmel and Cooley believe that the individual should not be studied outside the social context, outside his environment. Cooley introduced the term "primary group" into social psychology, and showed the decisive role of these primary groups (the family, informal associations at home or at work, etc.) in the formation of the individual. However, Simmel's and Cooley's very concept of social surroundings and social environment was extremely narrow. The social environment was reduced to the small primary group, and "face to face" contacts, to use Cooley's expression, determined the nature, essence and features of the interpersonal communication of individuals in groups.

While substantiating the essentially social nature of an individual's psychic life, Cooley at the same time idealistically interpreted society as the sum total of psychic relations. He ignored the fact that a group is not something exclusive and autonomous but always remains a part of society, or of a class. Therefore, the focussing of attention on purely psychological relations, emerging on the ba-

sis of "face to face" interaction, concealed and blurred the real picture of primary group relations. This picture could only be fully revealed by taking into account the role of the sum of all social relations that determine the patterns of an individual's formation within the microenvironment.

The psychologising of the nature of social relations in groups is a fault characteristic also of Cooley's followers today (Jacob Moreno, Robert Bales, Michael Argyle and others).

In the 1920s, social psychology became the leading trend in the development of psychological science in the USA, Britain, Germany, France and Japan. The broad scope of applied studies in this field was greatly stimulated by major industrial enterprises and military departments. Numerous special institutes and laboratories carried out research into the so-called human factor.

Walter Moede and Floyd Allport laid the foundations of studies showing the influence (positive or negative) that primary groups have on their members in the course of some kind of activity. The scientists wanted to discover in what instances the individual's attitude to the group was positive and in what instances it was negative. It turned out that the general effect of a group's activity depended directly on whether, in carrying out certain tasks, individuals acted "side by side" or "together". It was discovered that the mere presence of observers, regarded as authoritative figures by the group, was enough to create a group atmosphere promoting an increase in productivity of the whole group and its individual members. Moede cites examples when, under the influence of a primary group and figures of authority, the individual threshold of sensitivity to electric current were significantly decreased in certain individuals.

Worldwide interest was evoked by results of research showing how personal interrelations affect the increase of labour productivity, influence the attitude to work and work discipline.

During the so-called Hawthorne experiments (the town in the USA where the experiments were carried out), Elton Mayo made certain conclusions that formed the basis of all subsequent works, by various authors, on the role of the "human factor" in present-day production. It was revealed that social psychological factors play a significant part in

increasing labour productivity, that the labour productivity of each worker is to a considerable extent influenced by interpersonal relations in groups and corresponds more often not to a worker's abilities but to the scale of values and the attitudes accepted within the group. It turned out that labour productivity depends not only on pay and work conditions but also on the kind of informal relations within the group, and that this informal structure is capable of slowing down or, on the contrary, optimising management processes at the small group level .

Thus it was established that the nature of informal relations between group members significantly influences all the group's production indicators including labour productivity, fluctuation of manpower, and also the attitude of workers to changes in quotas and wage rates.

World War II intensified the study of phenomena of group development. The cohesion and fighting efficiency of groups, the stability of their structure under pressure of forces aimed at severing and destroying intra-group links, and the efficiency of group activity depending on the type or style of leadership, were all objects of experimental study. Groups (formal and informal, primary and secondary, reference, diffuse, corporative, and so on) were the focus of special attention. When referring to the groups, American psychologists ever more frequently use the term "small group". The study of small groups has become the main trend in social psychology abroad.

Research into group phenomena and characteristics has gone beyond social psychology. The data obtained have become widely used in the organisation of management in various sections of industry. They are taken into account in the difficult problem of personnel training, the scientific organisation of labour and the formation of various types of human community. These studies concentrate on the small group—a special kind of psychological phenomenon regarded as a unique intermediate link in the "individual-society" system. Moreover, bourgeois psychologists believe it to be such a link that, having discovered its laws, one can supposedly explain not only the features of the formation of an individual's main traits, but also the laws of social development. In this way, in relation to the individual, the small group is seen as the social environment which rigidly determines the behaviour and features of the individual, whereas in relation to the whole

of society, it is both an analogue and a unique model of social relations.

The corresponding section of social psychology has been called group dynamics. One of the founders of this trend was Kurt Lewin, who began his work in Germany but later emigrated to the USA (during the rise of fascism). Revising and continuing the work of Simmel, Cooley, Allport, Herbert Mead, Ralph Linton and others, the exponents of group dynamics put forward several new ideas and accumulated extensive empirical material. The development of group dynamics as a special field of social psychology in the USA, has undoubtedly been influenced by Lewin's "field theory", Moreno's sociometry, Leon Festinger's theory of "cognitive dissonance", Andrew Cohen's theory of "delinquent behaviour", Argyle's and Bales' theory of "social interaction", the study of conformism by Solomon Asch, Richard Crutchfield, David Krech and Muzafer Sherif, and the concept of "group cohesion" elaborated by Kurt Back, Robert Bales, Neal Gross, William Martin, George Homans and others.

When talking of social psychological research in the USA, where this branch of psychology is most highly developed, one ought to mention the prominent role of Harvard University (Robert Bales, Alex Inkeles, Talcott Parsons and Derek Price), the Group Dynamics Research Centre at Michigan State University (Dorwin Cartright, Frank Harary, Theodore Newcomb and Donald Pelz), and also of Chicago State University, the University of California and Columbia University.

One of the characteristic features of the development of social psychology in the USA is the enormous accumulation of empirical material (the bibliography on applied aspects of social psychology in the USA comprises approximately 10,000 works). George Homans commented in this respect that American psychologists had gorged themselves on facts which now had to be digested. The success of future studies in this field depends entirely on whether there will be serious theories firmly based on a science about society and the laws of its development. Western social psychology is making the first attempts to rise above the level of empiricism and to explain various psychological and social psychological phenomena. However, the methodological principles of these theories are extremely unstable since philosophy and sociology do not have a single scientific

theory explaining the main laws of the development of society and the interrelations of its members.

Marxism and Social Psychology

Historical materialism, as a science of the laws of social development is the methodological basis of social psychology in the USSR. One of the most important principles of social psychology—the principle of the social basis of psychological phenomena which arise in the course of communication, interaction and interrelations within various human communities—was first elaborated by Marx, Engels and Lenin.

The founders of scientific communism paid considerable attention to the psychology of individual social groups and classes, revealing the specific character of a number of socio-psychological phenomena, and formulating the question of their influence on the behaviour, active position and activity of people in contemporary class society. In their joint works, *The German Ideology* and *The Manifesto of the Communist Party* and in Marx's *The Class Struggles in France*, and *Capital*, Marx and Engels studied questions of the formation of social groups, and drew attention to the need to follow the class principle when solving the problems of relations between individuals and between various groups of people. Marx and Engels also touched on such issues as the effectiveness of collective labour in capitalist and socialist society. They were especially interested in the degree of activeness of individuals and groups during labour activity, on the one hand, under conditions of forced labour, and on the other, of free labour with scope for the individual to demonstrate his potentialities and abilities.

An acquaintance with the works of the founders of scientific communism confirms the groundlessness of the views of some present-day bourgeois scientists who claim that Marxism ignores the psychological factor in social development, making the material factor absolute. Equally false are the assertions by certain foreign philosophers, sociologists and psychologists that, while studying the laws of the class struggle and social development, Marxism ignores the "human factors" paying no attention to the analysis of the individual's psychology, and that Marxism supposedly

dissolves the individual into the collective, sacrificing it to the social principle.

Besides the scientific theory of the emergence and development of society, we find in the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin an explanation of the relationship between social being and social consciousness as well as a profound analysis of the social psychology of different classes, nations, strata and social groups. In the works of Marx and Engels, for the first time in the history of the social sciences, society was seen not as the sum of individual people, an aggregate of individuals, but as a special sum of the relations, links and conditions connecting these individuals to one another.

According to Marx, people are similar or different because they are the products of similar or different social relations. He states: "...The essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations."[1] It is precisely this approach that makes it possible to study and understand the nature of an individual's main personal qualities which are always the unique projection of those complex (class, social, economic, political, cultural, etc.) relations between people that are typical of the world today. Therefore, every individual is always a person living in a certain social epoch, belonging to a certain class or occupying a certain place in the system of relations established in society.

The thesis of the social basis of an individual's main personal traits is one of the cornerstones of Marxist social psychology.

A person's inner world is mediated by the specific nature of his social ties with the outside world, i.e., society. A person's individual consciousness is conditioned by the ideological, political, social and spiritual values of society: "...The development of an individual is determined by the development of all the others with whom he is directly or indirectly associated... The history of a single individual cannot possibly be separated from the history of preceding or contemporary individuals, but is determined

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[1] Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p. 4.

by this history."[1] These words hold the key to the correct scientific approach to the study of people's individual traits. Marx and Engels continue: "The individual *is the social being*. His manifestations of life—even if they may not appear in the direct form of *communal* manifestations of life carried out in association with others—*are* therefore an expression and confirmation of *social life*."[2]

The history of the formation of the methodological principles of present-day social psychology in the USSR is evidence of the fruitfulness of Marxist philosophical principles in the study of man, consciousness and activity. The works of Marx, Engels and Lenin help Soviet psychologists to master the Marxist approach to problems of the psyche and consciousness and teach them to use the principles of materialist dialectics in the analysis of specific social psychological facts.

Lenin's works remain as always a source of scientific psychological thought. They are a constant reference for Soviet psychologists and provide the guidelines for a correct methodological approach to complex present-day problems.

Lenin always paid heed to the mood of the masses and studied the aspirations of the people and its individual strata. He pointed out the necessity of learning to approach the people with particular patience and care in order to understand the peculiar features and unique traits of the psychology of each stratum and group. When speaking of the importance of working out the methodological principles of management psychology under the socialist mode of production, Lenin often stressed that one of the main features of a leader was the ability to work with people, a knowledge of the fundamentals of individual, collective and social psychology.

Lenin's works contain striking examples of profound penetration of the character of the individual and of foresight, on this basis, into the general trend of man's behaviour. The dialectics of his observations on character run as follows: from the analysis of behaviour to its synthesis in the individual's character and psychology; and

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[1] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "The German Ideology", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 438.

[2] Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p. 303.

from the known character to the foreseen and already expected behaviour. His works contain numerous apt and laconic descriptions of chatterboxes, with whom he was especially ruthless, and of day-dreamers and careerists.

Lenin's writings also contain the foundations of a scientific approach to one of the central problems of social psychology—the problem of the individual. His interpretation of the individual develops Marx's thesis of man as the sum total of social relations.

In their works on the individual's activity, Soviet psychologists use the Lenin's idea of the active nature of reflection, the origin of consciousness from labour activity, and of social being's mediation by the material conditions of the life of society. In overcoming the mechanistic interpretation of the individual and various idealistic attempts to mystify the nature and character of human activeness, Soviet social psychology also rests on Lenin's criticism of the attempts to explain human behaviour exclusively on the basis of biology.

In solving the problem of the individual from the Marxist-Leninist position, Soviet social psychology proceeds from the premise that the individual reveals his activeness in his interaction with the surrounding world, i.e., through activity.

Whereas in the book *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats*, Lenin defined psychology as a science "of the dependence of the course of ideas on the course of things", in the work *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* and later in *Philosophical Notebooks*, he expounded the foundations of the theory of reflection which formed the philosophical basis of materialist psychology. The above-mentioned works defined the main possibilities for solving vital psychological and gnoseological problems, above all, the problem of the social basis of the psyche, of the relation of reflection to the reflected, the subjective to the objective and the individual to the social.

These works helped scientists to realise how the transformation of external influences on the inner psychic state of a person occurs, how the reflected is turned into reflection, and how and in what way the social psychological and the typically individual, the personally significant and the socially valuable, are combined within the structure of the individual.

The deterministic interpretation of the individual in

the light of Lenin's doctrine signifies the historical approach to the process of the individual's formation. In early childhood an individual enters a ready-made, historically formed system of social relations. His subsequent development takes place in a specific sphere and in a specific social environment. This is what forms him as an individual. For example, this is how Lenin characterised the conditions for the formation of the individual in tsarist Russia: "The old society was based on the principle: rob or be robbed; work for others or make others work for you; be a slave-owner or a slave. Naturally, people brought up in such a society assimilate with their mother's milk, one might say, the psychology, the habit, the concept which says: you are either a slave-owner or a slave, or else, a small owner, a petty employee, a petty official, or an intellectual—in short, a man who is concerned only with himself, and does not care a rap for anybody else."[1]

However, as Lenin points out, the individual is not the passive product of the social environment, but rather is an active figure. The mastering of social experience is carried out via the individual's "inner world". Activeness is revealed in needs and patterns of behaviour typical of the individual—in varied activity aimed at the transformation of surrounding reality. An individual's activeness is expressed in the views which he holds, conscious of his position and place in life. "Man's consciousness not only reflects the objective world, but creates it."[2]

One of the most important and characteristic aspects of a person is his individuality, the unique combination of his character, predominant feelings, motives of behaviour and formed abilities. Lenin frequently pointed out that communism does not presuppose any levelling of human personalities. "When we say that experience and reason prove that men are *not* equal, we mean by equality, equality in *abilities* or *similarity* in physical strength and mental ability.

"It goes without saying that in this respect men are *not* equal. No sensible person and no socialist forgets this."[3]

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[1] V. I. Lenin, "The Tasks of the Youth Leagues", *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1982, pp. 293-94.

[2] V. I. Lenin, "Conspectus of Hegel's Book *The Science of Logic*", *Collected Works*, Vol. 38, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p. 212.

[3] V. I. Lenin, "A Liberal Professor on Equality", *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 144.

Lenin's elaboration of the question of the dynamics of the mood of the masses became an important contribution to Marxist social psychological theory. So, from this observation of "the flashes of social protest that break out, now in one place, now in another",[1] he deduced the law of the inevitable confluence of even insignificant trends into a single stream, if these trends are directed in the same way and unconsciously voice objective class interests.

Thus, we see that the theoretical heritage of the classics of Marxism-Leninism includes very important theses and conclusions on the manifestation of socio-psychological laws under various historical conditions.

The Development of Soviet Social Psychology

An interest in socio-psychological problems emerged immediately after the October Revolution. It was evoked by the great changes in society, which had a tangible effect on, and caused unprecedented developments in people's psychology.

Psychologists were no longer satisfied with the study of "man in general" as such, existing outside time and space which was characteristic of the old, traditional psychology. The attention of researchers was drawn to the specific, real, historically and socially conditioned individual. It seemed that this interest could be satisfied by the social psychology outlined in the works of Wilhelm Wundt, Gabriel Tarde, William McDougall, Emile Durkheim and Gustave Le Bon abroad, and in the works of Mikhail Lavrov, Nikolai Mikhailovsky, Lev Petrazhitsky, de Roberti, and D. N. Ovsyannikov-Kulikovsky in Russia. However, the obvious methodological groundlessness of these scientific schools, which blatantly psychologised social phenomena and substituted the study of such abstract "motives" of human activity as "the popular soul", "the national spirit", affiliation to a particular ethnic group, etc., for the class approach to the analysis of the laws of social development, and the shakiness of their philosophical foundations, made any direct continuation or development of these trends impossible after the Revolution.

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[1] V. I. Lenin, "Review of Home Affairs", *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 288.

In the initial post-revolutionary period reflexology began to play a prominent role in the science of human behaviour.

Reflexology was a natural-scientific school in psychology founded by Bekhterev, an eminent Russian neuropathologist and psychiatrist. Reflexological theory was based on the thesis that every single conscious or unconscious thought process is, sooner or later, externally manifested in behaviour. Reflexology analysed the external features of a person's actions, facial expressions, gestures, voice and speech, in relation to those physical, biological, and, in particular, social influences both present and past, which condition his behaviour.

However, this approach to the study of highly complex scientific problems, above all of the mechanisms for forming an individual's purposefulness, the specific features of the interaction between the individual and the social environment, the laws of the formation of individual and group standards of behaviour, etc., in practice limited reflexology to the explanation of the most elementary links between the living being and the world. As a result, sociology was swallowed up by biology and psychology by physiology. Regarding the human being chiefly as a physiological species, Bekhterev likewise considered society to be a simple physiological machine. He tried to reduce the laws of the psychology of the masses to the main natural laws (of inertia, equality of counteraction to action). Ignoring the fundamental difference between the organic and inorganic world, the biological and the social in the structure of an individual, and consistently universalising existing physical and biological laws and inventing new ones, Bekhterev established numerous principles (cohesion, reproduction, selection, etc.) to which, he believed, the individual and society were subordinated in their development. As a result, Bekhterev's attempt to discover universal laws of the development of the individual and society naturally failed and his successors and adherents were likewise unable to establish the existence of any such laws.

The reflexological approach was an abstraction even in its application to the specific individual because it did not take into account all the aspects of an individual's behaviour, regarding him merely as a set of interacting physiological systems. The reflexological view of society as the sum total of such biophysiological systems was even more

absurd. It should be said that this kind of approach to the problems of social psychology was to a great extent typical of the 1920s. The works of the famous American biologist of the time, Charles Child, extensively cited by reflexologists, put forward a most explicit formulation of the thesis on the biological nature of social processes. Reflexologists were impressed by Child's thesis, according to which the same processes take place in society as occur in an organism. Child believed that, in practice, the definition of an organism from the consistently physiological point of view could likewise be applied to human society. Social integration is a dynamic integration of human organisms and the human organism is an integration of cells, tissues and organs. Hence he hoped to reveal a fundamental similarity or identity in the general laws and processes of integration which dominate on the one hand in cells, and on the other, in the greatest contemporary states and nations.

Defending materialist social psychology, Marxist criticism exposed the methodological preconditions of reflexology by basing itself on Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*. "Can one imagine anything more sterile, lifeless and scholastic than this string of biological and energeticist terms that contribute nothing, and can contribute nothing, in the sphere of the social sciences?.. In fact, an *enquiry* into social phenomena and an elucidation of the *method* of the sociol sciences *cannot* be undertaken with the aid of these concepts. Nothing is easier than to tack an 'energeticist' or 'biologico-sociological' label on to such phenomena as crises, revolutions, the class struggle and so forth; but neither is there anything more sterile, more scholastic and lifeless than such an occupation."[1] The Marxist thesis that "the transfer of biological concepts *in general* to the sphere of the social sciences is *phrase-mongering*",[2] was used as a weapon in the fight against mechanistic and idealistic theories in the sphere of social psychology.

Vasilyev's "biological sociology", Reisner's "mass psychology" and Voitolovsky's "collective psychology" were unable to solve the problems facing social psychology. In effect, these doctrines were only attempts to translate the psychological school of sociology, essentially an idealistic trend, into the "language of reflexes".

[1] V. I. Lenin, "Materialism and Empirio-criticism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 14, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, pp. 327, 328.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 329.

From the very start, Soviet power came up against immense difficulties in teaching and educating the members of the new socialist society. During the socialist revolution, the Civil War and the period of peaceful construction, a new type of individual began to emerge and take shape, and the age-old dream of past thinkers of the free, harmonious and all-round development of the individual at last became realisable.

Quite naturally, one of the most important problems of social psychology—the interrelations of the individual and the organised collective—was dealt with in the 1920s and 1930s by Soviet psychologists mainly in research into child and school collectives. The establishment and formation of the child collective was declared the main task of education. Moreover, the works of Soviet psychologists showed a marked tendency to regard the individual not only as the object of group community influence, of collective influence, but also, in its turn, as an active entity affecting the course of intra-group relations and processes. Marxist social psychology believes not in the predetermined dependence of the individual on the collective or the suppression of individuality within the collective, or its dissolution in the community, the group, but in the conscious, active position of the individual within the group, the flourishing of individuality, the synthesis of "I" and "We", "Mine" and "Ours". This thesis was at the basis of the study of the individual and the collective and was the main guiding line in social psychological research in subsequent decades. However, this viewpoint only gained the upper hand in science after a period of intense searching and sharp theoretical debate.

The problem of the formation of an individual's personal traits has always occupied a prominent place in psychology. In the 1920s-1930s, two trends emerged in it, one with a sharply defined biological, the other with a sociological bias.

The exponents of "biogenetics" (Y. A. Arkin, I. A. Aryamov and P. P. Blonsky) believed in the spontaneity of an individual's psychic development and the independence of development from education, which they saw merely as an external factor capable of either slowing down or accelerating the expression of certain natural, hereditary psychic qualities. The "sociogeneticists" (A. S. Zaluzhny, S. S. Molozhavy and A. B. Zalkind), on the other hand,

claimed that the individual's immediate surrounding determine the structure of his personal qualities, as well as all his automatically formed adaptive behavioural mechanisms. Moreover, all the most important factors of social formation and development of the individual were slurred over and portrayed as insignificant. The environment was declared to be a determining factor in the development of the individual, while the consciousness was ignored. Whereas Marxist philosophers proceeded from the formula: "My attitude to my environment is my consciousness", sociogeneticists put it another way: "My attitude to my environment is my adaptation, my behaviour". The latter ignored the fact that consciousness resulting from specific social relations is, in its turn, a powerful factor regulating an individual's behavioural acts and his interrelations with the social environment.

Many psychologists in the 1920s concluded that the laws of a collective's behaviour and the patterns of the interpersonal relations of its members should be sought in the laws of collective reflexology and in biology. The collective was defined as a group of interacting people reacting jointly to common stimuli. Thus, in their search for the "common" element, researhers came to a biological understanding of social phenomena in the spirit of collective reflexology.

Neither the biogeneticists nor the sociogeneticists were able to provide an adequate picture of the development of the individual in his social environment, or to discover the role of the collective in the development of the individual's personality. The development of social psychology was slowed down because of the disparity between the tasks of educating the individual in the socialist work collective, and the essentially individualistic, idealistic and mechanistic interpretation of the individual. This contradiction was successfully overcome in later years, mainly in the work of the outstanding Soviet pedagogue, A. S. Makarenko.

Thus, the attempt to create a Marxist social psychology in the 1920s had no tangible success because the scientists working in the field did not have sufficient knowledge of Marxism-Leninism to be able to eliminate social psychology's eclectic combination with reflexology, Freudianism and subjective sociological empiricism. The methods of socio-psychological research were inadequate for the science's wide-ranging tasks.

There were two circumstances among the other factors which impeded the development of social psychology.

The first was that the essential feature of the development of general psychology in the post-revolutionary period in Russia was its opposition to the old, strictly individualistic and idealistic psychology. Since the old psychology was individualistic, the new psychology had to be a social psychology. But if the whole of psychology was a social science, then was there any need for a *special* social psychology? Some regarded this question as quite justified. The situation was also complicated by the fact that in the 1920s, as I mentioned, social psychology was monopolised by reflexologists, who mechanistically abolished the distinctions not only between the human personality and the biological organism, but also between man and society, and united all the sciences of nature, man and society under the banner of reflexology.

The second circumstance impeding the development of social psychology was the permanent misgivings that when studying socio-psychological phenomena, the science had the tendency to substitute itself for historical materialism by psychologising social phenomena.

Of course, it would be wrong to think that these misgivings resulted from the instability and lack of clarity about the actual subject matter of social psychology and of the object and subject of its research. Already in the 1920s, a number of problems in psychology were correctly formulated as problems of social psychology (the problem of psychological relations within the collective and of forms of collective behaviour, for example, the psychological determination of class solidarity, antagonism, hatred, heroism, etc.). Soviet scientists involved in investigating the theoretical foundations of social psychology concluded that, far from being a substitute for historical materialism, social psychology could promote it by elaborating a system of psychological patterns of social behaviour within the collective.

Questions of Psychology in the Works of Nadezhda Krupskaya

Nadezhda Krupskaya, Lenin's wife and colleague, and an outstanding Soviet educationalist, who helped organise the Soviet education system, made an immense contribution

to the elaboration of the fundamental principles of Soviet psychology. Krupskaya's works contain many profound and important pronouncements on the most topical issues of psychology, in particular, on problems of the collective. Krupskaya was among the first to put forward the thesis of the vital role of the school collective in the complex process of the formation of child's personality. She elaborated questions of communist education, stressing the importance of "the ability to live and work in a collective". Along with Makarenko, she laid the scientific foundation for the theory of the collective as a powerful and decisive factor in communist education.

"We are trying," she wrote, "to bring up our children to be fully developed, physically and mentally strong people, not individualists but collectivists, not contrasting themselves to the collective but comprising its strength and increasing its significance... We believe that the personality of a child can only be fully and comprehensively developed in a collective. The collective does not swallow up a child's personality, but influences the quality and content of education."[1]

For Krupskaya, collectivism was not simply a feature of social relations; it was one of the principles of communist morality, of moral behaviour in socialist society. Rightly asserting the objective necessity for the teaching of collectivism, which is required by the very development of socialist society, Krupskaya singled out collectivism as the predominant trait of a Soviet person. She gave a detailed explanation of this concept: collectivism is comradeship, mutual assistance, good organisation and good discipline. "...School should teach children to associate, to set common goals and common tasks, and to solve these tasks through joint effort... Comradely cohesion and the habit of acting collectively creates new people, children with collective feelings and collective thoughts... Children must learn to live and work in an organised way, but this cannot be achieved without knowledge and without school."[2]

Addressing Soviet teachers, Krupskaya spoke of the need to educate collectivists, i.e., people capable of subordinat-

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[1] N. K. Krupskaya, "The Pioneer Movement as an Educational Problem", *Educational Works* in ten volumes, Vol. 5, Moscow, 1959, p. 205 (in Russian).

[2] N. K. Krupskaya, "The Soviet School", *Educational Works* in ten volumes, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1958, p. 198-99 (in Russian).

ing the personal to the social. Moreover, she stressed in particular, that when speaking of education, one should not ignore friendship, voluntary social activity, collective work and the ability to work for a common cause. At the very basis of communist relations lies the idea of joint, socially useful activity. School life and participation in the activity of primary school collectives (classes, detachments and teams) is one of the areas where this ability is acquired and formed. The very existence of a children's organisation is of exceptional educational significance. The child, and later the adolescent and youth, become accustomed to thinking of the interests of the common cause, of the collective as a whole, and what is more, not just of their own primary collective, but also of the whole school. Krupskaya pointed out that a child should begin living a collective life as soon as possible. In her discussions with pioneer leaders, teachers and parents, she constantly stressed that the way a pupil's life is organised in the class or school collective can sometimes determine whether that child grows up a whole person, a fighter and patriot, capable of putting his whole heart into a common cause.

The important conclusion from this is that a pupil's entire activity should be of a collective nature. Games, labour, studies and other kinds of activity should be organised in such a way as to promote the formation of collectivist principles, to strengthen and develop the spirit of friendly support and mutual assistance, and to encourage the ability to subordinate, when necessary, the personal to the collective. Krupskaya warned teachers of the mistake of opposing collective activity to individual. The results of joint work cannot but depend on the quality of each individual's work (all pupils should be made to see this during the learning process).

Krupskaya underlined the great importance of children's joint experience during competitions in various subjects and sports and in the organisation of Pioneer, Komsomol and other meetings, and school parties for the cohesion of the class collective. Collective emotional experience accompanying varied socially useful activity promotes the formation of a collective, brings pupils closer and teaches them to empathise with others.

Krupskaya described adolescence as the age when an individual strives for self-assertion and self-realisation, and she drew the attention of teachers and educationalists to

the need for extensive organisational, ideological and educational work with classes. She called for the kind of organisation of work that, firstly, would help children to reveal their capabilities and gifts, consolidate what had been accomplished and provide guidelines for further effort, and secondly, that would involve all pupils. All Krupskaya's educational activity was aimed at proving that the development of the truly free individual is possible only within the collective, and, moreover, in the new, socialist collective. Resolutely exposing the attempts of vulgarisers to reduce the collective to an aggregate composed of mutually replaceable parts, or to regard it as a kind of biological mechanism, Krupskaya opposed the mechanistic application of biological or physical laws to social relations. She stressed that the collective was, in essence, a "social force" and constantly fought against reflexology's penetration of education and teaching theory, defending the Marxist interpretation of the individual as the subject and object of social relations. She also drew attention to socio-psychological aspects in the age-based approach to the direction of the development of child and youth collectives.

The specific feature of the psychology of the transitional age is that it is the psychology of a half-child, half-adult. Like a child, the adolescent eagerly absorbs all impressions and is growing both physically and mentally. He senses this growth and draws strength and courage from it. However, he still does not know his own strength and has to test it. The need for activeness, the free application of this strength, albeit in games is acutely felt at this age.

But at the same time the adolescent is no longer a child. He already has quite a large, and sometimes even harsh, experience of life. He can no longer live with a child's illusions and has quite different, adult interests. He is not opposed to playing, but the game must have a point.

At this age, young people are capable of wholehearted passions and boundless enthusiasm. But these passions and enthusiasm quickly fade if they cannot be expressed in some kind of action, lively activity that is fascinating for the adolescent, and not just mental, but also purely physical.

Krupskaya's psychological analysis leads her to conclusions which are very close to Makarenko's well-known theses, based on a profound knowledge of the adolescent ("collective emotions", "prospects for further development", "the transformation of external means of behavioural organ-

isation into means of inner organisation, and into a criterion for the inner evaluation of actions", etc.).

Krupskaya was always guided by principle and showed exceptional perspicacity in her definitions of psychological problems. In the early 1920s, the concept of "moral insanity" came into use among psychologists and educationalists. It then existed on a par with the concept of mentally retarded children.

The 1923 editions of the journal *Na putyakh k novoi shkole* (Paths to a New School System) contained two articles, one by Blonsky and the other by Krupskaya, which put forward a fundamental scientific criticism of the theory of "moral insanity". Krupskaya gave a precise, philosophical qualification of the term "morally insane children" as a vile bourgeois term which has penetrated into Soviet education. She showed that this term presupposes the existence of some eternal, unshakeable moral laws somewhere outside the consciousness and established externally: "These moral laws live in the soul and a person who does not know them is morally insane. This is the view of philosophical idealism."[1] For a Marxist, the term "morally insane" is absolutely unacceptable. Krupskaya concludes that there are harrassed, embittered, exhausted and sick children, but there is no such thing as a morally insane child.[2]

The conclusions of the prominent Soviet psychologist Blonsky, had much in common with the thoughts expressed by Krupskaya. "The apologists of 'moral insanity' are at least a hundred years behind in their scientific development and their views can boldly be called archaic. But this archaic science is far from harmless when it begins to be applied to the children of Soviet Russia... When such an 'educational psychologist' comes into contact with the children of the Revolution, of the working class, he often uses the Latin term meaning 'morally insane children', not daring to say overtly 'hopelessly depraved children'. And precisely because the doctrine of moral insanity more often than not conceals the most despicable and malicious political reaction in education, it should be sharply criticised."

Krupskaya's and Blonsky's articles supplemented each other perfectly in destroying the theoretical basis of this harmful psychological and educational doctrine.

[1] N. K. Krupskaya, "On the Issue of Morally Insane Children", *Educational Works* in ten volumes, Vol. 2, p. 151.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 151-53.

The Role of Anton Makarenko in the Development of Soviet Social Psychology

Makarenko's doctrine on the collective, based on the experience of his educational work, gave a considerable impetus to the elaboration of the problems of social psychology.

The problem of the individual and the collective is central to Makarenko's psychological conception, and it was formulated as the question of interrelations between the individual and the collective, the prospective trends of development of the individual, the formation of the individual's motivational sphere, and the shaping of his character.

Makarenko formulated the key problems of the social psychology of the individual and the collective in sharp polemic with the biogenetic and sociogenetic interpretations of the relations between the individual and the collective. Criticising the above-mentioned definition of the collective, Makarenko was violently opposed to solving vital socio-psychological problems at the level of reflexological theory. "It is obvious to any unprejudiced person that this [the definition of the collective—*Auth.*] is a definition of a collective of frogs, monkeys, molluscs, polyps, anything you like, but not of humans," he wrote.[1]

Makarenko's idea of the collective predetermined the question of the individual's place in the collective and the system of social relations: "A collective is a purposeful group of organised individuals who possess the organs of a collective. Where there is the organisation of a collective, one finds the organs of a collective and the organisation of people authorised and trusted by the collective. And the question of the relations between comrades is not a question of friendship, love or neighbourliness, but of responsible dependence."[2]

This formulation of the question made it possible for the educator, by changing the position of the individual in

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[1] A. S. Makarenko, "The History of the Dzerzhinsky Commune", *Collected Works* in seven volumes, Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, p. 396 (in Russian).

[2] A. S. Makarenko, "Problems of Soviet School Education", *Collected Works* in seven volumes, Vol. V, Moscow, 1957, p. 210.

the collective, to considerably influence the formation of that individual, and in such a way that the pupil was not even aware of being the object of education.

Makarenko attached tremendous importance to the study of individual traits. For Makarenko, the aim of the educational process was the inculcation in the individual of specific traits, i.e., the moulding of the character and stimulating of those trends of individual development that can be clearly discerned in the child. He pointed out the following traits, synthesising them into an overall complex: "a person's general state within the collective, the nature of his collective interrelations and reactions, his sense of discipline, his readiness for action and inhibition, his degree of tact and orientation, his adherence to principles and his emotional aspirations".[1] This list reflects a profound psychological analysis of the essential traits of a Soviet person. This is confirmed by Makarenko's specific plan for studying pupils and also by the remarkable character descriptions compiled on pupils, which laconically and aptly depict the planned and already formed character traits.

Makarenko made a profound study of the individual's motivational sphere and the mechanisms of the formation of his socially valuable traits. The central place in this is occupied by the formation and development of needs. "The whole point of educational work and that of the family collective, in particular, is the selection and cultivation of human needs, of raising them to the level of high moral standards which is only possible in a classless society, and which can alone make a person strive for future self-improvement."[2]

Makarenko's works contained a broad and bold programme for studying the driving force of the development of the individual, in which the cultivation of the needs of the "collectivist" was assigned the dominant role. "The need of a collectivist, i.e., of a person linked to his collective by a common goal of movement, by a unity of struggle and a real and indisputable sense of his duty to society, is a morally justified need.

"Here, need goes hand in hand with duty, responsibility

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[1] A.S.Makarenko, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

[2] A. S. Makarenko, "A Book for Parents", *Collected Works* in seven volumes, Vol. IV, Moscow, 1957, p. 39

and abilities. It is the manifestation of the interests not of a consumer of social benefits, but of an active member of socialist society, a creator of these benefits."[1]

Makarenko was among the first to reveal to Soviet psychologists the possibility of analysing the formation in work and social activity of a harmoniously developed human individual. One of his most important traits as a psychologist was his overcoming of the passively contemplative approach to the psychological analysis of the individual. "The knowledge of one's pupil should come to the teacher not through impersonal study, but through joint work with the pupil and through active assistance. The teacher should regard his pupil not as the object of study but as the object of education."[2] Makarenko's works begin a long series of studies of the psychology of the individual and its development within the collective, based on active involvement in the individual's life and activity in the course of communist education.

Makarenko's role lay not so much in the fact that he noticed the influence of the collective on the individual (many had done this before him), but that he was able to explain the more progressive ideas in this field and make general conclusions from the Marxist point of view and, by putting them into practice, make a great step forward in laying the foundations of the theory of the collective.

A collective does not take shape and become cohesive in any activity, but only in the activity which makes up the main content of the collective's life, i.e., which is stimulated by actual motives. Makarenko based adolescent participation in this activity on the real development of self-management, with the pupils themselves becoming organisers responsible for a common task, who conceive ideas and plan and control the implementation of those ideas. An important principle of Makarenko's educational system was to provide every individual with an active role in a fundamental activity related to actual motives.

It is hard to overestimate Makarenko's contribution to the elaboration of the fundamental principles of Marxist-Leninist social psychology. The subsequent development of Soviet social psychology was based extensively on the creative study and further development of his ideas.

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

[2] A. S. Makarenko, "Methods of Organising the Educational Process", *Collected Works* in seven volumes, Vol. V, p. 91.

The intensive study of the collective, the position of the individual in the group and the active interaction between individual and society gained significant scope in the late 1950s and early 1960s. A number of tasks were set by the Communist Party for the social sciences, in the complex solution of which social psychology had an important role: the socio-psychological problems of increasing the cohesion of work collectives; the inculcation of a communist attitude to work; the raising of labour productivity by encouraging collectivism and the feeling of responsibility for the fulfilment of a task; and the formation in the individual of a communist ideals, in accordance with the requirements of the communist moral code. One of the most fundamental problems of psychology today—the problem of the individual and the collective, or rather of the active interaction of individuals within the collective and with the collective—still remains at the centre of socio-psychological research.

The major aspects of this problem are related to the study of the features of individual interaction in the collective, the analysis of the formation of the individual and group standards during active work, and the search for ways to increase group and collective cohesion.

It is quite obvious that social psychology is also of great significance as an applied field of knowledge. Economy, culture and ideological work, as well as education, make great demands on social psychology. The rapid growth of psychological sciences can no longer be explained merely by the laws inherent in scientific development. It is the result of the demands made on the psychological study of human beings by the scientific and technological revolution and the task of building communism in the USSR. Interest in man, the realisation of the importance of the "human factor" in industry and economic management, are a powerful stimulus for the development of social psychology as a theoretical and applied science.

It is impossible to run a collecive or production or any area of socialist construction efficiently without taking account of the changes occurring in the psychological sphere of the individual under the influence of the increasing demands being made on man by the industrial and social relations developing in mature socialist society.

The development of social psychology in the USSR was

affected by the lack of an experimental basis in the initial period of its emergence as a science. Although Makarenko's writings and practical educational activity not only contained the principles of educational psychological and socio-psychological natural experimentation, but also reflected the extensive practical application of this experimental work, the definition and evaluation of socio-psychological phenomena were given by psychologists mainly on the basis of observations and were thus highly speculative. The idea that it was impossible to use experimental methods in the cognition of social phenomena, that emerged in Soviet philosophical literature, contributed considerably to this state of affairs. This mistaken view was rejected in the discussions held in the late 1950s and early 1960s, during the rapid growth of applied sociology and social psychology.

At present, socio-psychological problems are being successfully worked out by many scientific groups at the Social Psychology Departments of Moscow and Leningrad Universities, at the Institute of Psychology of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Research Institute of General and Educational Psychology of the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, and in a number of other universities and institutes. Psychologists are studying the phenomena of social perception, which encompass a wide range of problems connected with the revelation of the laws of individuals' perception and understanding of one another for the purposes of optimising communication between people. Comprehensive research is being conducted into socio-psychological relations in work, academic, sporting and military collectives, in connection with the tasks of collective management and the aims of communist education. The most important parameters of interpersonal relations in collectives are being studied: cohesion, compatibility, collectivism, etc. In the course of this work, a large group of Soviet social psychologists has formed, systematically exchanging scientific data and jointly conducting extensive experimental and theoretical research (G. M. Andreyeva, A. A. Bodalev, L. P. Buyeva, Y. S. Kuzmin, A. I. Kitov, I. S. Kon, Y. L. Kolominsky, A. M. Stolyarenko, B. D. Parygin, A. V. Petrovsky, K. K. Platonov, L. I. Umansky, A. V. Filippov, Y. A. Sherkovin, Y. V. Shorokhova, V. A. Yadov and others).

There is considerable interest in socio-psychological is-

sues in other socialist countries. The works of Hans Hiebsch, Manfred Vorwerg and Ferenc Pataki, concentrate on the problems of the social adaptation of the individual in work collectives, the socio-psychological aspects of leadership optimisation in primary collectives and on questions of the psychological preconditions of creative work. Their works have been translated into many languages and aroused great interest among psychologists of various countries and of various trends.

Evaluating the present stage of the development of social psychology, one can say with confidence that this important branch of psychology is expanding. Soviet psychologists, guided by the principal tenets of Marxism and basing themselves on substantial practical experience, are laying down the foundations of present-day socio-psychological theory.

CHAPTER III

The Small Group and the Collective

The "Molecule" of Interpersonal Relations

During the first fifty years after psychology split away from philosophy in the 1860s-1870s and came into its own as a science, its subject matter remained the psyche, the soul of the individual, existing, as it were, outside time and the social environment, in the closed circle of the Ego. Senses, emotions, memory and thought were studied independently and it was never assumed that individual psychic processes could be affected by the presence or absence of other people, that by acting and communicating with one another, people feel and think not as isolated individuals, but as members of various communities that made an imprint on all the psychic manifestations of the individual.

The second fifty years were marked by the flourishing of social psychology, which elucidated the laws of interpersonal relations and studied groups, the individual within the group, and specific features of communication and interaction.

Leon Festinger, a prominent American social psychologist noted that the study of group dynamics was undertaken in order to establish why some groups have influence on their members and others do not. In order to explain this phenomenon of obvious broad practical significance, it was necessary to discover the laws of group development that would make it possible to predict a group's ability to influence the attitudes and behaviour of its members.

Now, more and more critical judgements are being made and the fateful word "crisis" is uttered among psychologists in the USA, where social psychology began developing first and where, one would think, it should have advanced the furthest. At the 20th Psychological Congress in Tokyo

in 1972, the American psychologist William McGuire spoke longingly of the idyllic period of the 18th Congress in 1966 when social psychology was inundated with grey-haired colonels, enterprising young men and enthusiastic young women. He likened the state of the science in 1972 to the peaceful sleep of a moth on a church bell and asked what would happen to the moth when the bell started to ring?

Of course, McGuire was to a certain extent right. The methodological crisis undermining American psychology today is a sad reality. American psychologists themselves give a number of explanations for the crisis: the data of socio-psychological laboratory experiments does not correspond to social reality; the professional incompetence of researchers who undertake to solve practical tasks without sufficient scientific information, and much more. And yet, the main cause of the unfavourable consequences of the rapid development of social psychology in the USA lies in its methodological weakness. And this fact is perhaps most obvious in research into group psychology.

American social psychology characteristically lacks a general theoretical basis for understanding various socio-psychological phenomena. The regularities of behaviour within different groups are essentially reduced to mechanistic dependences, e.g. the group exerts pressure and the group members either yield or do not yield (conformism, nonconformism); the group is attracted by some individuals and repulsed by others, or, vice versa, repels them itself; if the number of contacts within the group increases, the group becomes more cohesive, whereas if the number of members increases, the group links become weaker and break (cohesion and compatibility), and so on. There was a time when behaviourism—one of the most influential trends in American psychology—was willing to view the human being chiefly as a mechanism reacting to various stimuli. Now, the descendants of behaviourism and other theoretical trends in social psychology are prepared to view any social group as just such a mechanical aggregate of interrelated and interacting individuals.

But does "any social group" also include the collective? This is where the dividing line lies between Soviet and Western psychology with regard to method.

Soviet psychologists have always been interested in the psychological problems of the formation and functioning of the collective. They see in the latter a link between the

individual and society, and emphasise the fundamental importance of the collective in socialist society, especially at the present stage of scientific and technological progress in the USSR. Naturally, during the elaboration of the fundamental principles of social psychology, Soviet psychologists had to define their attitude to the main concept of group dynamics—the small group—and, having analysed it, to correlate this concept with the concept of the collective.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the correct approach to the socio-psychological phenomena which arise during the interaction of a collective's members: collective cohesion; the psychological atmosphere in the collective; the members' perception of the collective; the general state and self-esteem of the individual in the collective; the prospects of the individual in the collective in relation to the prospects of the collective itself, and so on. In order to solve all these problems, Soviet psychology could use, and in a number of cases successfully did use, the accumulated experience of the formation of collectives, in particular in the work of Makarenko. Makarenko's conception of the collective as a group of people united by common goals of activity and subject to the goals of society, has become generally accepted in Soviet psychology.

In the 1960s, as mentioned above, the requirements of scientific and technological progress in the country called for an intensive study of the socio-psychological problems of collective life: industrial, scientific, academic and military collectives, as well as other groups associated in some special way. Most authors in this field regard the collective as a specific type of small group. "The theory of small groups is a special sociological theory, the subject of which is the structure and functioning of small social associations (collectives), and their interaction with society and the individual."[1]

K. K. Platonov defined the collective as a group of people comprising a part of society, united by the common goals of that society.[2]

These definitions are on the whole quite legitimate, but one should point out that while stressing the social aims

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[1] *Philosophical Encyclopaedia*, Moscow, 1970, Vol. 5, p. 213 (in Russian).

[2] K. K. Platonov, "General Problems of the Theory of Groups and Collectives", *The Collective and Individual*, Moscow, 1975, p. 13 (in Russian).

of the joint activity of the collective, the authors of these definitions did not refer to socially significant goals to explain the specific relations within the collective. Thus, the differences between the collective and the small group were examined mainly from the sociological point of view, but much less attention was paid to them in the sphere of socio-psychological research proper, which studies the specific nature of the mechanisms of interpersonal relations in the collective as compared to other groups.

By the beginning of the 1970s, "areas of growth" had included research into group differentiation, problems of group compatibility and cohesion, certain questions of social perception (mainly one person's perception of another), and also problems of individual behaviour under group pressure (the problem of conformity). It became clear that the correct sociological understanding of the essence of the collective, for all its fundamental significance, could not in itself guarantee the solution of numerous specific psychological problems, chiefly those connected with the differential diagnostics of groups and collectives and with qualitative and quantitative research into their most important parameters. Strictly speaking, the real socio-psychological task of scientifically interpreting interpersonal relations in the collective was turned into a methodological problem: the need was acknowledged for the elaboration and application of adequate experimental methods for the study of collectives and the individual in the collective. The limitedness of existing experimental methods was felt all round. Researchers displayed great interest in systems of measurement that would enable one, when studying the processes of group dynamics, to operate with quantitative characteristics to supplement the mainly descriptive approach to socio-psychological phenomena. Under these circumstances, a whole series of socio-psychological laboratories in Moscow, Leningrad, Minsk and other scientific centres, while continuing their search for new original ways to solve the problems facing them, turned to the works of American and European psychologists in the hope of finding the necessary experimental methodology. What could Western science offer them in this respect?

The numerous works aimed at the study of small groups, where interrelations and interactions between individuals take place, stand out in the spectrum of American socio-psychological research. Bypassing a fairly long history,

one can say that this type of research was sparked off by a seminar on small groups at Harvard in 1946, which chose both the corresponding problems and the psychologists interested in their elaboration (Robert Bales, Alvin Zander, Dorwin Cartwright and others). The clearly designated field of experimental study, the inventiveness in developing methods and finally, the very promising prospects for understanding the mechanism of the interaction of individuals in the course of joint productive activity, all helped to make this one of the most popular fields of social psychology.

However, what was this psychological theory like which formed the basis of numerous studies on the small group in the West? The small group was mainly regarded in the light of emotional relations (sympathy, antipathy, indifference, isolation, complaisance, activeness, submission, aggression, etc.). The frequency of interactions to which many other group parameters are connected, was acknowledged to be almost the main objective criterion of the small group.

According to this theory, the small group is a set of people associated with one another over a certain period of time (G. Homans); an association of interacting individuals in direct (face to face) contact, or a series of contacts in which each group member has a perception of all the others (A. Hare). These and other similar definitions were distinguished by the fact that on the one hand, the traits of the small group were deliberately psychologised and taken out of their wider social context, which gives the status of reality to any acting group (that is, if one is not talking of laboratory models), and on the other, the strictly "psychological" part of the definition was reduced to an indication of superficial links and relations in the group and was deliberately oversimplified. This interpretation of the small group obviously could not serve as a basis for the construction of an adequate socio-psychological theory of the collective. At the same time, it was this trend in the study of the links between individuals that had the greatest variety of specific methods. And it was to this trend that Soviet social psychologists turned, intending to use the experimental methods worked out by their American colleagues for the study of collectives, and in particular, group differentiation, group cohesion and compatibility, conformity, the degree of resistance to group pressure, group leadership, and so on.

It should be noted that the application of experimental techniques used in American psychology was usually accompanied in the Soviet Union by philosophical criticism of the views of the originators of these methods. One such method was Jacob Moreno's spiritualist theory of the "tele" current which supposedly establishes an irrational and, essentially, mystical basis for interpersonal communication in small groups. Many Soviet studies on the problem of conformism and resistance to group pressure rightly pointed out that it was wrong to interpret broadly the conclusions of small group studies and to extend them to social life in general. But, at the same time, it was tacitly acknowledged, as it were, that, having undergone this "purifying" criticism, Western experimental methods could be widely used to obtain a representative socio-psychological characteristics of the collective. These "growing pains" in Soviet social psychology were the result of the following factors in the sphere of the methodology of the particular research.

First, the majority of Soviet researchers regarded the collective, as mentioned above, only from the point of view of its social characteristics. When referring to the collective, psychologists mainly underlined the social purposefulness of the activity of groups being studied, while their particular socio-psychological quality, which forms the inner aspect of the life and functioning of these groups, was essentially neglected. The term "collective" was, as it were, pushed out of the mass of socio-psychological concepts and became a term used only to supplement the synonyms for the concept "small group" in the interpretation of practical experimental material. As a result, the experimenter's subjective examination of the collective within its own psychological context was not made a sufficiently special task.

Second, the fact was overlooked that the methods of studying small groups in American social psychology, as should be the case in any sphere of knowledge, were closely linked to a definite understanding of the subject matter of research. Meanwhile, underlying these methods lay the essentially mechanistic interpretation of interaction in any small group where the individual is subjected to various types of forces (pressure, resistance, attraction, repulsion, cohesion, etc.), and where the links between individuals are for the most part emotional. Moreover, if the aims and tasks of the group and the connection of its activity with

the ideals and values of society were recognised, they were not actually taken into account during experimentation. Eventually, it was found that the "stimulus-reaction" principle at the basis of socio-psychological research was trapping researchers in the circle of well-known behaviourist schemes.

Finally, the desire in the name of experimental "purity" to ignore the content of group activity and work mainly with insignificant material and with chance associations of people—diffuse groups and human conglomerations —and in general to formalise research, resulted in it being impossible to use the resulting conclusions with reference to real groups united by common and significant aims and values. To use an historical analogue, one may recall the failure at the beginning of this century of "experimental didactics" in the attempt to extend the application of certain laws of memory, noticed by the German psychologist Hermann Ebbinghaus in his research into memorising nonsense syllables (artificial combinations of speech elements), to include the memorising of academic material which required concentrated learning. Incidentally, several important conclusions were made by Ebbinghaus in the field of memory psychology not because of but rather despite his persistent tendency to stray away from real situations and specific processes of memorising, with the aid of quasi-speech elements. This was because the participants, according to the experimenter himself, involuntarily interpreted the nonsense material offered to them.

On the whole, there have been many instances in science when the attempt to study a problem in its simplest mathematical form, has led in research to the loss of the very quality at which the research was aimed. In the field of social psychology this kind of result is particularly undesirable. For example, the fully justifiable desire to study comprehensively such a complicated phenomenon as the collective frequently leads, as a result of systematised research, to a superficial notion of the collective as a group of mechanically interacting people. By "simplifying" the task in an attempt to avoid mathematical difficulties, it is easy, by taking this short cut, to lose the specific qualities of the object of research. Meanwhile, socio-psychological research into the collective should reveal precisely this specific qualitative characteristic which is not reducible to links of the "stimulus-reaction" type.

Unfortunately, this interpretation of the collective, deprived of its qualitative characteristic was adopted in a number of socio-psychological studies. The methods used were calculated to study the collective as a group of interacting people who, judging by the content of the experiment, were linked to one another by anything, but certainly not by common socially determined tasks, aims and values. The individual, in this case, belonged to a given group merely superficially. The results of these studies corresponded to the hypothetical model of the object of research tentatively assumed in the experiment. Indeed, they could not do otherwise.

The sharp methodological criticism of Western psychologists' attempts to make the small group an analogue of society and to substitute psychological laws for the laws of society's historical development did for a long period not affected the main point of the theory of group dynamics—the patterns of the functioning of small groups and the interpersonal relations within them. Moreover, certain Soviet psychologists believed that, in fact, one could interpret these patterns as universal and capable of explaining the interconnections between people in any group, including the special type of group called the collective.

In order to find the correct theoretical solution to this problem the latent mechanism of group dynamics, the "cell", or "molecule" of interpersonal relations had to he discovered. This would make it possible to understand what formed the real basis of interpersonal links in the group in general, and in the collective, as a special type of group, in particular. It would then be possible to determine the future strategy of the development of Soviet social psychology of groups and collectives and the study of interpersonal relations in general. Metaphorically speaking, a decision had to be made whether Soviet social psychology should roll its stone to the top of the pyramid built by foreign, and mainly American, psychologists, or should take the pyramid to pieces and, laying a new cornerstone, start to build a new one.

With this general methodological task in mind, we turned in the late 1960s to the problem of the individual's conformity within the group, a subject on which extensive experimental material had been accumulated over the preceding 20-30 years, and sufficiently impressive and apparently reliable conclusions had been reached.

Conformism or Collectivism?

Looking back at a notebook from 1969, I came across a reference to a highly interesting conversation. "Look carefully around you and you will see that it is one of the most important laws ever discovered by psychology. The wisest, cruellest and most beneficial law. It both depersonalises an individual and protects him. Why don't all these people go downstairs and sit down to eat? We are all tired and hungry. What are we waiting for? Of course, we want someone to decide for us, for some person to break through the invisible nets of conformism cast on us by God or the devil for the questionable pleasure of living peacefully in the society of similar individuals."

We were standing in the huge foyer of London's Royal Festival Hall after the closing of the 19th International Psychological Congress. Delegates and guests were sharing impressions, exchanging personal cards and copies of papers, and occasionally glancing through the banisters at the white rectangular tables in the banquet hall below. However, the broad staircase remained empty. A middle-aged lady from Harvard, a specialist in social psychology even at the meal continued discussing the problems of conformism. As she explained her ideas, she kept repeating: "That is my point of view." But I knew very well that such views were in fact held by practically all American social psychologists.

Basically, these views were: a person is included in various groups which have a strong effect, a suggestive influence on him. Under group influence, the individual accepts the groups' judgements and beliefs, bringing his own actions into line with what the group expects of, rather, with what he believes the group should expect of him. And a dilemma arises of its own accord that must be solved in relation to each person. Either he is a conformist, glancing around at every step so as not to act in a way contrary to others, a compromiser at heart, or a nonconformist, a negativist rebelling against all social prohibitions and restrictions and acting contrary to the accepted standards of behaviour and to the demands of society.

This movement has since gone out of fashion, but then, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, London's busy Piccadilly Circus and Trafalgar Square were crowded with hippies. They lounged on the littered pavements in their

fantastic rags, shaggy-haired and dirty, embracing one another, snoring gently, sucking Coca-Cola through straws out of cans, smoking and placidly puffing out smoke, while perfectly respectable English people passed by.

This was how these two opposites coexisted, glancing defiantly at each other: the modern-day savage with a torn goatskin on his bare unwashed body and cowboy trousers with fringes from the knee down, and the spiritual twin of H. G. Wells' croquet player, whom not even the imminent end of the world could make violate the conventions of high society. Our colleagues from the USA, Britain and Japan insisted that either you were a conformist or a nonconformist. There was no other alternative. And indeed, they had formal logic on their side; a dichotomy allows no third alternative.

However, before we go any further, was it really correct to call hippies nonconformists? Of course they did represent a protest against their social environment and they did behave in a way contrary to the social norm. But, on closer inspection, it became clear that, however paradoxical, hippies were no less conformist than the respectable English people gazing at them with disapproval. All these young people were rigidly bound by responsibilities and requirements with the social group which formed their microenvironment. And, in fact, their extravagant clothes, rags, dented top hats, copper crosses and chains hanging on their bare chests were just as rigidly regulated and established by corresponding custom as dinner jackets, tails and evening gowns are in high society. For example, had a hippy taken the trouble to wash properly, he would evidently have been condemned by other hippies, something he feared. He feared isolation from his group. And there is nothing at all strange in the fact that today many hippies who have returned to the heart of bourgeois decency do not permit themselves any divergence from commonly accepted fashion. Thus, on closer inspection, nonconformism turned out to be inverted conformism, and the controversy formulated above to be fictitious, psychologically speaking.

I expressed these thoughts to that same lady from Harvard.

"But if you are right," she objected, "then every single one of us is a conformist. Perhaps under your social system, where the role of the collective..."

But this was the crossroads where our paths divided, I thought.

Psychologists and sociologists in capitalist countries hint rather transparently that every person who is guided by the opinion of the majority and acts as a member of a collective is already a conformist. Moreover, they are not opposed to portraying Soviet people, collectively building communist society, as conformists through and through. But it is not difficult to see that in doing this, they are attributing the faults of their own social system to the USSR. However, we were participants and guests at the Congress and it would have been improper to switch this psychological discussion into the sphere of politics. One could easily continue the argument on the grounds of scientific psychology.

It was at this 19th Psychological Congress that I presented a paper called "Conformism and Collectivism", which, strictly speaking, formed the beginning of our research into the individual in the collective.

Beginning with the experiments of Solomon Asch and Muzafer Sherif (USA, 1940s), it was considered an established fact that under the influence of group pressure, at least one third of all individuals change their views and adopt those imposed by the majority, revealing an unwillingness to express or defend their own opinion when it does not coincide with the evaluations of the other participants in the experiment, in other words, manifesting conformity. Under group pressure, the individual can either be a conformist, or a nonconformist. All subsequent studies merely specified this conclusion. The questions of whether conformity increases in proportion to group size, and how the participants interpret their conforming behaviour were elucidated and the sexual and age aspects of conforming reactions were revealed.

The choice of a conformist or nonconformist position became a specific educational dilemma: should one regard the point of education as the moulding of individuals capable of resisting the influence of the social environment, the group or collective; or should one educate individuals with a tendency to agree with others, unwilling and unable to withstand the influence of the group, i.e. conformists. The obvious inadequacy of this formulation of the question indicated the erroneousness of the original alternative. The very conception of the essence of individual and group

interaction obviously concealed a serious methodological error which continually led psychologists into an impasse. The only way out it seemed, was to completely revise the conceptions of group dynamics and to find out the degree of legitimacy of the application of models of group interaction contained in group dynamics.

Group interaction and group pressure... It seemed that group dynamics took the social factor into consideration, but on closer examination, this turned out not to be the case. The group which influences the individual in the classic experiments by Solomon Asch, Richard Crutchfield and Muzafer Sherif, is a chance association of people, what one would call a "diffuse group" (as opposed to cohesive). The experiment was intended to study the purely mechanical influence of the group on the individual, the group being a simple aggregate of individuals with nothing connecting them except time and place.

The study of conformity was conducted with the aid of "dummy groups". Either a group of people was used whose intention was to misinform the "naive" isolated individual, or the experimenter deliberately distorted information coming from the group by controlling the lines of communication between the group and the individual being studied. This method was intended for the solution of insignificant tasks. For example, the participants were asked to determine the length of a straight line, short intervals of time, and so on.

Let me cite one such experiment. The participants were trained over a certain period to determine the length of one minute without using watches or counting the seconds to themselves. Soon they were able to calculate a minute with a five second error either way. Then they were placed in special experimental booths and asked to determine a minute and, by pressing a button, to inform the experimenter and also the other participants when they believed a minute had passed (the participants knew that on pressing the button, a light would come on on the experimenter's control panel and in all the other booths). During the experiment, the experimenter could give a signal in all the booths, supposedly coming from one of the participants (for example, a signal was given after 35 seconds), and to record who hurried to press their buttons in response, demonstrating suggestibility, and whom the signal did not affect. One could judge the degree of suggestibility from

the difference between the estimation of the length of a minute during the preliminary experiments and during experiments when a false signal was given.

This experiment showed that the number of participants manifesting varying degrees of suggestibility was very large. Continuing with the experiment it became possible to pick out individuals with a tendency to conformity. For instance, if after some time individuals were again given the task of estimating the length of a minute, but without the group, some reverted to their initial (correct) estimation, when group pressure was removed. The rest continued to show the time interval indicated earlier by the dummy group's false signal. Evidently the former, not wishing to appear different from the group, merely formally adopted the group's view and easily rejected it as soon as pressure was removed (tendency to conformity), whereas the latter implicitly adopted the "general view" and adhered to it in future (tendency to suggestibility).

This study, which was carried out under the guidance of V. F. Safin 15 years ago in our laboratory[1], proceeded from the conception of submission or resistance to group pressure and repeated the main aspects of Crutchfield's research. Criticism of the American ideas of conformism in this and many other Soviet works boiled down to the assertion that it was impermissible to transfer the experimental psychological situations described by Asch to social life in general. This, in itself, was a correct criticism, but inadequate for an evaluation of the conception of "group pressure" and for the establishment of a correct methodological attitude to this conception. This study involuntarily glossed over the essentially mechanistic interpretation of interrelations in the group, where the individual was subjected to the forces of attraction and repulsion and its scale of values, if acknowledged, was not really taken into account.

The conception of "group pressure" made it possible to discover the specific features of certain forms of the

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[1] The Psychology of the Individual Laboratory at the General and Educational Psychology Research Institute of the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences (the laboratory is headed by Professor A. V. Petrovsky). The author refers to works by his colleagues and students: R. S. Nemov, A. S. Morozov, Y. V. Yanotovskaya, Y. V. Shchedrina, V. V. Shpalinsky, M. A. Turevsky, V. A. Petrovsky, and others.

individual's interaction with the group and of emerging phenomena of conformity or suggestibility, but at the same time, it unwittingly confined researchers to the vicious circle of ideas according to which the only alternative to conformity was nonconformity or nonsuggestibility (the resistance of the individual to suggestion). No other result could be expected in a group of people only interacting formally and in relation to objects unconnected with their real activity or vitally important values. The division of group members into conformists and nonconformists was inevitable. However, did this kind of study of conformity enable one to conclude that this was a model of interrelations in any group, including the collective, where activity has both personal significance and social value?

It becomes clear, in the light of this question, what forms the basis of the "small group", the concept adopted by researchers into group dynamics. They interpret interrelations between people as direct relations taken irrespective of the actual content of joint activity, and isolated from the social processes of which they are, in fact, a part. In this connection, we put forward the hypothesis that in groups uniting people on the basis of joint, socially valuable activity, interrelations are mediated by the content and values of that activity. If this is so, then the true alternative to conformity is not nonconformism (negativism, independence, etc.), but a particular quality of collectivity which has to be studied experimentally.

This hypothesis determined the tactics of our research. An attempt was made to compare the influence of suggestion on individuals belonging to an unorganised group and to a well-knit collective. It was discovered quite unexpectedly that the suggestive influence of the opinion of the random group of people on the individual was much greater than the influence of the opinion of the organised collective to which he belonged.

However, this experimentally substantiated conclusion only seems paradoxical. The procedures envisaged by the methods aimed at revealing suggestibility, appealed mainly to the unconscious views and actions of the individual, whereas the individual's behaviour in the collective is determined by his conscious attitude to each member of the collective. When an individual knows the whole collective well and many of its members, he consciously and selectively reacts to the opinions of each member, guided

by the relations and evaluations formed through joint activity, and by the values accepted and maintained by all the members. On the other hand, the state of the individual in the unfamiliar, unorganised group, who has little information about the group members, causes an increase in suggestibility (the link between the uncertainty of a situation and suggestibility has been pointed out by many authors). In this way, whereas the individual's behaviour in an unorganised random group is determined exclusively by the position which he chooses—more often than not unpremeditatedly—"autonomy or submission to the group", in the collective there is yet another specific possibility—the realisation of the individual's collectivist self-determination. The individual relates selectively to the influences of the specific group, submitting to some and resisting others, depending on mediating factors such as evaluations, convictions and ideals.

Thus, it was shown that individual self-determination in the collective was contrasted with the dilemma "either autonomy or submission to the group", and that conscious acts of will in which self-determination is realised, were opposed to unconscious attitudes of suggestibility (incidentally, it was proved that despite existing ideas, weak will cannot be considered a criterion or an analogue of suggestibility). This made it possible to formulate the task of new research aimed at a profound analysis of individual self-determination.

If, using the dummy group method, one urges the individual, supposedly in the name of the collective to which he belongs, to reject the scale of values accepted in the collective, a conflict arises dividing individuals into those who manifest conformity and those capable of carrying out acts of collectivist self-determination, i.e., of acting in accordance with their personal values.

Collectivist self-determination arises when an individual's behaviour under specially organised group pressure is conditioned not by direct group influence, and not by the individual's tendency towards suggestibility, but mainly by the aims and tasks of the activity of the group and by a stable scale of values. Collectivist self-determination in the collective in contrast to the diffuse group, is the predominant mode of the individual's reaction to group pressure and thus stands out as a typical feature of the collective. Let us examine a specific experiment.

To begin with, the group members' agreement or disagreement with certain ethic views was established. As a rule, the majority agreed with the generally accepted norms reflected in the judgements proposed by the experimenter, and a small minority expressed a negative view. The latter was excluded from further experiments since the study of negativism as a psychological problem was not relevant to this particular piece of research. The following question arose with regard to the group majority: what was the psychological meaning of their agreement with the ethic views? Was it a result of submission to group pressure, expressed covertly in the very fact that the moral norms of the experimenter's judgements were generally accepted? In other words, was their agreement not evidence of their desire to be like everyone else, to remain within the limits of behaviour which they, not without justification, attributed to other group members as normal, expected and socially acceptable? Was this a result of the individual's conformity within the group, as follows from the experiments and theoretical generalisations of American social psychologists? We put forward quite the opposite supposition: perhaps agreement did not signify submission to group pressure or conformity, but was the result of the coincidence of the individual's values with the generally accepted ethic values expressed in the judgements proposed. If this were so, then what looked like conformity in fact had a quite different psychological meaning and represented a genuine alternative to conformism.

The subsequent experiment was set up so as to direct group pressure (dummy group pressure, of course) against generally accepted values and to create a conflict that would either confirm or disprove one of the above-mentioned suppositions. In this way the group was experimentally differentiated into conformists (these were in the minority) and people who manifested collectivist self-determination, defending the common values of the group, even when the rest of the group "rejected" them.

This study was conducted using the material of ethic values. However, collectivist self-determination presupposes the defence not only of moral values, but also of the aims and tasks adopted by a group in the course of joint activity. It became necessary to use yet another means of research to reveal individual self-determination on the basis of the defence of collective goals and interests

which had acquired personal significance for its members.

The participants were given a choice of socially significant goals, each person having first sorted them into order of attractiveness. Three types of goals were chosen: desirable, undesirable, and neutral. Then several goals were put forward for realisation in group activity. Groups were selected with similar emotional attitudes to the goals. Henceforth group activity was guided by the socially sanctioned goal which had to be realised.

In the course of experimentation, the phenomenon of collectivist self-determination was found to be present in some groups and absent in others. Judging by the experimental data, its appearance depended on the degree of appropriation of socially accepted group goals by each member, and did not show a marked dependence on the original attractiveness of the goal, though on the other hand, it was not entirely unrelated to it. It was shown that in groups where extensive educational work for the realisation of common group goals had been specially organised and where these goals had come to be regarded as socially valuable, the number of collectivist reactions was twice as high as in groups minimally involved in the activity. Some members of actively working groups, even having received the apparently authentic information that almost the entire group had refused to carry out the task, nevertheless continued their activity. Despite the fact that the dummy group's "legend" about the reasons for refusal looked sufficiently authentic, and the realisation of the collective goal was indeed difficult, and even at odds with the participants' specific personal interests, they actively withstood their colleagues who had supposedly given up the continuation of socially valuable activity.

Thus, collectivist self-determination with regard to the goals of group activity is just as real a phenomenon of intra-group activeness as individual self-determination in the sphere of moral values accepted by the collective.

In these studies,[1] collectivist self-determination appeared as a relative uniformity of behaviour as a result of the conscious solidarity of the individual with the estimations

[1] Research by my colleagues V. A. Bakeyeva, I. A. Oboturova and A. A. Turovskaya.

and tasks of the collective as an aggregate of people united by aims and ideals going beyond the framework of the given group and implanted in the ideology of society. It is collectivist self-determination and not nonconformism or "individual's insusceptibility", which can conceal a negativist or nihilistic attitude to socially valuable requirements, expectations and influences that represents an alternative to conformism. The use of the concept "individual's insusceptibility" is usually accompanied by indications that an insusceptible individual is subject in his actions not so much to external influence as to conscious aims and intentions. However, even this does not help. When the model of a group adopted uncritically from Asch and Crutchfield and the traditional dummy group method is used, the negativist, nihilist and nonconformist can masquerade as "insusceptible" just as easily as a conformist can pretend to be a "collectivist". It became obvious that a psychologist experimenting with dummy groups would remain within the confines of the mechanistic system of group pressure until he realised the need to separate not so much "insusceptible people" from "conformists" as "collectivists" from "conformists" and "insusceptible collectivists" from "insusceptible conformists".

Collectivist self-determination as a specific form of active interaction of the individual and the group is a concept which made it possible to give a real social determination of an individual's behaviour and thus avoid the dilemma imposed by the system of group dynamics: either the predetermination of an individual by his sociopsychological environment, or his absolute autonomy. By linking the problem of intra-group interactions to the content of what influences the individual through group communications, the formulation of the question of collectivist self-determination made it possible to refute the notion of the priority of communication and the communicator over the objective content of the information. The American psychologist Thomas Ostrom, citing the work of Asch, wrote: "Asch (1948) demonstrated, for example,that the quote, 'those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed two distinct classes' has an entirely different meaning when ascribed to Karl Marx than when attributed to John Adams... More generally, any background or contextual factors which influence the meaning of a communication, such as its source, will influence the in-

dividual's acceptance of its arguments."[1]

The sense of these utterances and quotations is clear. Following Asch's experimental constructions, the reader is supposed to conclude that if a Marxist is presented with an assertion such as "black is white" in the name of Karl Marx, he will accept it as the truth because of the attitude, determined by the "high prestigiousness of the source of communication". Likewise, should a Marxist thesis be attributed to John Adams, the Marxist would supposedly doubt and reject it.

The problem for the Marxist psychologist here lies not only in the unacceptability of these views, the ideological bias of which is obvious, but also in revealing, through experimentation, the socio-psychological conditions in which the law expressed by Asch's formula is really valid, and those in which it is purely fictitious. It is clear that by ignoring the content of group interrelations and above all of the scale of values determined by ideals and convictions of general significance, one severely narrows down the idea of group life reflected in Asch's experiments. In human groups with only "surrogates of collectivity" one can find confirmation of the idea of the domination of the "high prestigiousness of the source of communication" over the consciousness and will of the individual who receives any, including false, information. However, attempts to extend these conclusions to the socio-psychological investigation of actual collectives, in which relations are based on a conscious evaluation of the content of joint activity, its goals, tasks and ideological foundations, are obviously doubtful.

Thus, the method of studying conformism with dummy groups and using material of no importance to the participants (i.e. determining the length of intervals of time) inevitably results in the conclusion that the only alternative to conformism is nonconformism, negativism and independence of an individual within the group. There can be no other result in a group of people whose interactions are merely superficial.

The "stimulus-reaction" formula was suitable for the psychological interpretation of artificial experimental situations. However, when used in the context of actual

[1] *Psychological Foundations of Attitudes*, ed. by A. G. Greenwald, T. C. Brock, T. M. Ostrom, Academic Press, New York, 1968, p. 20.

interrelations, this formula (either conformist or nonconformist) revealed its inadequacy. Socio-psychological research needed to be directed into work with a fundamentally new model of the collective and the individual within the collective, where group interactions involve values and the aims and actual content of collective activity.

In this way, the hypothesis became increasingly clear that, in groups uniting people to carry out socially useful activity, the real alternative to conformism is not negativism (nonconformism, insusceptibility, independence, etc.), but a particular quality of genuine collectivity, taking the form of individual self-determination in the group (collectivist self-determination).

The phenomenon of collectivist self-determination turned out to be the very sought for "cell" through which the most important socio-psychological characteristics of the living social organism—the collective—are revealed. The relations between two or more individuals cannot be reduced to the direct links between them. In groups carrying out joint activity, these relations are inevitably mediated by the content, values and aims of that activity. Relatively direct interrelations can be recorded in diffuse groups, whereas in the collective, they are mainly of a mediated kind, conditioned by the joint activity of the collective. Thus, the collective has quite different psychological characteristics from small groups, which were the favourite object of research in group dynamics. For this reason the attempt to extend the conclusions made during the study of small groups to the collective, was doomed to failure.

The "Multistage" Structure of Interpersonal Relations in the Collective

The fact that interpersonal relations are mediated by the content of the collective's real activity enables one to see the overall structure of the special group called the collective. Whereas interrelations in the traditionally interpreted group appear as non-hierarchical with respect to group activity and its aims and principles, in the collective, these processes are made hierarchical and form a multistage structure. One can distinguish in this structure several strata (layers) with various psychological characteristics and governed by various socio-psychological laws.

The centre of the group's structure (A), comprises group

activity itself, its socio-economic and socio-political content. Although this is essentially a nuclear formation—with regard to the psychological strata—it is not *merely a psychological* formation. It is an activity-based characteristic of the group as a collective, which forms a part of the social whole. A set of empirical indices has now been selected which can be reduced to general indicators—*blocks of estimates of objective collective activity*—which give a general description of this nucleus of group processes in the collective.

Thus, three criteria for assessing the group as a collective have been selected: 1) the evaluation of the collective's performance of its main social function (the success of participation in the social division of labour); 2) the evaluation of the group's correspondence to social norms (in Soviet society this means correspondence to the socialist way of life); 3) the evaluation of the group's ability to guarantee each member opportunities for complete and harmonious development.



Fig. 1

All psychological characteristics of the collective are dependent on socially conditioned formations. The socio-historical formation determines the psychological. This Marxist thesis lay at the basis of the theory of activity-based mediation.

The singling out of the above-mentioned blocks of estimates of collective objective activity enables one to determine the socio-psychological parameters of groups with different levels of development by classifying the given group as a collective when the indicators on all three criteria are sufficiently high (Fig. 1).

The next, essentially psychological stratum (B), records the attitude of each group member to the group activity, its aims, tasks and the principles on which it is based, as well as the motivation of activity and its social significance for each participant.

The second stratum (C) contains the characteristics of interpersonal relations mediated by the content of joint

activity (its aims and tasks and course of fulfilment), and also by the principles, ideals and values accepted in the group, which are ultimately a projection of the ideological structures functioning in society. It is evidently in this stratum that one should include the various phenomena of interpersonal relations such as collectivist self-determination and others, with which I will deal later. The principle of activity-based mediation is the basis of this understanding of phenomena of the second psychological stratum.

Finally, the last, surface layer of interpersonal relations (D), envisages the presence of links (mainly emotional) in relation to which neither the collective aims of activity, nor generally significant values for the collective are the main factor mediating the personal contacts between group members. This does not mean that such links are direct in the full sense of the word. One can hardly imagine relations between any two people with no mediating link in the form of interests, tastes, empathetic attractions, suggestive influences, habitual expectations, etc. However, the content of group activity has little or no effect on these links.

Just as it is impermissible to extend laws peculiar to diffuse groups to the collective, it would be wrong to universalise the conclusions obtained during the study of phenomena of the surface layer of interpersonal relations in the collective, and to consider them necessary for describing the essential characteristics of interpersonal relations. In exactly the same way, the links in the second stratum (C) are essential but insufficient for a description of the collective without taking into account the data about stratum (B), i.e., without an elucidation of the social meaning of the collective members' activity, of the motives of activity, etc.

Unfortunately, in a number of socio-psychological studies of collectives (industrial, academic, sporting and so on), especially those of an applied nature, the results of the experimental study of the surface layer were used to describe the collective as a whole. Here, the determining role was ascribed to the scale of acceptability, communicativeness and other aspects unrelated to the objective activity of the group. Naturally, the psychological assessments put forward as a result of this investigation were inadequate and sometimes tended to be confusing.

Although group dynamics on the whole correctly described interpersonal relations in diffuse groups, which were virtually identified with small groups, a fact which led to the incorrect generalisation of results, it did not distinguish between diffuse and other types of groups. Meanwhile, Soviet psychologists have been faced with the task of studying the collective as a special type of group, not to be regarded as governed by the laws functioning in the "classic" small group. Above all, the solution of this task demanded the singling out of the real criteria of the collective, in other words, of the interrelations between its members which are mediated by the content of joint activity significant to the whole collective. This is usually difficult to do because these interrelations form part of numerous other contacts and interactions not obviously, or not at all mediated by the aims and values of the group. The mutual understanding of several members of a collective who all support the same football team differs considerably from the intra-group relations in the same collective that emerge in tackling serious production tasks or the solution of moral conflicts.

An analysis of the phenomenon of collectivist self-determination has made it possible to suggest that in a collective there must logically be other socio-psychological phenomena, qualitatively different from those characteristic of random groups. The essence of these distinctions lies in the different nature of interrelations and interactions.[1]

In a diffuse group, direct relations and interaction are the determining factors (for example, complaisance or resistance to group influence). As mentioned above, the directness of these relations is merely relative, since attitudes, views, experience of previous contacts, prejudices, stereotypes, etc., are inevitably involved as intermediate variables in interrelations in any group, even a random group. American social psychology absolutised the simplified scheme of interrelations and interaction which dealt in experimentation merely with group stimuli and group reactions, frequently ignoring the truly boundless variety of

[1] By using the term "collective", we mean what Makarenko called the "primary collective": "A primary collective is a collective in which the individual members are constantly associated through work, friendship, the home and ideology." (A. S. Makarenko, *Collected Works* in seven volumes, Vol. V, p. 164.)

intermediate links. Using the successful concept put forward by M. G. Yaroshevsky, one can say that the "superconscious categorial structure" of behaviourist psychology, by trapping the scientist in the circle of behavioural characteristics, eliminated the possibility of directing experiments towards the study of the substantial and motivational aspects of interpersonal relations.

So, what is the fundamental distinction between the collective and other types of group? Interaction and interrelations mediated by the aims, tasks and values of joint activity, i.e., by its actual content, are determining factors in the collective. From this point of view, *the collective is a group in which interpersonal relations are mediated by the socially valuable and personally significant content of joint activity.* This qualitative difference of the collective, it turned out, could be proved by research in which the consideration of the mediating link is given a fundamental significance, and allows the collective's vitally important parameters to be singled out experimentally. These parameters can include the predominance of manifestations of collectivist self-determination and the sharp drop in conformist reactions in situations of significance for the collective. However, as we shall see below, it is the first parameter in the series of others. The apologists of group dynamics could not agree on the question of group typology because they were unable to see the main factors behind group formation. In the conceptions of group dynamics, these factors are either absent or are juxtaposed to secondary factors (e.g., group size, number of group communications, etc.). To establish a group typology (here more like a topology), we have used a geometric model. The vectors which make up the diagram show the degree of mediation of interpersonal relations (C), on the one hand, and on the other, the content aspect of mediation, developing in two opposite directions: A—in the direction generally corresponding to socio-historical progress, and B—in a direction impeding such progress. Let us make vector OA the pro-social development of mediating factors and vector OB their anti-social development (Fig. 2).

Now, using the three vectors (A, B, and C), let us construct a diagram and examine its components.

The first figure (I) represents the necessary features of a collective, meeting the demands of social progress. The high social significance of factors maximally determines



Fig. 2

and mediates interpersonal relations and makes the collective highly cohesive.

Figure II represents a group in which the very high level of development of social values only very insignificantly mediates group processes. This could be a newly-formed group with joint activity that is still far from fully established. Here, one person's success does not determine the success of others' activity and the failure of one has no effect on the results of others. Moral values function in this kind of group, but they have not been evolved in the process of communication and joint work but have been brought into the group from the social environment in general. The future of these values depends on whether collective activity, which constantly creates and strengthens them, is well organised.

Figure III represents a group which has a high level of the mediation of interrelations but in which the factors which mediate these interrelations are highly reactionary


Bisector M
A
Fig. II
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
Fig.II
Bisector
M
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K
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y
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Quadrant II
Quadrant I
D1
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-S-S-O-
D
G
Quadrant IV
Quadrant III
x
E1
F1
Fig. IV
Fig. III
B
Bisector
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Fig. 4

and hostile to social progress. This position can be held by any anti-social corporation.

Figure IV represents a group in which interrelations are actually not mediated by common factors of joint activity and if mediation does occur, the anti-social nature of the mediating factors deprives the group's activity of any social value. Its members have united for their own personal gains alone.

Finally, figure V represents the typical diffuse group in which both the social value of mediating factors and the degree to which they are manifested in the system of interpersonal relations remain at zero. An excellent example of this is the experimental group chosen at random and given socially insignificant tasks to perform.

Any social group can be placed in the diagram. Every type of activity has its own range of mediation of interpersonal relations and social value and thus its collective-forming force.

The socio-psychological conception founded on these ideas of multistage group activeness and group typology, at the basis of which lies the principle of the mediation of interpersonal relations by the content and values of activity, has become known as the *stratometric conception.*

Socio-Psychological Myths

If one looks at the various socio-psychological systems which make up American social psychology (the topological ideas or "field theory" of Kurt Lewin, Jacob Moreno's sociometry, Leon Festinger's theory of "cognitive dissonance", Theodore Newcomb's theory of "consensus and attractiveness" and so on), a curious conclusion arises. The differences between these systems are related not so much to the choice of objects, tasks and methods of study or, what is particularly important, to the conception of the essence of interaction and interrelations in these systems, as to the method of interpreting the empirical data obtained. For example, if one compares Cartwright's and Zander's "field theory" with the "theory of reinforcement" of John Thibaut and Georg Kelly, which grew out of Burrhus Skinner's ideas, one can record differences in the interpretation of forces which clash in the sphere of group processes, but not in the choice of the object of study. This invariably remains the interaction of individuals, determined in the

former case by the "field structure" and in the latter by the type and size of reward. The tasks of the study of small group interaction are always the same: the psychological parameters of group dynamics are revealed in relation to group size, the intensity of group pressure, reciprocity in sociometric choices, etc.

Thus, while noticeably differing in their theoretical interpretation of specific empirical studies, the various trends in American psychology all use the same methodological preconditions and deal with the same invariable model of interpersonal relations. It is this that has caused the flood of experimental facts into the numerous textbooks and handbooks on social psychology in the USA. The fact that empirically obtained data apparently does not reflect the theoretical orientations of individual socio-psychological trends creates the false impression of the methodological neutrality of facts obtained in socio-psychological experimentation. This can lead astray the philosopher or psychologist who is willing to argue with neo-Freudian or neo-behaviourist conceptions, but who has taken the general model of group processes and interpersonal relations on trust and is therefore capable of assimilating psychological facts which are used in these conceptions.

Behind the facts and laws revealed by strictly experimental research lies an area of unpremeditated mythicisation which has taken the place of a *single* theoretical and methodological platform for the adherents of the various American socio-psychological trends. It is no surprise that social psychologists in France, Holland, Belgium, West Germany and Britain, clubbing together around the *European Journal of Social Psychology*, have for a number of years been criticising contemporary American psychology, in particular for what they call "empirical prejudice", manifested in the illusion that a theory can emerge on the basis of the collection of facts and measurements obtained without any prior theoretical work.

If there is no coherent, philosophically based theory of social psychology (this fact is realised not only by critics but also by American psychologists themselves), then its place is taken by postulates existing merely in the researcher's mind. Whether deliberately or not, the experimenter selects the corresponding contingent of participants, sets the corresponding tasks and the conditions of their fulfilment, and uses specific methods which predetermine the desired result.

One can assume the irreproachability of the experimental data, but mythicisation begins when these data, and consequently the ideas behind them, wrongly become regarded as universal and as the explanatory principle for a whole class of phenomena.

This is how the myths arose which have to a great extent determined the understanding of the essence of interpersonal relations. Soviet psychologists had to deal with these myths when they first began experimentally studying group processes, interpersonal relations and interactions. The psychological *theory of the activity-based mediation of interpersonal relations*, formed on the basis of the stratometric approach was also forced to define its relation to these myths.

This theory is a system of interconnected assertions and explanations with its own methods for interpreting and predicting various socio-psychological phenomena, as well as the effects of intra-group activeness. The law revealed by researchers envisages (something characteristic of this theory) the transition from one assertion to another without turning directly to perceptible experimentation. Proceeding from these ideas, let us compare the theory of activity-based mediation not with individual theoretical trends, but with the generally accepted *tradition* of American social psychology, with *traditional Western* social psychology.

In other words, the objects of comparison should be, on the one hand, the traditional, matter-of-course, as it were, model of the group (of group processes, group dynamics, group interaction), which is the foundation of empirical socio-psychological work in the West, regardless of the original theoretical orientation of the experimenter, and on the other, the model of group processes based on the stratometric conception of intra-group activeness.

Whereas it is typical of small group psychology to regard interpersonal relations as direct interaction (pressure, subordination, sympathy, etc.), our theory sees them as *mediated by the content of joint group activity*. This thesis, which makes it possible in socio-psychological research to overcome the postulate on "directness", is the fundamental and guiding principle of our theory.

Activity-based mediation as conceptual principle for understanding the essence of interpersonal relations in groups determines all the other fundamental differences between our model of groups and group processes and the traditional approach to the examination of socio-psychological

phenomena in Western psychology. The latter, above all interprets the group (one can justifiably regard this as the first myth) as the sum total of communicative acts and emotional attractions, as an emotional communicative aggregate. In this respect, we find no distinction between the adherents of the field theory, group dynamics, interactionism, the sociometric conception and so on. In the light of stratometric ideas, on the other hand, the group is seen as a part of society with the content characteristics related to its activity and the values accepted by its members, and is therefore seen as an *activity-mediated community.*

Traditional Western social psychology, whose object of study is the small group, assumes that the latter represents the most important characteristics of interrelations and interaction in society. This is *another myth.* Soviet sociological and socio-psychological literature has often stressed the ideological aspects of this myth, justly pointing out the incorrectness of substituting psychological relations for socio-economic ones. However, the other side of this erroneous view has remained concealed, i.e. the elucidation of the position occupied by the traditionally studied and described small group among other groups comprising the complex social system. In reality, it is not a model of the typical human group, dominating over other groups, but a particular example of a group with a low level of development.

It should be emphasised that traditional Western social psychology, while distinguishing groups according to size, length of existence, type of leadership, degree of cohesion, composition, etc., does not distinguish them according to the level of development of objective and valuable activity. It does not single out highly developed groups which differ qualitatively from traditionally analysed small groups. In this connection, there is a belief apparent in all Western socio-psychological theories that the laws of interpersonal relations experimentally revealed in the small group can be extended and extrapolated to any other group of the same size, period of existence and composition, etc. This conclusion can also be seen as a case of mythicisation.

If, for example, it is discovered in a socio-psychological experiment that the group's perception of the leader depends on the size of the group (as it increases, the group members lower their appraisal of the leader's "human factors"), researchers have no doubt at all that this law can be

universally applied to any other group. Or if, as Flanders and Havumaki[1] showed, praise addressed by the leader to several chosen group members acts like the principle of "divide and rule", and gives rise to differences in the status of members, this thesis has been transformed into a socio-psychological law supposedly of general significance and equally applicable to the random group as to the group with a high degree of cohesion, united by common aims and values. These "universal" laws have found their way into textbooks and handbooks on social psychology without any reservations made about their limited sphere of operation.

Let me repeat that, in contrast to traditional Western social psychology, the stratometric conception distinguishes groups of varying levels of development, taking into consideration two main criteria: *the presence or absence of the mediation of interpersonal relations by the content of group activity* (in this way diffuse groups are separated from other more highly developed groups), and *the social significance of group activity* (which enables one to distinguish the collective from other highly developed groups). The distinguishing of the collective *as a group* in which group processes are mediated by the content of joint, socially useful and personally significant activity, introduces a new object of study unknown to traditional Western social psychology.

Of course, it would be an exaggeration to claim that the stratometric conception discovered the collective as a subject of socio-psychological research. The study of the collective has always occupied an important place in the works of Soviet psychologists and educationalists, who have stressed the socially purposeful activity of the collective as a highly developed group, and have studied the paths of its formation. However, these works did not always give the qualitative psychological characteristics of interpersonal relations in the collective as distinct from other groups, nor did they show the special features of the structure of group activity in the collective. What is more, they omitted to stress the incorrectness of transferring laws applicable to groups with a low level of development to the collective (and vice versa), to propose methods of study that would

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[1] N. A. Flanders, S. Havumaki, "The Effect of Teacher-Pupil Contacts Involving Praise on the Sociometric Choices of Students", *The Journal of Educational Psychology*, Washington, Vol. 51, No. 2, April 1960, pp. 65-69.

reveal the essence of group processes in the collective, and to select quantitative indices reflecting the socio-psychological phenomena of the collective. It proved possible to fulfil all these conditions on the basis of the stratometric approach.

Its first principle is as follows: the idea accepted in traditional Western psychology that the socio-psychological laws of any group *can be essentially reduced to the general laws of group dynamics is mistaken with regard to the collective*. And vice versa, socio-psychological phenomena characteristic of the collective, cannot be found in groups with a low level of development. Collectivist self-determination, for example, cannot be found in a diffuse group, where there is no common link mediating individual behaviour, a fact which made nonconformism the only alternative to conformism. The same is true of all other phenomena in the sphere of interpersonal relations in the collective.

The second principle: despite the established view that the laws discovered by American social psychologists were correct for the group "in general", in collectives, interpersonal relations and the laws which govern them are not simply different from those in diffuse groups, but *qualitatively different*, often "inverted", as it were, diametrically opposed.

Interpersonal relations (individual-individual) can be conditionally represented by two lines of communications: *activity-based communications* ("responsible dependence", according to Makarenko) and *strictly personal communications*. The mutual influence of these two lines of interpersonal relations in the collective is quite distinct from that in the random group. In the diffuse group, it is assumed, the links which necessarily arise in group activity are not yet capable of significantly influencing the personal relations of the group members, while the personal relations (sympathy and antipathy, a greater or lesser susceptibility to influence, etc.) can easily deform the links which form through activity. The very opposite appears to be the case in the collective: relations of "responsible dependence" which are formed in joint activity, have a definite influence on personal links, while the latter are unable to destroy the system of group activity and the work interrelations which arise during that activity.

The thesis cited above is the starting point for the discovery of new and the reinterpretation of old socio-

psychological phenomena. Let me cite a few examples.

A number of Western psychologists (Allport, Triplett, Catrell and others) studied the connection between the successfulness of activity and the presence of other people. These works denied the existence of an invariable dependence between them but gave no explanation as to why in some cases the presence of other people promoted the successfulness of activity and impeded it in others. At best, attempts were made to point out the dependence of success on the personal interrelations which formed between the subject of the activity and each person surrounding him (Barry Collins). We can now evaluate the complexity of the above-mentioned connection differently. The influence of the presence of others evidently should vary depending on whether the participants in the activity and those present form a single collective or represent a diffuse group. During actual group activity one can expect the formation of a positive interconnection in the collective and its absence (or insignificant manifestation) in the random group. It is also impossible to agree with the conclusions of certain psychologists as to the superior effectiveness of the "artificial" group to the "natural group" or to consider these conclusions universal. One should note that the artificial group consisted of individuals working independently, whereas the natural group comprised individuals collected for laboratory study between whom definite interrelations had not yet formed. One can assume that the efforts spent by the latter in establishing adequate interaction reduced the overall effectiveness of the natural group's activity. It is more than likely that the introduction into the experiment of collectives would have led to the opposite result—the acknowledgement of the superiority of natural groups (when these are collectives) to artificial groups.

Back in the 1920s, the so-called Ringelman effect was discovered, according to which the efficiency of each group member depends on group size and drops in correspondence with an increase in size. This effect does not occur in the collective (R. S. Nemov) because of the peculiar superfluity of collective activity, and because of its supererogation (i.e., the overfulfilment of quotas and planned tasks and the adoption of increased work obligation, etc.).

Another example: the "levelling" of group effectiveness, its maintenance at an "average" level, has long been regarded as a vitally important psychological law. When

performing an individual task, some group members managed to accomplish more than others in the same period of time. Following the announcement of the average group result, the former lowered their work rate while the latter accelerated it, to meet this "average" level. There are grounds for believing that this socio-psychological law will not be found to operate in such groups as the collective.

A fact of vital importance here is the possibility of reinterpreting group phenomena in such a way as to eliminate the contradictions between the results obtained by different researchers in group dynamics. The study of the relation between the intensity of emotional communication in the group and the effectiveness of group work is revealing in this respect. The survey of this problem in scientific literature has produced contradictory results: some scientists observed a positive, others a negative relation between the said variables. The reason for this is that the conclusions were referred to the group "in general". The division of groups according to the degree of mediation by the content of joint activity eliminates the apparent contradictoriness of the results. Experimentation has shown that the relation between the effectiveness of activity and the favourable nature of emotional psychological interrelations in the collective was positive and in poorly developed groups negative (R. S. Nemov).

Contradictoriness of conclusions drawn by scientists working within the framework of the traditional approach to the phenomena of group dynamics is the general rule and not the exception. And there is nothing surprising in this. Even if the psychologist refuses to distinguish groups according to the level of development of activity relations, the groups themselves bear these differences and manifest them during experimentation. This can lead to the opposite conclusions being drawn, especially if the experimenter is working with a natural and not a laboratory group. For example, in their experiments on the elimination of group conflict, Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn Sherif[1] thought up the idea of organising joint activity as a means of solving conflicts and easing tension in group interrelations. Naturally, the characteristics of the group before and after the beginning of group activity in such a case will be different and their

[1] M. Sherif, C. W. Sherif, *Groups in Harmony and Tension*, Octagon Books Inc., New York, 1966; M. Sherif, C. W. Sherif, *An Outline of Social Psychology*, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1956.

correlation with other variables will produce the opposite results.

So, the trouble with traditional Western social psychology lies not in the fact that it fails to reflect the activity parameters of group processes in its accepted model of experimental research, but in the fact that, while bearing these parameters in mind, it does not use them as a basis for a differential approach to groups of various levels of development. Thus, we can legitimately carry out a revision of the vast collection of experimental material accumulated by traditional social psychology from the point of view of the theory of activity-based mediation.

The Problem of Group Size[1]

The problem of the influence of group size on the processes and characteristics of interpersonal relations in the group can serve as a specific example of a revision of socio-psychological phenomena. It would seem that the problem of group size is posited in the very term "small group", the key concept of group dynamics, microsociology and other trends in traditional Western social psychology. The fact that the group is by definition "small" compels the researcher studying the group to consider its relation to large groups, the group's specific character conditioned by its quantitative parameters, the size limits within which this specific character is maintained, the correspondence of group size to the tasks of activity and to the requirements of maintaining the necessary psychological climate, etc. Thus, it is natural that Western handbooks on social psychology in one way or another touch on the problem of group size.[2]

What significance does the factor of group size really have for social psychology? In tackling this problem, we come across highly conflicting views. By the problem of group size, various authors (and occasionally one and the same author) often mean essentially different things.

The first is the *problem of the size limits of the group*

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[1] This section is based on the article by A. V. Petrovsky and M. A. Turevsky, "Group Size as a Socio-Psychological Problem" (*Voprosy Psikhologii*, No. 2, 1979).

[2] For example, see: *Group Dynamics. Research and Theory*, ed. by Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, Harper & Row Publishers, 1968; A. Hare, *Handbook of Small Group Research*, Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1962.

i.e., the limits within which it maintains its specific features.

Despite the existence in literature of numerous, often highly categorical statements on this problem, in our view it cannot be seen as satisfactorily solved. The size limits of the small group ("primary" or "contact" collective) are established within the following quantitative indices: 2-7 members (V. V. Bogoslovsky), 2-20 (G. S. Antipina), 12-30 (R. Pinto and M. Grawitz), 3-45 (V. G. Ivanov), from 2 to 30-40 (Y. L. Kolominsky), 50-70 (L. S. Blyakhman) and so on.

It is obvious that different researchers proceed from quite different, and not always theoretically substantiated, characteristics of the group, in relation to which the ultimate quantitative parameters are established. Often, indeed, they omit entirely to mention which characteristics they have in mind when determining the limits of group size beyond which the group loses its specific character. It is one thing when the size limits of a group are established in correspondence to its essential activity-based properties, and another when the psychologist is guided mainly by the opportunities in the group for individuals to express their attitude to one another. Unfortunately, researchers have bypassed this problem. However, it is obviously futile to guess at the size limits of small groups without preliminary theoretical work.

Only the special study of groups operating under different conditions and varying in size and level of development, with the aim of determining their specific character, enables the scientist to outline the approximate size limits within which this specific character is maintained, begins to disappear noticeably, or is totally absent. There is every reason to expect significant differences in the size limits of groups with varying degrees of activity-based mediation of interpersonal relations.

The second problem is the *influence of size on the group's socio-psychological features.* Here, we have in mind groups whose size is undoubtedly within the limits of small ("primary" or "contact") groups. One can cite several statements showing how this problem is elaborated. For example, a series of experiments showed that a group's attractiveness to its members is inversely proportional to the group's size. And, an increase in tension between group members was recorded as the group size decreased (Robert Bales and

Edgar Borgatta). It is asserted that groups with an odd number of members have less antagonistic relations than groups with an even number. The dependence was also shown of submission to group pressure on group size (submission increases with a rise from 2 to 3 or 4 members, but a further rise in group size to 10-15 members has no influence) (David Krech, Richard Crutchfield). It is also claimed that the addition of a third person to a twosome has far greater consequences than increasing a threesome to a group of 4, 5, 6 or more members. Data was also obtained on the fact that the tendency to risk grows with a size increase from 3 to 5 people (M. Bennett). However, while found in groups consisting of 4 members, this tendency was not recorded in groups of 8 members. The study of Antarctic groups living and working in isolated conditions, showed greater compatibility in groups of 20-30 than in groups 8-11 members.

As the authors of works on these questions note, these generalisations show firstly that group size has become traditionally recognised as a vital determinant of a group's psychological features and, secondly, demonstrate the blatant contradictoriness of the experimental data obtained. In our view, the way these questions have been elaborated and the specific solutions to the topical problems of social psychology put forward in the West are unsatisfactory.

The principles of the stratometric approach require a quite definite strategy for the analysis of the influence of group size on the nature of group activeness. Above all, in examining this question one should distinguish between diffuse groups on the one hand, and collectives on the other. Moreover, there are grounds for the belief that the influence of group size on the manifestation of forms of activeness, which are specific for different strata, will vary significantly. Hence follow further hypotheses concerning the specification of the problem. Let us outline them.

Above all, this is a question of the influence of group size on relations specific for groups such as the collective, mediated by socially significant and personally valuable joint activity, that is, on relations which comprise the inner layer of activeness in the collective. And secondly, it is a question of determining interpersonal relations unmediated by joint activity (i.e., relations which make up the surface layer of activeness), by the size of the group.

It is assumed that the dependence of various aspects of group activeness on group size is conditioned by the group's

level of development and by the place of phenomenon under study in the structure of group activeness. It is anticipated that group size by itself has no determining significance for the manifestation of group activeness of the inner (nuclear) and the second (interpersonal) strata in the collective. At the same time, it is suggested that phenomena of the outer layer depend on group size.

Why is traditional Western social psychology unable to provide a satisfactory solution to this problem?

Of interest here is the special correlation between theoretical and experimental conclusions obtained within the framework of activity-based mediation, and the results of research conducted within the framework of traditional Western social psychology. For example, American psychologists cite data according to which an increase in the number of individuals witnessing a person's suffering is accompanied by a decrease in the probability that they will render that person assistance (Bill Latane). It was further pointed out that group cohesion diminishes with an increase in group size. There are also indications of an increase in individual conformity with an increase in the size of the group exerting pressure (Crutchfield). Evidently these laws "operate" to a greater or lesser degree in diffuse groups. However, as already mentioned, the laws typical of such groups cannot be regarded as so for all groups.

The examples cited above confused diffuse groups proper, which perform artificial laboratory tasks, and real groups (such as Antarctic winterers and scientific research groups), whose level of development was unknown. It is clear that in these circumstances the explanatory value of the above-mentioned generalisations significantly diminishes because they have been incorrectly extended to the small group in general. In contrast to American research, the theory of activity-based mediation draws a strict distinction between qualitatively different groups.

The third problem of *optimal group size* is elucidated mainly through performing applied psychological tasks. Whereas the size limits of a group determine the quantitative parameters within which the group is preserved as an aggregate of people with specific traits, the optimal size of a group determines the number of members which creates the most favourable conditions for carrying out the group's functions. In certain cases, the concepts of size limit and optimal size may coincide if the set of psychological traits

necessary for optimal group action coincides with those features without which the group cannot carry out its functions.

Let us examine the problem of optimal group size in socio-psychological works. S. I. Shapiro believes that the most stable group consists of 6-7 people. Groups composed of less than 20 people can still exist because of the "inner" forces of cohesion, but their degree of stability is minimal. Larger groups, on the other hand, are subjected to the undivided sway of the force of dissension and can only exist because of the inflow of "external" cohesive influence.[1] Shapiro even provides a formula of "the proportionality of forces of dissension to the square of the number of group members".[2] F. N. Antipina, analysing works by American psychologists writes that "the normally functioning group is reckoned to be a group of 4-5 people".[3] Referring to the formation of scientific groups, S. Y. Zlochevsky points out that "a sufficiently trained researcher is at most able to grasp 5-7 opinions put forward by his colleagues. Experimentation has shown that if this number is exceeded, it results in the views of colleagues being inadequately understood. On the basis of this, 5-7 is considered the rational number of members in a scientific group."[4]

Are these conclusions and recommendations correct?

First of all, I would like to stress that many authors take on a great responsibility by establishing the optimality of quantitative characteristics of the group in general and by providing important parameters for the fields of practical activity (industry, the army, sport, etc.). Indeed, this would mean that the school class which, as we all know, well exceeds 20 pupils, has no hope of becoming a collective since it is subject to the "undivided sway of the forces of dissension". As far as "external cohesive influence" is concerned, one has to assume that in groups with under 20 mem-

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[1] S. I. Shapiro, "On a Mathematical Model of the Small Group (On the Question of Optimal Group Size)", in: *Socio-Psychological Questions of the Social Activeness of Schoolchildren and Students*, Kursk, 1971, pp. 48-49 (in Russian).

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 50.

[3] F. N. Antipina, "The Problem of the 'Small Group' in American Empirical Sociology", *Filosofskiye Nauki*, No. 4, 1965, p. 53.

[4] S. Y. Zlochevsky, "The Psychological Features of the Selection of the Membership of the Scientific Group Depending on the Logical and Organisational Structure of Scientific Research", in: *Psychology of Collective Activity*, Kiev, 1977, p. 7 (in Russian).

bers the "inner forces of cohesion" are miraculously independent of "external cohesive", i.e. educational (or, more broadly speaking, socialising) influences. That is the school class. But what about the military unit with over 20 members? Does one have to conclude that the forces of cohesion here are also highly unstable? And what about the sports team of over 20 members setting off for an important international competition?

One can cite endless examples of academic, military, production and scientific groups whose numerical composition does not coincide with the "optimal number" but which are genuine, socially mature collectives. In other words, though supposedly not optimal "in size", they are optimal socially. One must then ask for what purposes is the number of members not optimal? For both personally and socially insignificant laboratory interactions in an artificial group, perhaps? Indeed, is there such a thing as "general optimality"? Something is always optimal for a specific purpose: for the successful group realisation of specific purposes, for correspondence with specific norms and demands, for adapting to specific conditions, etc.

There is another more justified approach to the practical solution of the problem of optimal group size. It is a research strategy which barely relies on socio-psychological theory, which is an empirical, but not an artificial, laboratory attempt to solve the problem. Here, we have in mind the method of generalising the experience of a specific type of group under specific experimental conditions. This method is at present being used to carry out certain tasks of practical importance. An example of such experimentation is the applied research conducted under Y. S. Kuzmin.

In other words, the task of compiling a special list of the optimal sizes of groups engaged in all sorts of activity and working under different conditions is now being tackled.

The necessity for the formulation of an uncontradictory theory explaining socio-psychological phenomena in small groups and collectives as well as growing practical demands, are increasing the need for a new research strategy. In addition there are a number of difficulties which cannot be overcome within the framework of the previous approaches to the problem.

Whatever the results of the study of specific groups to discover their optimal size for applied purposes, and how-

ever successful these may be, they do not allow one to deduce an optimal size for the group or the collective in general. Those concerned with the necessity of proposing general figures for all kinds of practical activity usually quote Makarenko. He did indeed write about "primary team collectives" at the Dzerzhinsky Commune: "...The size of a team can vary between 7 and 15 people. A team should not contain over 15 members. Experience has shown that if comprised of a larger number of members, the primary collective yields poorly to the leadership of its senior member, who is unable to involve all the members of the team."[1] Makarenko also points out: "A primary collective, i.e. a collective which should not be divided further into small collectives or groups, should comprise no less than 7 and no more than 15 people. I do not know why this is so, I have not analysed this. I only know that if a primary collective has under 7 members, it begins to turn into a friendly collective, an exclusive group of friends. The primary collective with over 15 members always tends to divide into two collectives, there is always a line of division."[2]

First, it is quite clear from this quotation from the report entitled "On my Experience", that Makarenko was talking about the optimal size of a specific collective, a team of boys at his commune and not the collective in general. Second, Makarenko's statement did not claim to be a fundamental theoretical socio-psychological principle but was merely a reference to his own personal experience. After all, he does write: "I do not know why this is so, I have not analysed this." In this same report we read: "...What I am going to tell you is not my conclusions; conclusions can only be made in a large work, a monograph, in works backed up by Marxist analysis."[3] Thus, reference to Makarenko's educational experience does not and should not preclude other approaches to the problem of optimal group size. On the contrary, it should steer the researcher towards the search for specific solutions applicable to various groups, and at the same time towards continuing the theoretical analysis begun by the great educationalist Makarenko.

Thus, for every type of non-diffuse group, an optimal size can be determined for the performance of its function-

[1] A. S. Makarenko, *Collected Works* in seven volumes, Vol. V, pp. 9-10.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 256.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 251.

al tasks. The optimal size of a group as a functional system (a work team, space crew, scientific group, military detachment, academic group or sports team) is directly conditioned by the specific content of the group's objective activity and changes in this activity result in the alteration of some of the group's psychological traits. It is quite wrong to assume that the size of the group is determined by any of the group's psychological traits, irrespective of the content of its activity, for example by "global compatibility". So, the optimal size of a research group is determined by the actual programme on which that group is working, and is recorded in its programme-role structure (M. G. Yaroshevsky).

Within the limits of a given group size the problem arises of the optimisation of the system of interpersonal relations, in order to promote as far as possible the fulfilment of the group's functional tasks. Here, one can really reveal actual psychological laws. In particular, the lower the level of a group's development, the greater the significance its size acquires for integrative group processes (cohesion, one's satisfaction with the group, mutual understanding, etc.), while this factor plays a much less significant role in the collective.

In the final count, a group becomes optimal not as a result of an increase or decrease in size, but of a rise in its development level, by means of the alteration of the content of its objective activity and thus of the system of interpersonal relations within the group.

So, when a psychologist is faced with the task of recommending to practical workers the optimal group size for the performance of their specific tasks, *as a psychologist*, he has no right to impose on them a solution which in reality is a matter of practice rather than of psychology as such. It is another matter when he has to say what the optimal size of a group should be so that optimal psychological conditions can be created for the fulfilment of a group's functions. In this case, he should, first reveal the level of development of the given group and thus establish to what extent the interpersonal relations in the group are mediated by the content and values of its objective activity. And, depending on the results obtained (which must be backed up at least by a rapid analysis), he should put forward his ideas.

One can assert with justification that the socio-psycho-

logical potential of a highly developed group can compensate for the practical inadequacy of its size. Thus, the phenomenon of "supernormative collective activeness"[1] is found in various forms of communist work, in the radical change of production quotas, the movement of workmen to operate a larger number of machines simultaneously, etc. As for groups with a low level of development, in order to reveal an accessible optimum of psychological conditions of activity, one ought in fact to turn to the determination of a favourable group size. Let me say straight away that this is done through necessity, since in groups of this type the integrative traits are inversely dependent on group size. The psychological optimisation of the group requires the reduction of its size and this can clash with organisational requirements. Besides, the overall efficiency of joint activity frequently depends directly on the number of workers, and this often requires an increase in group size which can be uneconomic. A discrepancy is formed which must be taken into account. To sum up, it is clear that the strategy of socio-psychological research should be directed not towards the determination of optimal group size but rather towards the revelation of the optimal ways of achieving a high level of group development.

In this way, attempts to find an absolute number to describe optimal group size "in general" are doomed to failure from the start. And let me stress once again that references to a number discovered as a result of specific experiments with specific groups are a flimsy basis for such attempts.

The laws of interpersonal relations postulated with regard to the small group "in general", but actually deduced from the study of poorly developed groups, cannot be extended to other groups, especially to the collective, even when there is a coincidence of external characteristics, of which group size has always been a particularly prominent one. It is the inability to distinguish groups according to character and degree of activity-based mediation, the lumping together of all types of groups and obtaining mean indices in empirical studies, that has caused the above-men-

[1] Supernormative activeness is manifested as the correspondence of the psychology and behaviour of the collective to social expectations, which cannot be presented to the collective as normative or obligatory (for the corresponding type of activity) but which are values for the society for which activity is carried out.

tioned confusion in the formulation and solution of the question of the importance of group size. Only when activity-based mediation and not group size is recognised as determining socio-psychological processes will the social psychologist be able to provide an adequate estimation of group phenomena and correct practical guidelines.

Let me demonstrate this with regard to one of the problems on the border between social and educational psychology, where the exaggeration of the importance of group size can cause serious psychological errors.

There are postulates which, though not formulated as clear-cut theses and definitions, have nevertheless in practice entered the specific field of knowledge and determine practical approaches and solutions. One such postulate is the view that the effectiveness of educational activity is inversely proportional to the number of students. We cannot cite any specific source with this formulation of the idea, but it undoubtedly exists in educational thought and guides many practical steps in teaching.

"The smaller the school group, the easier it is to work with"; "it is easier to teach two people something than ten"; "the main evil of schools is overcrowded classes". One can go on with the list of such statements and finally come to the general conclusion: "Individual tuition is the optimal organisational form of academic activity." But here one has to stop. This last statement contradicts too blatantly the main principles of Soviet educational theory, for which this thesis is equivalent to a return to the practice of "noblemen's didactics" of the 18-mid-19th centuries in which the tutor frequently played the leading role in education.

Makarenko opposed "one-to-one tuition" bearing in mind the process of general education. And, indeed, it is highly unlikely that anyone today would seriously defend such tuition in the educational sphere if only because upbringing and teaching are one process. Meanwhile, the latent idea of the inverse relation between educational effectiveness and the size of the academic group, objectively reinforces the principle of "one-to-one tuition".

Approaching the problem from the stratometric view, we put forward the hypothesis that the inverse relation between teaching effectiveness and group size should be found only in groups where the interpersonal relations of the pupils are not mediated by substantial and well-planned academic

activity based on responsible dependence. Here, and only here, does the principle of "the fewer the pupils the better" make sense. In a true academic collective, in a group uniting people who work jointly (together and not side by side), in which socially significant tasks are performed and responsible dependence is an inherent feature of interrelations (the success or failure of one conditions the success or failure of all), a fundamentally different law operates: the effectiveness of academic activity is directly proportional to the number of students within the limits of the group size optimal for the given type of academic task. This means that ten can be easier to teach than two, that individual tuition is less productive than joint activity and that joint activity gives rise to the "group effect", an extraordinary addition to the possibilities of each individual person. All this takes place if academic activity acquires traits of genuine collectivity.

Collective cognitive activity as a form of academic educational work in schools is only just beginning to appear in the experimental research of Soviet educationalists and has not yet yielded convincing scientific and educational results. In our view, a more reliable basis for checking the above-mentioned hypothesis is the broad experience of intensive foreign-language teaching to adults under conditions of collective cognitive activity. In particular, we have in mind the work being carried out in the Department of Psychology at Moscow State University. The experimental data obtained from this research give ground for us to claim that within the limits of a group whose size is determined by the corresponding curriculum, as the number of students rises, the productivity of collective activity increases because of the "group effect", and the opposite occurs when the number of students decreases.[1] This is accompanied by intensive collective-forming processes.

If this and other hypotheses are confirmed in new specialised research, the abstract notion of the inverse relation between group size and teaching effectiveness not only in academic but also, of course, in any other (particularly industrial) activity, will be refuted.

[1] The experimental research conducted by L. A. Karpenko.

The General Psychological Theory of Activity and the Activity-Based Approach to Social Psychology

The working out of a psychological theory of the group is an important task for Soviet social psychology. But each particular theory should be an organic part of a general theory. How is the social psychological theory of interpersonal relations in groups and the collective related to the general theory and most important principles of Soviet psychology?

Describing the situation which had formed in Soviet psychology by the mid-1970s, A. N. Leontiev pointed out: "Unfortunately, it is socio-psychological problems that are the least elaborated in our science and the most littered with concepts and methods borrowed from foreign research, in other words, from studies subordinated to the task of seeking psychological grounds to justify and perpetuate the human relations of bourgeois society. But the Marxist transformation of social psychology cannot take place irrespective of a *general psychological view of individual*, and of the role in his formation of the vital links between the individual and the rest of the world, generated by the social relations into which he enters."[1] [The Author's italics.] Our conception proceeds from the *general psychological view of the individual* founded on the principle of activity of a person acting and being analysed at the social level, and consequently above all in the group, in the collective.

In our view, the main theoretical meaning of this conception lies in *the transfer of the principle of activity, which forms the central link in the Marxist conception of the psychology of the individual, i.e. general psychology, to the field of social psychology.* As a result, socio-psychological theory acquires new possibilities in the methodological confrontation with traditional Western psychology and makes it possible to change the conceptual structure of socio-psychological knowledge, by introducing the category of activity into psychological research.

Naturally, no one in social psychology today means to study and interpret the individual outside his social environment, outside the group, outside the community to which he belongs. On the contrary, it is group interaction

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[1] A. N. Leontiev, *Activity. Consciousness. Personality*, Moscow, 1977, p. 234 (in Russian).

and group interrelations that are the *subject* of socio-psychological research. One cannot say that the fact that interaction and interrelations occur in a real, functioning, working group with definite social aims, is ignored in the works of social psychologists and Soviet psychologists in particular. However the acknowledgement of this fact has not always influenced the development of socio-psychological research in the direction prompted by the general psychological interpretation of the human being. Meanwhile, just as the *individual* in objective activity changes the surrounding world and by this changes himself and develops his *personality*, so the social *group* in its joint socially significant activity constructs and changes the system of interpersonal relations and interpersonal interaction and becomes a *collective*. Both social psychology and general psychology are based on the principle *internal via external*. This is clearly demonstrated by phenomena of interpersonal relations. For example, collectivist self-determination with regard to tasks of group activity is formed as a result of energetic collective activity, aimed at the realisation of set goals; in other words, interpersonal relations are transformed by the activity of the collective which is directed *outwards*, at the appropriation of a socially significant object and not at these interpersonal relations themselves.

Using this approach, the general psychological conception of objective activity is expanded as a result of the inclusion of the concept of collective activity.

It is not so easy to understand or see what the principle of activity-based mediation can introduce or has already introduced into general socio-psychological theory. This is because, having initially arisen in the field of research into groups and collectives (the stratometric approach), it did not claim to go beyond the limits of this relatively narrow, though important, field. The idea of activity-based mediation was regarded as heuristically valuable only for understanding group psychology and for singling out special laws governing multistage intra-group activeness in collectives. This *adaptability of the stratometric conception to the tasks of inter-group differentiation* did not enable one to see prospects for its application in other areas of social psychology. Vygotsky once wittily remarked that as a theory spreads to more and more areas, its volume increases to infinity while its scientific content diminishes towards zero.

A real universality of ideas which form the foundation of a given conception is the only basis for such application of laws. In our opinion, the Marxist conception of socially determined *objective activity* as the creator of human relations possesses this universality.

By examining the collective as the *subject* of joint socially conditioned activity, one can see how it is *objectified in the object* of its activity, and at the same time, how this object is *deobjectified in the subject*, in the collective, mediating and transforming the links and relations between individuals. In our view, the Marxist conception of the determining role of objective activity can be applied to any interpersonal relations although the effects of activity-based mediation in them can be effaced and indistinct.

Activity-based mediation as a system-forming criterion, enables one to single out the collective as a group in which processes are determined by the content of joint, socially valuable activity, and thus introduces a new subject of research unknown to traditional Western psychology. After all the collective, as it is known and studied by Soviet psychologists, educationalists and sociologists, is born of socialist society, is a vital part of its social structure and its most important unit.

However, the principle of the mediation of interpersonal relations by the content of joint activity is found, one assumes, in any group which acts jointly, such as the countless associations which arise in any social system, including the capitalist. An exception to this is the diffuse group proper, the favourite laboratory group used by foreign psychologists to study small group processes. It is not a matter of whether or not interpersonal relations are mediated by activity in non-diffuse groups or small groups—these too are studied (in military, and industry, etc.). We accept that they are mediated. Rather, it is a question of what the content of this joint activity is, what aims it pursues, whose class interests it serves and so on. Ultimately, these aspects determine the nature of the interpersonal relations formed in groups and they inevitably differ from one another on a number of parameters.

There are historical reasons why American social psychology did not see the operation of the principle of activity-based mediation in the system of interpersonal relations and group proc being studied, did not discern the process of group pment and the emergence of higher

stages of development, and did not notice the possibility of the multistage, multilayered composition of highly developed groups. Traditional Western social psychology shunned Marxism and was thus confined by blinkers which left only a narrow section of empirical facts about a specific type of experimental small group within its field of vision. But the corresponding methods of their study and the conclusions and generalisations drawn could under no circumstances be applied to the broad field of psychological study of more or less developed groups in general and particularly to the collective.

The theoretical meaning of the conception of activity-based mediation cannot be reduced merely to the application of the principle of activity to the sphere of social psychology. This approach opens up the tempting prospect of viewing socio-psychological research in the light of the idea of the mediated nature of a person's psychic qualities formulated by Vygotsky. As we know the function of mediation is ensured by the use of signs with the aid of which mastering of behaviour and its social determination take place. It is this idea which proved fruitful in the elaboration of the more advanced branches of Soviet psychology above all genetic and educational psychology.

According to Vygotsky, the genetic sequence of psychic development is as follows: first the interpsychic and then the intrapsychic functions are formed. Hence we see the role of primary groups in the formation of the child: traits of personality initially take shape in these groups in the form of relations between children, and then take root in activity. But, whereas Vygotsky convincingly showed that the intrapsychic category contains the function of mediation, on the other hand, one can attempt to continue his idea moving from the intrapersonal determinant of behaviour to the interpersonal, i.e., from the individual to the group. It is obvious that the interpsychic, in its turn, should also presuppose the presence of a mediating factor, a certain intermediary that becomes the structural centre functionally determining all the processes which together make up group behaviour and interpersonal relations. This structural centre is *joint, socially determined activity*. The stratometric conception enables one to reveal mediating factors conditioning individual behaviour in the group, and to carry out a differential analysis of the dependence of personal characteristics on the level of group or collective develop-

ment, and also on the values and structure of the society in which these groups function. This last fact opens new paths for studying and understanding the individual.

These are the main points which include the socio-psychological theory of interpersonal relations in the context of the general theory of Soviet psychology. Socio-psychological research on the basis of the activity-based approach is relatively new, but by forming part of the mainstream of theoretical thought it is acquiring reliable guidelines and clear prospects for the future.

CHAPTER IV

Who is Who in the Group?

Interpersonal Choice: Riddles and Answers

In its study of the problems of small groups, modern-day social psychology has its own "cartography". The first "cartographer" was the American psychologist Jacob Moreno, who put forward a method of revealing interpersonal preferences in groups and the technique of graphic (sociometric) recording of communicative links within the group. Sociometric methods of studying interrelations have frequently been described in both popular and specialised scientific literature. With the aid of sociometry, one can detect the quantitative degree of preference, indifference or hostility shown by group members in the process of interpersonal relations. Sociometric data is widely used in determining group structure, the distribution of authority and power and in diagnosing the level of group development, etc.

The question: "With whom would you like to...?" is the basis of the sociometric method. It can refer to any sphere of human interrelations: with whom would you like to sit at school, go on holiday, spend your free time, work, etc. As a rule, two types of choice are given, in the area of joint work and leisure. There can also be a more precise definition of the degree of desirability of the choice (very desirable, desirable, indifferent, undesirable, very undesirable) and a restriction of the number of people from whom to choose. The subsequent analysis of choice when entered on a choice matrix shows a complicated interweaving of mutual sympathies and antipathies, the existence of sociometric "favourites" (chosen by the majority), "outcasts" (rejected by all) and a whole hierarchy of intermediate strata between these two poles.

Undoubtedly, the sociometric method is highly efficient and can help to unfold a sufficiently clear picture of emotional attractions within the group, which would take much longer via observation. Any group can be interpreted as a communicative system, emerging through the interaction of its members. However, sociometric analysis can only provide a very general description of this system of communications. In no way does it bring us any closer to understanding why in certain groups the individual is opposed to the group and in others no such split is evident. One cannot regard the system of links established with the aid of the sociometric technique as invariable. Today's "favourite" can be tomorrow's "outcast". Sociograms cannot tell us the reasons for these changes, nor the motives which guide group members in their rejection of some and choice of others, nor what lies behind sympathy and antipathy. The unsatisfactory aspects of the sociometric method were correctly outlined by the Bulgarian psychologist L. Desev: "1. Limited cognitive opportunities (the impossibility of a sufficiently profound and comprehensive analysis of the individual, group and collective): a) primarily emotional, and not all, relations are recorded, expressed in sympathy, antipathy and indifference; b) motivation, the reasons behind individual relations remain vague; c) relatively small informative value—according to U. Esser and P. Förster, they give 20 per cent of the information obtained by the 'group appraisal method'; d) they are suitable for the study of groups and collectives with no more than 40 members. 2. The danger of subjectivism—actual relations in daily life and at work do not always coincide with the relations recorded by sociometry."[1]

The model of the group as an emotional-psychological phenomenon which forms the basis of sociometric research does not enable one to analyse interpersonal relations on the basis of definite socially established norms, values and evaluations, for everything is reduced merely to the registration of interactions, reciprocal emotional appraisals and attractions. This type of approach simply ignores the purposeful activity of the group and its members.

The philosophical and methodological criticism of Moreno's ideas which has accompanied the use of the socio-

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[1] L. Desev, *The Psychology of Small Groups*, Moscow, 1979, pp. 51-52 (in Russian).

metric technique in the USSR in recent years has been concentrated on the so-called sociodynamic law. According to Moreno, it is only possible to normalise the psychological climate in a group, or raise the level of its cohesion and activeness by the displacement of individuals, the removal from the group of persons with a low sociometric status and the introduction of persons with a high status. However, this criticism has not touched on the essentially mechanistic nature of sociometric procedure.

In reaction to certain aspects of sociometry, a number of studies were carried out by my colleagues which have made it possible to understand more deeply the essence of interpersonal relations and communications in the group.

In one of these studies (by Y. B. Yanotovskaya) an attempt was made to examine "choice in action": a choice made by adolescents during practical labour activity. In contrast to all works using the sociometric method, Yanotovskaya surmised that sociometric choice does not always reflect the real relations between group members, and that relations revealed as a result of the application of sociometric procedure may not correspond to real-life relations.

Research consisting of two cycles was carried out to check this supposition. The aim of the first cycle was to detect the structure of primary collectives with the aid of a traditional version of the sociometric method. The question: "To which of your friends do you turn for help if you are in difficulty?" was put to groups from secondary schools and vocational schools. (This was in reference to a specific situation during a class in lathe-operating.) The second cycle recorded, without the students' knowledge, to which members they actually did turn for help in these classes. Before they started their work operations (the experiment was conducted in several stages: when no assessment of work was made, under conditions of controlled assessment, and under conditions of competition) the teacher said: "If you are in difficulty, you may turn to me or to each other for help."

By recording appeals for help throughout the entire experimental series the researchers obtained a precise picture of the actual reciprocal choices of group members in the course of the activity. In this way two sets of data were obtained: sociometric choices, which the author regarded as predictable, and actual choices. When compared, considerable differences were found between the two. Whereas

in the sociometric (predictable) choice some adolescents and youths were assigned to the "not preferred" category, there was no such category in the actual choice. This meant that genuine, actual relations between people take shape in joint socially useful activity. In comparison to sociometric choices in conditions of work activity a predominance of positive and not negative emotional links was observed.

The analysis of the choice of work partner shows that "favourites", who attracted the absolute majority in sociometric choice, may only be in the "preferred" sub-group formed on the basis of the results of actual choice. In sociometric choice, a decisive role is played by the social expectations of the group or the teacher which are recorded in the evaluative formulae of the given collective—a kind of cliché—determining the direction of choice. In practical activity, on the other hand, choice also presupposes the prediction of mutual preference based not only on the relations between the person tested and his work partner (I want to choose him), but also on an appraisal of the possible result (How will so-and-so react if I choose him?). Therefore, the most diverse motives can play a decisive role in the realisation of choice: prestigiousness, self-assertion, work motive, etc. It should be stressed that this is a matter of "choices in activity", determined by the orientational and working structure of the group as a socio-psychological body.

The attempt by psychologists to establish on the basis of sociometric measurements, the sympathies and antipathies of group members by means of the choice procedure (which fits the idea of the group as an emotional-psychological phenomenon) inevitably remove from the framework of experimentation the problem of revealing the far more significant system of interpersonal relations that characterise the group as a socio-psychological body. Indeed, sympathy and antipathy are an altogether shaky foundation for the analysis of the nature and mechanisms of group interaction. Even some adherents of sociometry have been compelled to admit this. "Moreno's sociometric scales constitute only a beginning but his work points to the difficulties involved and gives us some appreciation of what still remains to be done,"[1] noted T. Shibutani.

[1] T. Shibutani, *Society and Personality. An Interactionist Approach to Social Psychology*, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1962, p. 409.

The interaction between an individual and the environment is formed and realised in the system of objective relations in production and social life. As Marx wrote: "In production men enter into relation not only with nature. They produce only by co-operating in a certain way and mutually exchanging their activities. In order to produce, they enter into definite connections and relations with one another and only within these social connections and relations does their relation with nature, does production, take place."[1]

Behind the actual links which objectively form in the process of interrelations between people, we find a complex system of expectations, mutual interest and varied views in which interpersonal attitudes have been consolidated. Of course, the nature and significance of objectively forming links is determined above all on the basis of the study of actual facts, the actions and deeds of people, and the objective results of joint work activity. Lenin stressed that there can be only one criterion for judging the real thoughts and feelings of people: "the *actions* of these individuals. And since we are dealing only with social 'thoughts and feelings', one should add: the *social actions* of individuals, i.e., *social facts.*"[2] Even a superficial knowledge of sociometry enables one to see that experimental answers may not reflect the real grounds for choice and thus often do not help to reveal true motivation but confuse the experimenter.

Researchers are faced with the question of how to show the real inner dynamics of group interrelations that remain uncovered by sociometric methods, which only enable one to discover more rapidly and definitely than by simple observation the external aspect of these relations. The general external picture of interactions in the group can be regarded as the result of the deeper relations between group members, but sociometry does not clarify the reasons behind preference and isolation.

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[1] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "Wage Labour and Capital", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 9, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 211.

[2] V. I. Lenin, "The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr. Struve's Book", *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 405.

In this connection an important socio-psychological task arises—*the discovery of the motivational nucleus of choice in interpersonal relations*—which must be included in sociometric analysis, i.e., the discovery of what motivates an individual's desire to enter emotional (and also production) contact with some group members and rejection of other members.

A direct question does not always result in a sincere answer since the individual himself is not always aware of why he finds one person preferable and another unacceptable. In this connection, the experimental discovery of the motivation of interpersonal choice on the basis of indirect data is of great importance.

The elucidation of the motivational nucleus of choice in the system of interpersonal relations is an example of the improvement of sociometric tests. Owing to the introduction of the appropriate methodological procedure, it becomes possible to shift from the study of the surface stratum of communication to the study of its inner strata. So, the sum total of interpersonal relations as reflected in sociometric research usually serves as the fundamental structural characteristic of the group under study. Sociometric indices function as vital psychological variables in the study of intragroup interaction, but sociometric preferability or rejectableness will always appear as a "secret" which the teacher or psychologist must reveal.

So, what does the sociometric section, i.e. the information contained in choice matrices and sociograms represent? Do we obtain with the help of sociometry a fundamental picture or do we merely reveal the undifferentiated surface layer of interrelations? As V. A. Petrovsky has shown,[1] there are two aspects which can be revealed here: 1) in contrast to the formal picture of work contacts, the sociometric scheme of interpersonal relations in the group acts as the psychological structure of social links; 2) the sociometric scheme itself becomes a formal structure with regard to the substantial factors determining the psychological unity of the collective. For example, the sociometric method

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[1] V. A. Petrovsky, "The Methodology of Studying Motivation of Interpersonal Choice in School Collectives", *Measurements in the Study of Educational Problems*, Tartu, 1973 (in Russian).

cannot distinguish an established collective from a corporation or a corporation from a random group.

There are two main ways to overcome the narrow sociometric approach. First, through the creation of new experimental procedures on a different basis, and second, by regarding the sociometric picture merely as the external form of collective life and assuming that a deeper idea of its content can be gained by analysing the motivational relations which united the group under study into a single whole. Thus, sociometry is not totally rejected, but occupies a specific place in the system of socio-psychological research into the group.

V. A. Petrovsky substantiates his method of revealing the motivational nucleus of interpersonal choice in the group in the following way: let us assume, for instance, that a pupil who is unprepared for a difficult dictation on material already covered is given the right to choose freely whom he will sit next to. It is easy to imagine his train of thought. Most of all, he would like to sit next to Ivanov, because he will undoubtedly write everything correctly and will not hesitate to help. Next, he would choose Petrov, who would help but not very willingly... In fifth place he would put Pavlov, who would undoubtedly want to help but might get the dictation all wrong himself. And last of all, he would choose someone who not only would not share his knowledge, but would tell the teacher that he was being disturbed.

Of course, cases when a pupil relies completely on his neighbour's help, making no effort of his own, are untypical. However, if one assumes the probability of such a situation and compares the two lists of choice (one regulated in accordance with a free sociometric choice, and the other in accordance with a secret plan: "I will be able to copy whatever I need"), they will coincide. And then the hope of obtaining help is the only content of the motivational nucleus of the choice of desk partner.

One can also compile regulated lists on different individual virtues. If one then sets these lists out in hierarchical order and compares them with the list obtained on the basis of sociometric instructions, it becomes clear how the corresponding personal virtues of group members form part of the motivational nucleus of choice in sociometric experimentation.

The evaluation of choices obtained makes it possible

first to elucidate which personal virtues mainly comprise the scale of individual preferability, second, to establish the relative importance of each individual trait on the basis of correlation coefficients, and third, to establish the group of individual characteristics which have high correlation coefficients. It is this group of characteristics that forms the motivational nucleus of choice in the system of interpersonal relations. Having established this nucleus, one can judge which personal needs dominate in the choice.

The revelation of the motivational nucleus of preferability helps one to understand interrelations whenever there is a question as to why the sociometric picture in a given group looks the way it does; why one group member prefers another; why one section of the group is in the "favourites" category and another in the "outcasts" category. It is obviously of great importance for social psychology to obtain answers to these questions.

It has been experimentally established (N. M. Shvaleva) that the content of the motivational nucleus of the choice of partner in the structure of interpersonal relations can indicate the level attained by the given group as a collective. At the initial stage of group formation, choice is characterised by a direct emotional slant, and orientations in choice of partner are mainly towards a person's external virtues (sociability, external attractiveness, style of dress, etc.). However, choice in a more highly developed group is carried out not only on the basis of first impressions, but proceeds from an evaluation of deeper personal traits which come to the fore during joint activity and in actions of personal importance.

With the development of the group as a collective, there is an increase in the status or "value" of personal traits, which characterise an individual's general outlook and attitude to work, that is, features which form and are manifested in joint activity.

The Reference Group, Referentiality and Referenceometry

Thus, for sociometrists, sympathy and antipathy have remained the basis of choice in the system of interpersonal relations. One person chooses another because he *wants to be with that person*: to associate, work, rest, be friends, and enjoy himself with. No doubt sympathies are a sufficiently strong binding link for people who have formed a

group not for the purposes of joint work, but for rest, leisure and entertainment. And, no doubt the existence of mutual attraction, of sympathy or antipathy, has importance for common work as well. But one wonders whether sympathy is the only or the principal reason why one person, in the course of communication, singles out another from many, differentiating the group according to the most significant criteria from his point of view. If one looks at Western literature on intra-group differentiation one gets the idea that essentially there can be no other foundation for choice than the emotional. It is no accident that in group dynamics, the group is regarded mainly as an emotional-communicative association of people. However, using the principle of activity-based mediation, one can reach different conclusions.

One of the most important characteristics of the individual in the group is that he *looks to his group as a source of orientation* in the surrounding reality. This tendency is a natural result of the division of labour. Each participant in joint activity has an interest in the assessment of its important conditions, aims and tasks, of each person's contribution to the common work, including his own, and in the evaluation of his own personality, reflected in the mirror of general opinion. To a great extent, this is all inherent in the collective, where interpersonal relations are mediated by the common work, by its content and values, derived from the demands made on the collective by society, and from social ideology.

The individual acquires a personal scale of values through active interaction with other group members and through performing the specific tasks set before the group. The assimilation of these values also presupposes a kind of control over the individual, actually implemented by the group or attributed to the group by the individual. Orientation towards group values and the group view compels the individual to single out a set of people whose views and evaluations are particularly important for him. These people act as a kind of prism through which he strives to carry out acts of social perception—to see and evaluate the objects, aims, tasks and methods of activity or other people which he regards as significant. They become the mirror in which he begins to see himself. All this obviously presupposes the kind of principle of preferability and electiveness in interpersonal relations which is lacking in sociometric research.

How should one designate this group of people within the collective which the individual chooses in order to orientate himself to their views and evaluations, a group of people who acquire the status of *special preferability* for the subject? Y. V. Shchedrina, who first posed and studied this problem, suggested that it be regarded as *the individual's reference circle of communication*. Thus, she ascribed the grounds of choice to the altogether broad class of socio-psychological phenomena contained within the concept of the "reference group".

The concept "reference group" was first introduced by Herbert Hyman, who conducted research into social status in the 1930s. By cross-examining people and elucidating with whom they compare themselves when they wish to get an idea of their social status, he established that the standards with which an individual compares himself are not so much the standards of the groups to which he belongs as the standards of the groups to which he feels he belongs. The latter act as reference groups. A reference group is a group which attracts a person, with whose norms and values he identifies or strives to identify himself, and a member of which he would willingly become (what Kelly calls the normative function of a reference group); or a group with which a person compares himself, which serves as a starting point for a subject's evaluation of himself and other people, the so-called frame of reference (what Kelly calls the comparative function of the reference group). The comparative and normative functions of a reference group cannot be held in contrast. Shchedrina rightly points out: "Thus, we can conclude that just as the value aspect is characteristic of comparative reference groups, so the correlative or comparative aspect is characteristic of normative reference groups, i.e., the two different functions of reference groups (the normative and comparative) are deeply and inherently related."[1] Shibutani combines to a certain extent both views, stressing the value aspest inherent in the concept of the reference group and defines the latter as a group "whose outlook is used by the actor as the frame of reference in the organization of his perceptual field".[2]

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[1] See: *Psychological Theory of the Collective*, Moscow, 1979, p. 115 (in Russian).

[2] T. Shibutani, "Reference Groups as Perspectives", *American Journal of Sociology*, Chicago, Vol. LXX, Number 6, May 1955, p. 565.

Her theoretical analysis of literature on reference groups enabled Shchedrina to single out and underline a factor of evaluation which is invariable for all definitions of the reference group: a subject's orientation towards his reference group's evaluation of his actions, personal traits, the vitally important circumstances of his activity and the subject of personal interests, etc. Even when an individual has no information on his reference group's evaluation of his person, he cannot help making suppositions about its possible opinion. For the reference group's norms and values to remain a permanent point of reference for the individual, he must constantly correlate his actual behaviour to these norms and values. An individual chooses from the numerous people around him those to whom he attributes a special and subjectively important trait, a particular characteristic—*referentiality*.

Referentiality is revealed in situations where the attitude of the subject to objects of personal significance is determined (i.e., to aims and tasks of activity, and also to the objective difficulties of their realisation, to conflict situations and to the personal traits of participants in joint activity, including himself, etc.). *The correlation of subject and objects of orientation is effected by means of turning to the scale of values of another person, another member or other members of a collective.* Referentiality is a form of special subject-subject-object relations, in which the link with another subject mediates the relation of the subject to the object of subjective significance. "A significant other person" becomes a kind of mirror in which the individual and all that surrounds him is reflected. Naturally, group members possess different degrees of referentiality and this fact explains the direction of choice, the greater preferability of some compared to others.

Referential preferability significantly differs from preferability in the classical sociometric test (taking into account all its modifications which do not change its essence). Referentiality evidently lies in the deeper layers of intra-group activeness, mediated by the values adopted in the given collective. The individual is given the opportunity not only of perceiving the surrounding world through the prism of his companions' scale of values (convictions, views and opinions), but also, owing to this, of correcting his attitude to his environment and of better understanding and evaluating himself. In communication with his refer-

ence group, an individual as the subject of cognition becomes the object of self-cognition, consciously or unconsciously singling out individuals capable of evaluating him by those parameters which he himself regards as most important.

Thus, to regard electiveness and preferability in the group exclusively from the sociometric point of view is to impoverish the interpretation of interpersonal relations and the essence of intra-group differentiation, and to ignore the activity-based approach to group processes and the conception of the individual in the group. The psychology of interpersonal relations is extremely limited without consideration of referential preferability.

Perhaps the advantage of the sociometric approach to the group lies in the fact that it is firmly based on operations research, equipped with a corresponding empirical procedure and provides precise quantitative data, systematised and vividly represented in sociograms and matrices? There are, in fact, no grounds for such an assertion. *Referenceometry* (the measurement of referentiality)—a simple way of revealing referential preferability—is no less effective than traditional sociometric procedure.

The idea of referenceometry was intended, on the one hand, to enable the individual under study to get to know the views of any group member on previously selected objects of undisputed significance (including the evaluation of his, the individual's, personal traits), and on the other, to limit strictly the number of people chosen. This compelled those tested to show a high level of selectivity in choosing the circle of people whose opinions and evaluations attracted them most of all. "Talking privately to each person," writes Shchedrina, "the experimenter led him to believe that he might be given the chance of finding out some of the evaluations made about him by his colleagues. After the individual had marked one of the group (on a list of the group presented to him—*Auth.)*, the experimenter announced that he could make another choice, possibly the last. Then, he was allowed to make one final choice. The instructions were specially designed so that the individual being tested did not know beforehand how many evaluations he would be allowed to find out. This was done in order to reveal a strictly ordered group of people whose evaluations were of interest to the individual. The important aspect of this procedure was that the individual, absorbed by the possibility of

finding out the opinion of people whose evaluation was at that moment most important to him, remained unaware of the specific aim of the experiment, thus enabling the experimenter to obtain a strictly ordered list of the individual's preferences."[1]

The study of referential phenomena with the aid of this type of measurement procedure has produced highly interesting results. To start with, they fully confirm the hypothesis of *the presence in every collective of a special system of preferences and choices, the foundation of which is the criterion of referentiality.* This system of links has the same formal characteristics as the sociometric system. Referenceometric procedure is highly efficient and portable. It gives an idea of the status structure (who is who in the group), the reciprocity or absence of reciprocity of preferences, makes it possible to reveal the motivational nucleus of choice and also to conduct auto-referenceometric experimentation (in which the person tested predicts his own place in the system of choices). It also enables one to conduct mathematical analysis of data and to express this graphically on charts and choice matrices, etc. But, in contrast to the sociometric system, it is the *value factor* and not sympathies or antipathies that forms the basis of choice. Values, which make up the inner foundation of the collective's socially significant activity, also form the basis of intra-group preferability and choice according to the criterion of referentiality.

Thus, we can make an important conclusion. As we know, J. Moreno singled out two main structures in group organisation: the *formal* (official, apparent, external), and the *informal* (internal, obscure, dynamic), concealed behind or beneath the formal. One should assume that this differentiation of structures was sufficiently productive. However, Moreno wrongly identified the informal dynamic structure with the sociometric system, and described the communications within this structure as exclusively emotional. Meanwhile, yet another informal group structure, besides the sociometric, no less, and perhaps even more, significant for an understanding of group life, remained concealed behind the formal structure, i.e., the *structure of subject-subject-object relations*, in which the values of society represented in the subject's scale of values are accu-

[1] *Psychological Theory of the Collective*, p. 122.

mulated. Moreno and traditional Western social psychology in general, bypassed this second inner structure of the group. Now, the study of this almost unresearched socio-psychological structure is acquiring great explanatory significance.

The question arises of how the two systems of intragroup choices and preferences correlate with one another. This, too, has been experimentally answered. Apparently, coincidence is not excluded, but rather improbable, and even considerable differences may exist between sociometric and referenceometric choices.

In over fifty per cent of cases there was a weak interaction between choices (when only one person chosen sociometrically, was also chosen referenceometrically), or the choices did not coincide at all. Frequently, those who were "outcasts" in the sociometric experiment, were elected in the referenceometric experiment by the same person. In certain groups this phenomenon occurred in 25-28 per cent of the possible number of cases. It is interesting to compare these data with the results of the comparison of choices according to the two opposite sociometric criteria of rest and work. Here, the coincidence of such opposite choices was observed in only 1 per cent of cases.

Hence, one can conclude that the emotional factor is clearly the direct determinant in sociometric choice, dominating regardless of what the person is being chosen for—work or leisure. In cases of sociometric choice according to the criterion of work cooperation, although a partner is being chosen for joint work, the person choosing more often than not, proceeds from emotional preferences, ignoring the person's characteristics from the point of view of value. It is quite another matter when choice is determined by factors of referentiality—value-normative, comparative, evaluative, and the factor of desire for a rise in social status. The social significance of these factors and their leading role in the general determination of collective activity appear indisputable.

The fundamental difference between these two systems of group preferences is corroborated by other results obtained in experimentation. Low correlations were obtained between the sociometric and referenceometric status of individuals. It is worth noting that many people (by no means all, of course) who were in the category of sociometric "outcasts" were among the referenceometric "favourites". Thus, the fact that an individual is not chosen by another

according to the emotions, is not a decisive characteristic of his position in the system of intra-group differentiation. It must still be discovered whether he is a kind of "group oracle", its "trusted person" and "authority", whether the group prefers to look at people, events and the circumstances of activity with his eyes, in other words, one must find out how significant, ~~how referential he is~~ for his companions.

But, perhaps referenceometric choice does not prove that a person is elected on the criterion of referentiality? What if an individual simply picks out those whose opinion he does not yet know, omitting those of whose opinion he has no doubt? This supposition has also been checked experimentally. First of all, the degree of the individual's confidence in the appraisals to be given of him by his group co-members was elucidated. In more than fifty per cent of cases those tested expressed a high degree of confidence in the expected appraisals (10 per cent were practically 100 per cent confident). And nevertheless, the individual inquired about the appraisals of precisely these same group members through the experimenter. "This indicator," writes Shchedrina, "can evidently be called a paradox of the participants' desire to obtain surplus information about an object of significance from people they regard as referential."[1]

Indeed, this is a paradox! And yet, does the eternal question which lovers never tire of asking each other: "Do you love me?" not have the same psychological basis? It would seem that everything is clear, the choice has long been made and sufficiently irrefutable proof obtained, and yet a person goes on and on asking: "Do you love me?"

Thus, obviously referenceometric choice reflects the important aspect of the psychology of interpersonal relations, makes it possible to carry out a referenceometric "vision" of group communications based on values, and opens up new prospects for socio-psychological research. It supplements the sociometric approach and the sociometric tests as an instrument for cognising group differentiation, and moreover, is applied not to the surface layer of intra-group activeness but to the deeper layers conditioned by the content and values of activity. Undoubtedly this is a more substantial description of group differentiation than the sociometric one. Whereas the latter allows one to give a

[1] *Psychological Theory of the Collective*, pp. 124-25.

rough outline of interpersonal relations in the group as a kind of community where links are superficial and mainly emotional (I want to be with him—I do not want to be with him; I like him—I do not like him), the psychological study of the collective, in which relations between its members are mediated by the content of activity, necessarily demands the consideration of referential indicators.

The Individual in the Group

Man develops his personality in the society of others. As we know, the fact of belonging to the human race makes one an "individual". Born into the world an individual, man develops his personality later, and this is a process of a historical kind. While still an infant, the individual is included in a specific, historically formed system of social relations. In the course of his future life, this system forms his personality.

However, it would be wrong to view the personality merely as the passive product of the social environment and not as an active agent. The assimilating of social experience proceeds in man via his "inner world" which reflects a person's attitude to what he does and what is done to him. A person's activeness is manifested in characteristic motives of behaviour, attitudes and ways of action, and in diverse activity aimed at transforming the surrounding world. A person's activeness is expressed in his world outlook. Identical circumstances in life can give rise to very different positions revealing different forms of individual activeness.

It would seem that, above all, the personality is "something in me for me", but on closer inspection it is actually "what is in me for others". All the inner psychological strata of the personality are formed as a result of communication and are destined for communication. A person enters communication and defines in it vitally important guidelines for his behaviour, constantly checking what he does with what others expect of him, taking their opinions, feelings and demands into consideration. Ultimately, apart from the satisfaction of natural needs, everything a person does for himself (whether he is studying, working, assisting or impeding something) he also does for others and perhaps more for others than for himself, even when he may believe the very opposite.

Marx wrote in *Capital*: "...Man first sees and recognises himself in other men. Peter only establishes his own identity as a man by first comparing himself with Paul as being of like kind."[1] In other words, by cognising another person's traits, we acquire the necessary information to enable us to formulate an appraisal of ourselves. However, modern-day scientific data makes it possible to take this thought further: the appraisal of the Self (individual self-appraisal) is the result of the constant collation of what I observe in myself with what I see in other people, and, at the same time, with what I assume others see in me. Peter, already knowing something of himself looks closely at and compares himself with Paul, and believes that Paul is not indifferent to his (Peter's) personal traits and actions. This is all part of Peter's self-appraisal and determines his general state.

Here, of course, as in the quotation from Marx, figurative licence has been used. This is not a case of a certain Paul, but of a reference group, whose demands are taken into consideration by man as a personality, from which he draws his scale of values, whose ideals and interests are his ideals and interests, and so on. One should point out that every single person has his or her reference group, whose opinion is a constant guide. As a rule, this is not one group but several: at work, with friends, in the family, etc.

It is fine if the demands, expectations, interests, ideals and other values of all a person's reference groups are similar, and, more important, correspond to socially significant aims and ideals. However, street friends frequently approve and indeed encourage adolescent evaluations, interests, actions and desires which are totally unacceptable to the family and go against everything to which the parents have oriented their adolescent child. However, he takes both opinions into consideration. As a result, the adolescent's personality belongs to two sharply contrasting reference groups and suffers a severe psychological conflict.

It is an orientation towards the position of a reference group unknown to the educator which often explains an adolescent's or young person's rigid indifference to everything of importance and significance for, say, the family or the school class. "He thinks only of himself, he recognises no authority, no one can influence him," asserts the mother

[1] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p. 59.

of an adolescent child. This is a grave psychological and educational error. Such an assertion ought not to be made until it has been discovered whether there are any influential reference groups gradually forming the adolescent's negativist attitude to his family and school.

If an individual constantly checks his actions against the views and values of his reference group, it is very important for the psychologist to compare what a person sees in himself with what has value and significance for him. Let us imagine that a person is given a list of moral concepts (modesty, pride, rudeness, thoughtfulness, accuracy, adherence to principles, etc.) and is asked to place them in order of importance for the personality of any individual.

We thus obtain a "standard" or ideal rank of personal traits (these traits can be moral or professional, volitional, etc.) which can be used in the course of further experimentation. Next, we ask the same person, using the same rank of concepts, to place in order of significance those moral traits which he sees in himself. Now we have two numbered ranks, a "standard" and a "subjective", which can be collated. Comparison carried out according to a special formula reveals what is called the *rank correlation coefficient.*

Let us assume that an individual's "standard" and "subjective" ranks coincide completely (incidentally, this is extremely rare). This means that the individual is completely satisfied with himself in this respect: with his moral condition, his self-will or his appearance, depending on which traits he is dealing with. His own "subjective" rank is his model, his standard. Here we can say that the individual's self-appraisal is +1. Now let us imagine an equally improbable phenomenon: the individual's "standard" rank is the complete inverse of his "subjective" rank. From this one can infer that the individual has the lowest possible self-appraisal: —1. Between +1 and —1 is a scale of appraisals showing how an individual evaluates himself in a given respect.

A considerable number of people were tested using this procedure (S. A. Budassi). Take for instance Sergei V. His level of self-appraisal was 0.3; he clearly has a low opinion of himself. Irina S. has a self-appraisal coefficient of 0.91; her "subjective" list was very close to her "standard" and evidently she has a very high opinion of herself. Yekaterina V. has a coefficient of 0.61; Yelizaveta Z.—0.56 and

so on. It appears that every person has a kind of "inner manometer" whose readings show how he evaluates himself, what his general state is, and whether or not he is satisfied with himself.

It is hard to overestimate the importance of this overall appraisal of satisfaction with one's personal traits shown on the scale of this "inner manometer". Too high an appraisal (from 0.7; 0.8) or too low an appraisal (below 0.2; 0.3) can result in an inner conflict for the individual. Of course this conflict manifests itself in various ways.

A person with an excessively high self-appraisal tends to overestimate himself in situations where there are no grounds for this. As a result, he frequently meets with a sceptical attitude to his pretensions from his reference group. He becomes embittered, shows suspiciousness or deliberate arrogance, and in the end may lose essential interpersonal contacts and retire into himself. An excessively low self-appraisal can signify the development of an inferiority complex, a stable lack of self-confidence, a rejection of initiative, and indifference and anxiety. The fact that self-appraisal is the result of a kind of projection of the "subjective" rank on to the "standard", something of which the individual is by no means always aware, enables us to understand its complex integral nature and to show that it is not achieved directly but with the aid of a tool, a standard, consisting of the individual's values and ideals.

However, it is apparently not enough merely to know an individual's self-appraisal to describe his world outlook. Among my acquaintances is a person who has a very high opinion of himself on very many points, but life has more than once proved that other people, including those whose opinion he is compelled to take into account, have a very different view of him. Evidently one needs to elucidate yet another indicator of the individual's position in the group, i.e., expected appraisal. We can reveal this by means of an experimental procedure similar to the above-mentioned. To determine expected appraisal, we use the existing "standard" list and also a specially compiled list for traits (compiled according to the above-mentioned rules), placed in the order in which the participant believes his reference group would have placed them had it been given the task of characterising him using these traits.

The mathematical processing of the data obtained enables

one to determine the expected appraisal coefficient. It can be high, average or low, it can be close to or far from the level of self-appraisal, and finally, it can vary in relation to different reference groups. This latter point is particularly interesting. It has been noted that an individual's stable expected appraisal with regard to the collective changes significantly and becomes unstable when the individual joins a new collective and establishes new communications. For instance, an adolescent who is confident within the family, the company of friends and in the class collective, loses this confidence to a greater or lesser degree in the Pioneer camp where he meets new people who do not know him, who have not yet formed a definite view or appraisal of him, and who judge him on the basis of observations that are often random and superficial. Having established in a special study that the individual in new circumstances returns to his original expected appraisal, we can thus elucidate the degree to which an individual has joined the new group, the extent to which he and the group understand each other, and also the nature of his general state within the group (A. P. Kopylova).

Individual self-appraisal and expected appraisal are without doubt important characteristics of the individual in his relations with the group. But the attitude of the individual to the group here is on the whole expressed indirectly: self-appraisal takes shape in the human collective and includes a standard which is related to group values, but it does not contain the individual's direct appraisal of the group. And, indeed, it is extremely important to know whether an individual has a high or low estimation of the group. Is a high self-appraisal frequently accompanied by a low appraisal of the group (experimental data showed that this is so) and is a low self-appraisal frequently accompanied by a high appraisal of the group? The method of study described above enables us to elucidate this as well.

Say we have a person with a high self-appraisal, a low estimation of others and a low expected appraisal, an individual who clashes in relations with other people, who tends to regard everyone as callous and unable to understand his lofty intellectual traits, etc. If another individual differs from him in an unjustifiably high expected appraisal, this can be the result of self-assurance and a conceited attitude to others. In any case, even if these traits are not

openly manifested in behaviour, they are potential and can at a suitable moment reveal themselves in the general trend of the individual's behaviour. In other words, there is fertile soil for their growth.

These three indicators—self-appraisal, expected appraisal, and the individual's appraisal of the group—make up the description of a personality. Whether or not he wishes, a person takes into account these subjective indicators of his general state within the group. He even does this when he is unaware of the existence of these indicators and knows nothing of his permanent "inner manometer" whose three dials show how he sees himself, how he sees others and how, in his view, others see him.

The "inner manometer" of individual appraisal gives readings which a person collates when organising his contacts, entering communication and during his activity. The designer, engineer and adjuster of this manometer is the social group and its mechanism is the interiorised mechanism of social contacts, orientations and values. This collation mainly occurs unconsciously and the individual automatically adjusts to the type of behaviour determined by these indicators.

Unconsciously does not mean uncontrollably. Even if we ignore for the moment the fact that we possess the necessary psychological tools to record all indicators of interest: self-appraisal, expected appraisal and individual appraisal of the group, we should not forget that these vitally important appraisals are formed in the conscious life of the individual. Before becoming the property of the mind, they are represented in interpersonal contacts. The family, teacher, friends, books and films actively form both the child's "standard" set of moral values and his "subjective" list. They teach him to compare the two and to strive to bring them as close to each other as possible through the correctly organised process of education. An individual learns to evaluate others by the same indicators as he evaluates himself, having learned beforehand to compare himself with others. Born "without a mirror in his hands", as Marx put it, a person becomes accustomed to looking at the social group as into a mirror and, having mastered this habit, he transposes this "mirror" into his personality, retaining the habit of glancing into it from time to time.

In order consciously to direct the development of the personality, one must have a clear idea of the mechanism

of this unconscious behavioural self-control, and concentrate on the whole system of evaluations by which a person characterises himself and others. One must see the dynamics of their alterations and, striving to understand that person better, always to see him in the context of relations with all his reference groups. In other words, one should not lose sight of the social essence of the personality, however private or strictly individual its manifestations may seem.

The Origin and Psychological Characteristics of Leadership

One can, I think, regard as a postulate of social psychology the idea that the people making up a group cannot all have identical positions with regard to the group's occupation (the goals of its activity) or to one another. It is a matter of how to understand and describe the confrontation which is contained in the concepts "leader", "head", "authority", "followers", "subordinates", etc., and which is reflected in those people's personal characteristics.

Every group member occupies a specific place in the system of group organisation that corresponds to his own professional and personal characteristics, to his *status*, i.e., to the rights and duties assigned to him, and to his *prestige*, which reflects the extent of his merit and his contribution to the common cause. Seen from this angle, group structure represents a unique hierarchy of the prestige and status of group members. The top of this hierarchical pyramid is occupied by *the group leader*, who acquires the right to take the more responsible decisions affecting the interests of all group members alike. It is usually stressed that the leader may or may not be the official head of the group, and that optimally the leader and the head of a group should be the same person. In the absence of this, the effectiveness of group activity depends on what kind of relations form between the group's official head and its unofficial leader or leaders.

Western research into the problem of leadership over the last 30 or so years has resulted in a vast accumulation of empirical data which has produced both hopes of finding a solution and, just as often, disappointments. The first hopes and disappointments were caused by the "theory of leadership traits", based on the idea that leaders possess

specific traits and abilities which are inherent in them, and which manifest themselves regardless of the type of situation or group.

Initially, physical traits (height, weight, etc.) were regarded as most important. To be taller or heavier than others was seen as a sign of a leader not only in the figurative, but also in the literal sense. But the main confirmation of the theory of leadership traits was sought in the study of the personal characteristics of leaders (Emory Bogardus and others). However, in 1948 the American researcher Ralph Stogdill compared over 120 studies of "leadership traits" and came to the conclusion that there was no real scientific proof that only people with certain special character traits or a specific set of such traits make leaders.

The search for the determinant of leadership as a psychological phenomenon was shifted in the early 1950s to the area of research into group interrelations. Thus emerged the theory of leadership as a group function (George Homans and others), which regards the leader as a person who above all meets the social expectations of the group and most consistently adheres to its norms and values. Unfortunately, this theory was unconvincing because its logical structure contained a circular argument. A leader by definition is an individual who possesses the highest prestige and status, which naturally proves that as a leader he corresponds to the norms and values which the group attribute to a leader.

One of the most prevalent theories in Western social psychology is the theory of leadership as a situational function (Bales, Newcomb and Hare). Observing that the same people could occupy different positions or play different roles in different groups (e.g., a child can be a "leader" among his neighbourhood friends and a "follower" in class; a teacher can be a leader at school but be deprived of this status at home), the authors of this theory deduced that leadership is not so much a function of the individual or the group as the result of the complex and many-sided influence of various factors in various situations.

This view is not usually revised in modern-day social psychology although it has been amplified several times, using the approach discovered in the 1950s by Bales, and later elaborated by Fred Fiedler. According to the above-mentioned theory, every group has at least two types of

leader: the social-emotional (regulating interpersonal relations), and the task leader (taking the initiative in specific types of activity and coordinating common efforts to achieve the goal). The conception of leadership as a situational function gives rise to the notion of the *plurality* of leaders (or leadership functions) in the group, who undertake the responsibility of organising certain jobs or certain aspects of general activity. It is assumed that each situation of group communication can present its "situational" leader, and that theoretically there can be as many leaders as there are group members. At the same time, it is recognised that a *universal* or *absolute leader* can appear, ensuring many-sided group activity. The corresponding typology of leadership takes into account this position above all, whether it is a case of the volume of activity (a universal leader or a situational one), or of the content of activity (a leader who initiates or a leader who implements, etc.).

One ought to mention yet another leadership typology which was introduced by Kurt Lewin, Ronald Lippitt and others, in which the *style of leadership* is taken as the basis of classification: i.e., authoritarian, directive or, in contrast, democratic or liberal. As a rule, the numerous works by Western social psychologists stress the undesirable consequences of an authoritarian leader's activity and the optimal effect of the democratic leader. However, the straightforwardness of this leadership typology has recently aroused serious objections. It should be pointed out that Soviet social psychologists (N. S. Zherebova, I. P. Volkov, Yu. N. Yemelyanov, R. L. Krichevsky and others) justly criticise the Western psychological theory of leadership for its misguided attempts to extend the results of laboratory experimentation to the field of social life characterised by a variety of socio-economic factors whose influence cannot be taken into consideration by a positivist-orientated study.

This, briefly, is the general situation with the problem of leadership as expounded in the numerous Western surveys and handbooks on social psychology. Proceeding from the principle of the activity-based mediation of interpersonal relations one can reconstruct this picture significantly and propose new explanations for facts and theories which are already known.

Recently, American psychologists and mainly Fred

Fiedler[1] have attempted to build an "operational" model of leadership which would overcome the simplifications of the interpretation of leadership as a function of diverse problem-solving situations in the groups. Fiedler's "contingency model of leadership effectiveness" assumes that the effectiveness of group activity depends on how well the style of leadership is suited to the given situation. Leadership effectiveness is determined by the degree of freedom which the group situation allows and which gives the leader an opportunity to exercise influence.

The variables singled out by Fiedler (style of leadership, the situation of its implementation) convincingly characterise the position of the leader in the group. Let me say straight away, however, that they are insufficient for an adequate understanding of this position. Fiedler's model lacks a third vital variable which he did not take, and indeed could not have taken into account, while adhering to his methodological views. This third variable should have been the group's level of development (the degree of activity-based mediation of interpersonal relations). One and the same "style of leadership" in one and the same situation (a factor defined by Fiedler as a "task") can be either effective or ineffective depending on how the behaviour of the leader is mediated by the value content of the activity.

Fiedler's 'model is based on the idea of the inherence of conflict between the leader and the group. As he stresses, the leader, guided by a task and striving to ensure its successful fulfilment by the group, constantly runs the risk of worsening interpersonal relations with the group. Indeed, this is more than likely in the specific type of poorly developed groups, with which Fiedler and his colleagues were evidently dealing. But are there any grounds for applying these conclusions to the collective, in which the aim of group activity has equal value for all group members, both the leader and his followers?

The contingency model of leadership effectiveness cannot be applied in research into the collective simply be-

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[1] F. E. Fiedler, "Personality and Situational Determinants of Leadership Effectiveness", in: *Group Dynamics. Research and Theory*; F. E. Fiedler, "Validation and Extension of the Contingency Model of Leadership Effectiveness", *Psychological Bulletin*, Washington, Vol. 76, No. 2, August 1971; F. E. Fiedler, *A Theory of Leadership Effectiveness*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1976.

cause the collective's leader is not faced with a choice between the group or the group's aim. This is a false contradiction which has been discussed many times by us theoretically, experimentally and methodologically and has now been overcome, eliminated within the framework of the stratometric conception.

In actual fact, the main idea of the method of ASO[1], if one is talking not of the procedure but of the results of its application, is the opposition of the leader (an individual with a high ASO) to the group. A leader with a high ASO strives for the fulfilment of group tasks and is thus compelled to be demanding, and even to go as far as to clash with his colleagues who, it is tacitly assumed, are not orientated in the same way towards the group's aim. A leader with a low ASO manifests this tendency of group members and is therefore concerned more about establishing normal emotional contacts with them than about the aims or results of group activity. However, this situation is not typical for interrelations in the collective. Here, joint activity is determined by a generally accepted (appropriated), socially important goal, which mediates the entire system of interpersonal relations, including relations between leader and subordinates.

In a genuine collective, the division of leaders into "efficient", "task", "authoritarian", "emotional" and "democratic" becomes rather pointless because the emotional integration of the collective is determined by its activity-based characteristics, by its work integration. Of foremost importance are the interrelations which Makarenko called relations of "responsible dependence". Direct emotional contacts, the significance of which it would be ridiculous to deny, emerge from deeper interrelations—from activity relations. They depend on people's understanding of the social meaning of what they are doing, of their aims and

[1] ASO—assumed similarity of opposites, Fiedler's method of evaluating the style of leadership. The degree of ASO is a quantitative expression of the attitude of an individual to "others of significance". The greater an individual's ASO, the more he tends to notice the faults of "others of significance", to demand and control, and the more he is orientated towards the fulfilment of group tasks and less towards improving interpersonal relations. A low ASO index is evidence of the opposite attitude. People with a high ASO correspond to the psychological characteristic of the authoritarian style of leadership whereas a low ASO is a sign of the democratic style of leadership.

moral principles. It is these aims and principles which determine the whole complex hierarchy of interrelations in the collective. Therefore, the main means of optimising these interrelations lies not in their psychologically-based cosmetic alteration (either with the aid of specialists in "human relations" in industry or through obtaining the "emotional" or "democratically-minded" leader), but in the kind of organisation of collective activity that will ensure the best opportunities for individuals to manifest their personal qualities and for establishing interpersonal relations. It goes without saying that socialist society is creating the necessary conditions for this optimisation to take place.

Our theoretical position contains a certain paradox. If we want to understand, to optimise, to improve human relations in the collective, we must shift the focus of our attention from these relations themselves *to the content of group activity*, to the conditions of its transformation from socially significant to personally significant activity for every member of the collective. The performance of this task eliminates the contrasting of the "efficient" or the "authoritarian" leader to the rest of the group and the contrasting of the "operational" to the social-emotional leader, that is so pointless for the collective with a high level of development. This all makes it possible to conclude that Fiedler's amendments to the situational theory of leadership change neither its essence nor its general evaluation.

One has to agree with M. G. Yaroshevsky who, when describing this theory, concluded: "This picture is radically changed by the concept of the 'activity-based mediation' of group relations based on Marxist methodology, which regards objective activity as the force which unites an aggregate of individuals into a genuine collective. In order to 'catch' this force in a conceptual 'trap', quite a different technique is needed from the one worked out for the description of the individual and non-professional interpersonal relations. Although Western group psychologists were forced to introduce the concept of 'the task' as the determinant of group interrelations, once included in the socio-psychological schemes on the basis of research practice, it merely represented an amorphous remnant of objective activity lying outside the inner organisation of group processes. When a type of task-orientated leader is singled out, it is either his traits which characterise his attitude to the task

(need for success, feeling of responsibility, initiative, resistance to obstacles, etc.), or the reactions of his followers and the group as a whole to this style of leadership which are considered. But outside the zone of socio-psychological vision remains *the sociogenic, collective-forming role of the objective factor*, i.e., its role in achieving group cohesion, in the regulation of group interrelations and in the creation of collective motivation, in the dynamics of communications, the distribution of functions among group members and the change in social perception—in short, in the whole diversity of processes that determine the inner composition of this community as a special subject of cognition and action."[1]

How then is one to lure into a "conceptual trap" the kind of description of group activity that would explain the phenomenon of leadership in its numerous and psychologically fascinating forms? How is one to show the importance of the third variable for the interpretation of a leader's behaviour and personal traits? Here we base our conclusions on the results of specific experimental work carried out by our colleagues (A. S. Morozov, M. I. Frolova, V. A. Zozul), who have attempted to set just such "conceptual traps".

Their research compared the characteristics of trainers of sports teams assigned by a special method to the category of highly developed groups ("effective" trainers) with trainers of poorly developed sports teams ("ineffective" trainers). The tasks of sporting activity and the qualifications of the sportsmen (Masters of Sport) were the same in both cases. Individual style of activity and the individual psychological personal traits of the trainers determined by using Timothy Leary's popular method,[2] acted as variab-

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[1] M. G. Yaroshevsky, "The Role-Programme Approach to the Study of the Scientific Collective", *Voprosy Psikhologii*, No. 3, 1978, p. 44. Yaroshevsky largely proceeds from the idea of activity-based mediation in his study of specific scientific collectives, using his own *role-programme approach* and introducing the concept of the *study programme* which characterises activity from the point of view of its objective content. The productiveness of the concept "programme" is indisputable. This approach enables one to understand how group processes (perception, motivation, communication, role distribution, the approval of leader, etc.) are organised, and also to interpret group activity by including it in the broad objective-historical and social context. Without any doubt, the concept "programme" is both richer and broader than the concept "task" used by the adherents of the situational theory of leadership.

[2] A questionnaire given to the group which evaluated a given individual.

les, supplemented by the socio-psychological scales of "the trainer's collectivist tendency" and "the trainer's professional qualities". In essence, the level of group development represented in the description of the trainer as "effective" or "ineffective" also functioned as a variable.[1]

Let us examine the results.

The first conclusion concerned the individual psychological features of the leader or head (the trainer). It turned out that the differences between "effective" and "ineffective" trainers according to their individual psychological traits (using Leary's method) were statistically insignificant. Leaders of effective and ineffective teams were in fact identically evaluated by their subordinates on points such as authoritativeness, sensitivity, modesty, good-naturedness, compliance, etc. Here the research again showed convincingly that virtually any combination of personal traits can go to make a leader in the collective (at any rate in the perception of the collective's members).

Contrasts were revealed in the analysis of data on the supplementary socio-psychological scales (the trainer's collectivist tendency and the trainer's professional traits). Here, the differences were considerable. "This fact, which reflects a certain moral and ethical characteristic of the effective trainer of a top level Soviet sports team," writes A. S. Morozov, "is particularly interesting when compared with certain data on the psychological study of the personality of leaders in the USA.

"In one highly competent survey, it was noted that research had not found any link at all between the ethical and moral traits of a leader and his ability to attract followers. The author of the survey called it an interesting detail in the description of American society. To continue his thought, one could say that the marked dependence of this kind in the interrelations between leader and subordinates in our study is an important detail in the description of Soviet society."[2]

Clearly, the individual psychological traits of the leader perceived by group members belong to the surface layer

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[1] "Effectiveness" or "ineffectiveness" as a characteristic of a group with a high or a low level of development was determined according to three criteria: the effectiveness of sporting activity; the adequacy of the sportsmen's general social and professional behaviour; the creation of conditions for the full development of the personality.

[2] *Psychological Theory of the Collective*, p. 175.

of the stratometric structure of interrelations in the collective, while the evaluation of collectivist and professional tendencies belongs to its inner layers.

A second interesting conclusion relating to the interrelations of leader and subordinates was drawn following the comparison of the group's self-appraisal on three factors of interpersonal perception: 1) the promotion of the group's professional integration; 2) the promotion of emotional integration; 3) the exercising of personal influence in the group. The average mutual evaluations of group members on these three factors comprised the group's self-appraisal. The degree to which the trainer's perception of the team coincides with its own self-perception is a vital characteristic of its activity and the interpersonal relations in it, of the conflicting or harmonious nature of these relations.

The work of M. I. Frolova (and also the separate research of V. A. Zozul) has shown that the group's self-appraisal and its appraisal by the leader rarely coincide. However, this divergence takes opposite directions, particularly with regard to the factor of professional integration. Leaders of highly developed groups have a tendency to overestimate the group's potential in comparison with its self-perception. Leaders of insufficiently developed groups show the opposite tendency. A. S. Morozov rightly points out: "In this way, a leader's tendency to somewhat overestimate the collective should be regarded as expedient in practice because it shows the leader's belief in his subordinates, his recognition of their authority, and an optimistic view of the group. 'The underestimation effect' of ineffective trainers is a sign of their own inadequacy and is likely to have negative consequences for the group."[1]

Using different experimental material, V. A. Zozul reached the same conclusions in his research into the authority of the subordinate in the eyes of the leader. The leaders of highly developed collectives tend to overestimate their colleagues in comparison with the latter's appraisal of one another, whereas an underestimation is observed in groups with a low level of development. Thus, "trust in advance" is a characteristic feature of the interrelations of leader and subordinate in the highly developed collective.

The third conclusion reached using the method of inter-

[1] *Psychological Theory of the Collective*, p. 179.

personal perception states that in collectives sportsmen regard their trainer as a person who makes a considerable contribution to the professional and emotional integration of the team and also enjoys great personal influence within the team. The leader of this kind of group judges his colleagues just as highly, especially with respect to the factors of professional and emotional integration.

The picture is quite different in underdeveloped groups, where the team members see their trainer as upsetting first professional and then emotional relations, although they acknowledge his personal influence in the group. However, the latter point, as the research indicated, is more likely to produce negative results for the team. As for the leader, he pays the team back in the same coin, regarding his subordinates as people upsetting both professional and emotional relations, and also as deprived of initiative (on the factor of personal influence).

No doubt one could continue the list of such examples, but sufficient data has already been cited to prove the necessity of taking the third variable into account when studying the phenomenon of leadership and its effectiveness, namely the level of the group's development, or the degree of activity-based mediation of interpersonal relations in the group.

Let us attempt to use once more the diagram given above (Fig. 3, p. 80), but this time with regard to the problem of interrelations between leader and followers (head and subordinates).

The changes reflected by vector OC show the increasing degree of mediation of interpersonal relations by the value content of activity. The greater the degree of mediation, the more likely is control over these relations to be centralised, at any rate the relations of responsible dependence involved in management and subordination. The achievement of a common goal presupposes that all group members are aware of the need for regulation, organisation, mutual subordination and coordination. The social system realises its demand on a given community by helping to maximise its organisation and by establishing value parameters for it.

The changes shown by vector OA reflect the strengthening of the humane, moral principles in the scale of values mediating interpersonal relations, one of the most important characteristics of which is the democratisation of relations.

Correspondingly, vector OB reflects anti-democratic development, autocracy, reactionary tendencies, the suppression of equality, the destruction of personality and discrimination against the individual in the given community.

Four types of relations between leader (head) and group (collective) can be placed within the theoretical space formed by the three vectors. Figure I (the maximum possible centralisation and democracy) symbolises relations characterised by the sovereignty and initiative of the collective, the leader's responsibility to the collective, and conscious subordination to the leader, order and conscious discipline, voluntary subordination of personal interests to general interests of social value, the transformation of common interests in the sphere of socially significant activity into the personal interests of every member of the collective, and also other components of *the democratic style of leadership* of the socialist collective.

Figure III (maximum centralisation and minimum democracy) signifies relations characterised by the arbitrary rule and libertarianism of the leader, and by rigid control. A privileged leader stands apart and rules over his subordinates. This is the typical style of *authoritarian leadership*.

As the eminent German sociologist Max Weber pointed out, this kind of bureaucratic centralism is the "ideal" means of organisation, management and leadership for capitalist society in any group, large or small. The system of managing industrial "collectives" within the framework of the so-called policy of "scientific leadership" in the USA, Japan and West Germany is orientated towards bureaucratic centralism. Estrangement and the impersonal nature of interpersonal links, especially between leader and subordinates, have compelled monopolists to start up various programmes for the "improvement of human relations", to try to manipulate the sympathies, antipathies and feelings of subordinates, to cultivate in workers a love for their employer or manager, to promote "class reconciliation"; in other words, politely and correctly to squeeze the last ounce of effort out of workers while amiably patting them on the back and remembering their birthdays, in accordance with the psychologists' advice. However, the results of these attempts are both short-lived and ephemeral. A wave of strikes easily washes away these flimsy barriers intended to contain the struggle for social justice.

Figure II (minimum centralisation and maximum democracy) demonstrates the virtual absence of joint activity or the skills involved in its performance; while the level of humane relations between people is high, there is a lack of organisation, control and responsible dependence; leadership is temporary and situational, there is no demanding attitude or control over the performance of tasks; informal leaders (if they exist) compete with the official leader (if one is appointed); relations are characterised by mutual tolerance, leniency and indulgence which may have the best of motives but which are actually to the detriment of the activity involved. *The laisser faire, or tolerant style of leadership.*

Figure IV (minimum centralisation and minimum democracy) signifies anarchy in the system of interrelations, the right of might, a rigid hierarchy in power relations, the lack of the spiritual element and humanity in the interrelations between people and the absence of organisation and control. *This can be described as the anarchic style of leadership.*

The distinguishing between styles of leadership according to the above scheme of interpretation of their origin and also their relation to vital determinants is, in our view, of fundamental significance and enables one to understand better many psychological aspects of leadership. Here we proceed from the conception of leadership in the collective as a unity of democracy and centralism. As Lenin said, "...it must be clearly understood how vastly different democratic centralism is from bureaucratic centralism on the one hand, and from anarchism on the other."[1]

Let me point out certain characteristics of leadership which emerge from this. For one: there is the problem of the correlation of the leader and the official head of a group. One can assume that in the direction along bisector M, the opposition of head and leader is ultimately removed (the democratic nature of leadership does not impede centralisation, if the latter ensures the achievement of a generally significant and socially valuable goal). However, along bisector N, this problem is overcome in quite a different way: the authoritarianism of the group head excludes

[1] V. I. Lenin, "Original Version of the Article 'The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government'", *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 207.

the existence of an "unofficial leader", who is inevitably either ostracised or deprived (he is lucky if not by means of brute force) of his rights of leadership.

Thus, the opposition of the professional and the emotional leader is removed along bisector M, making their coexistence possible. Incidentally, although the sports teams studied by Frolova differed in the level of development, they evidently did not differ sufficiently for some to be placed along bisector M and others along bisector N. Although some teams were better than others, they were all Soviet teams. In all probability, they would lie along bisector M and this explains why they showed no significant differences when Fiedler's method was used.

Bisector N also has its paradoxes. Strictly speaking, bureaucratic centralism assumes no other leader but the autocratic. This is precisely the case in bureaucratic systems. However, the vain attempts to establish "class peace" in class society are now compelling monopolists and their managers to encourage and integrate "emotional leaders" into the bureaucratic system to carry out the function of "reconciliation". However, bureaucratic centralism easily gives up playing at liberalism as soon as the "adjustment of human relations" proves ineffective or clashes with the class interests of the bourgeoisie.

The theory of leadership traits, which, as is generally regarded both here and in the West, proved unsound thirty years ago, can also be interpreted using this diagram, which reflects the activity-based approach to the study of interpersonal relations within the group. Let us analyse the reasons why this theory was a failure. First of all, one should note that while aiming to ascertain the general (innate) traits of the genuine leader, researchers studied specific and very different groups in which they separated the leaders from the "non-leaders". These were groups of pre-school children, boys at a summer camp, students, and soldiers as well as discussion and psychotherapy groups and so on. It is blatantly clear that the activity of each of these groups makes its own specific demands on the leader and stimulates the manifestation of the corresponding personal traits. These groups included some in which the interpersonal relations were to a certain degree mediated by the content of joint activity, a factor which could not fail to be reflected in the character of the leader. For example, the Belgian psychologist Van Dusen established the

following sequence of traits among Boy Scout leaders (in an order of decreasing importance): interest in and knowledge of group activity; attitude towards cooperation; adaptability skills and sincerity. But, in the majority of cases (children of pre-school age and students) there was in fact no real joint activity and relations were of a relatively direct kind. The set of a leader's personal traits changed correspondingly. In other words, having thrown together all possible types of group activity, represented, moreover, in groups of different levels of development (according to the criterion of activity-based mediation) the adherents of the theory of leaders' traits were unable to single out any invariable traits of leaders "in general". Indeed, no other result could have been expected.

At the same time, one can make the supposition (as yet unconfirmed by experimental data) that if one were to differentiate groups first according to the type of activity, then according to the level of group development and then to place them in the theoretical space formed by the vectors, one might possibly be able to pick out for each specific type of group a set of personal characteristics that could be seen as "traits" inherent in a leader of that kind of group. One can go on to surmise that these traits would alter along all the directions assumed by this diagram (cf. Fig. 4, p. 80) (i.e., the degree of mediation of interpersonal relations, and the social or anti-social significance of these mediating factors).

What can the nature of these changes be? First of all, the lower a group's development (DG), the more likely the characterisation of its leader is to contain a relatively small set of traits. In certain works, they were picked out and wrongly attributed to the leader "in general" (physical strength, aggressiveness, self-assertion, cruelty, authoritarianism). By continuing lines ED and FG beyond our diagram, in other words, by taking them outside the limits of human society, we symbolise (position X) the system of biologically conditioned interrelations in the flock, in which a definite "pecking order" is established, expressing a classification table among chickens and other animals (a linear order when there is a particularly dominant individual: A→B→C→D etc; and a triangular order demonstrating the presence of not one but several factors of leadership: A→B→C→A). These factors are above all physical strength and aggressiveness. Again returning to the sphere of social

determinants, one has to remember that researchers established the presence of both "linear" and "triangular" orders in gangs, for instance. This is yet one more confirmation of the archaic nature of interrelations between leaders and subordinates in groups with a low level of development.

The more highly developed the group, the more complex and extensive is the set of morally justified personal characteristics required to describe its leader (EF). It is here that the compensation by some traits for others is possible. This explains the broad variability of traits which, incidentally, has been noted by researchers on many occasions. Their degree of mediation by the content of specific group activity in turn leads to the variability of these traits according to the criterion of the specific character of this activity. As a result, being a highly developed group, the collective guarantees the diversity of its leaders' personal traits. The strength and flexibility of the structure of the collective can also be shown, in particular, in the example of two individuals with totally different personal traits both being capable of performing the functions of leader.

Figure DEFG can be turned relative to the axis OC, enabling us to reflect the problem of leader's traits as applied to a group characterised by manifestations of bureaucratic centralism, or to a positively-orientated diffuse group. Then, at the pole E_1F_1 (a corporation in which interrelations are intensively mediated by antisocial values), one can expect to find *any set of any traits* in a leader, since his personal traits have no real significance because he has been bureaucratically forced upon the group and is in power not as a result of his own personal virtues, but exclusively because of privileges and rights conferred on him from outside the group. At the other pole a relatively small set of traits can be singled out (indeed, this has often been done experimentally), creating the most favourable conditions for free communication and universal well-being in the group, where people are linked merely by emotional attraction and not by any activity (intellectual superiority, goodness, compassion, external attractiveness). If we continue the lines E_1D_1 and F_1G_1 beyond the real human society (position V), then evidently we will arrive in the "kingdom of heaven" or in a world of ideal notions of the spiritual traits of the very best of mortals.

Hence, we can conclude that criticism of the ideas of leaders' traits is both right and wrong. It is right when

it speaks of the hopelessness of efforts to select general leaders' traits and even more so to explain them by a kind of inborn predisposition to leadership. It is wrong, however, when it fails to see that groups of various levels of development are represented in the immense wealth of material on leaders' traits, where, in one case there can be a rigidly fixed, ultimate set of traits corresponding to the narrow content of that group's activity, and in another, a broad variability of positive personal characteristics which cannot be reduced to a finite quantity, no matter to what methods of analysis the researcher resorts (i.e., classification, factorisation, etc.).

However, the main fault of the theory of leaders' traits lies elsewhere. The traits of a leader are neither the original nor the only determinant of leadership, because it is not so much the leader who creates the situation of domination in the group, as the group which gives rise to, chooses, accepts, cultivates a specific type of leader. As a socio-psychological phenomenon, leadership emerges as a result of the interaction of man and the socially conditioned circumstances of objective activity, of which he is the subject, being a member of a group of a certain level of development. This is by no means intended to discredit the problem of leaders' traits, but we merely wish to show its proper place in the structure of socio-psychological knowledge.

One of the most important characteristics of a leader is related to the selectness, preferability with which the group members invest him when selecting him according to certain criteria which should be analysed psychologically. What lies at the basis of this choice and what are these criteria?

In solving this question, social psychology turns in practice to sociometric choice, in accordance with which the group (all or most of its members) choose a certain individual, acknowledged to be the most suitable and desirable person to exercise the function of leader. In the attractiveness of the leader's personality theoretical analysis easily reveals emotional attractions as the basis of interpersonal choice. However, not surprisingly, Y. L. Kolominsky, who has for a long time been enthusiastically working out the sociometric method in Soviet psychology, emphasised that it is wrong to identify the leader with the sociometric "favourite". A "favourite", i.e., the most emotionally attractive member of the group, does not necessarily

dominate in the process of communication. Likewise, the leader is not necessarily a sociometric "favourite".[1] However, Kolominsky does point out: "At the same time it is not excluded that a leader can also be a sociometric 'favourite'."[2] One cannot help agreeing with these views. However, it remains unclear what system of interpersonal choice, if not the sociometric, conditions electiveness, the selection of a leader, which intra-group links consolidate his position as leader and in which cases a leader and a sociometric "favourite" coincide and in which they do not.

Above we showed that sociometric choices (the subject-subject relations) are merely an outer superficial system of interrelations conditioning the selection of a leader. Behind this lies another, deeper system of interpersonal links revealing, to a greater extent, the activity-based and value-based nature. Above all, this is the system of subject-subject-object relations, of interpersonal relations. Let me repeat: a subject striving somehow to perceive, understand, interpret, accept or reject a certain object (this can be an idea, aim or means of activity, a specific situation, someone's, including the subject's own, personal traits, etc.), turns to another subject as a possible source of orientation with respect to this object. Here, social mediation appears as mediation by a specific person. Referentiality and authority are manifestations of this type of relations.

The higher a group's development and the more mediated its interpersonal relations are by the content and values of joint, socially set activity, the more likely the emergence and stabilisation of a leader in the group is to occur as a realisation of precisely these relations.

In groups of the diffuse type, subject-subject relations predominate. The difference of groups by the level of development explains the coincidence of "favourites" and "leaders", outlined but not given the required interpretation (Y. L. Kolominsky, V. I. Zatsepin), typical of the diffuse groups, and the absence of real links between them in highly developed groups.

If this hypothesis can be accepted, then the essence of leadership where there is joint activity is the choice by the group of one or several members to whom it turns for

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[1] Y. L. Kolominsky, *The Psychology of Interrelations in Small Groups*, Minsk, 1976, p. 133 (in Russian).

[2] *Ibid.*

orientation with respect to the object of group activity (in understanding its aims, in the application of means necessary for its successful fulfilment, etc). Sympathies and antipathies can accompany, but do not determine such a choice. In essence, a leader is *the person most referential for the group* with regard to joint objective activity, a kind of "middle man" of interpersonal relations who influences the group's effectiveness.

However, the grounds for the emergence of this referentiality differ depending on the nature of the values which mediate interpersonal relations.

If one has in mind the psychological description of the individual in the collective (axis OK), then the values of the leader to whom the group turns, are characterised by historical progressiveness in the broad sense of the word (i.e., they meet the interests of social development, are aimed at the realisation of socially significant aims, etc.), and are imbued with the ideas of democracy and humaneness. Regardless of whether the leader is officially invested with power, the group gives him the attributes of authority, in other words, acknowledges his right to evaluate the significant points of joint activity (and systematically questions these evaluations), and also to take decisions of great importance for the whole group (V. A. Zozul). It is highly likely that in the sphere of tasks of group activity, a leader's status as a "referenceometric" favourite may coincide with the status of sociometric favourite. However, this combination is by no means essential, since the sympathies and antipathies lying at the basis of sociometric choice do not only emerge in relation to the content of group activity, but are the result of the many-sided communication of group members.

If one has in mind the psychological characteristics of the individual in a group in which relations of bureaucratic centralism predominate (axis OL), then the leader's scale of values is characterised by traits contradictory to social progress, by reactionary and inhumane traits. The leader is referential for the group owing less to the free choice of its members than to the fact that he holds power and thus the group members are compelled to take note of his evaluations and views, so as not to incur any sanctions. Whereas one can talk of the genuine power of authority in the collective, in groups of a blatantly bureaucratic centralist type, one can talk only of the authority of power,

and only of power supported from outside the group. The coincidence of leader and sociometric favourite in such groups is highly unlikely since the leader is not selected according to sociometric criteria. At the same time, *as a personality*, he is also not referentially preferable. Here, it is not personality that is referential but the position, status and role of the leader invested with dominant powers, regardless of his personality. In such cases, when a leader is replaced through intervention from outside the group, he immediately loses his traits of "referentiality" and the new leader just as rapidly acquires them.

If one bears in mind that the markedness of subject-subject-object relations diminishes along the coordinate OC and the markedness of subject-subject relations increases, then along the axis OM leadership should be characterised by the virtual coincidence of leader and sociometric favourite. Moreover, the absence of joint group activity explains why the leader is not the most referential person for the whole group, and if he is invested with characteristics of referentiality, then quite by chance, because of various situations of communication and the past experience of other group members.

We get another picture of the interrelations of the leader and the group along the axis ON. Here the leader and sociometric favourite can also coincide. However, one can surmise that a sociometric choice will be based not so much on sympathy as on fear of the group and of those behind it, on fear which is blocked only by the hope of finding a strong patron. This is the role played by the leader. It is possible for sociometric and "referenceometric" choices to coincide here, since there is an absence of joint objective group activity. At the same time, the exercise of group force against each member and each member's fear of the whole group, so typical of groups of the anarchic type, can increase the leader's referentiality precisely with regard to his evaluation of each group member.

One should stress the hypothetical nature of this model of leadership. Actual groups are not usually situated at the ends of axes OM, ON, OK, OL, and can occupy any position in the theoretical space formed by the vectors.

At any rate, the groups studied by our colleagues could as a rule be assigned to quadrant I on our diagram (the interrelations in them were to a greater or lesser degree mediated by the socially valuable content of joint activity)

and relatively rarely to quadrant II (recently formed groups not as yet united by common activity). The actions and interrelations within the groups studied (Soviet sportsmen, workers, students, employees in the sphere of law and order, etc.) revealed a common dependence on the moral values of socialist society although their levels of development were different. In what sense should one understand their division into highly developed groups and groups of a low level of development?

The use here of the term "low level of development" is not quite accurate since it is a matter only of the relatively lower level of development of a group as a collective, and not of groups of a low level of development proper, which can in no way be regarded as modifications of collectives either in the nature of the values functioning in them or in the aims of their joint activity.

A collective's style of leadership is revealed in *the sphere of administrative decision-making*. It is difficult to believe that all decisions made by a leader can always be assigned unreservedly to one and only one style of leadership. One can sooner surmise—and this is in fact the case—that among the numerous administrative decisions taken, a certain part belongs to one style of leadership, another part to a second, and a third part to a third style of leadership. Then we can speak of style of leadership not in absolute but in relative terms, having in mind the predominance of administrative decisions typical of one style of leadership.

In this way one can define five types of decision-making: a) individual decision-making without prior consultation with or subsequent informing of colleagues; b) individual decision-making with subsequent informing of subordinates; c) individual decision-making with prior consultation with the collective; d) joint decision-making with colleagues; e) complete handing over of the decision-making function to subordinates. Consequently, one can speak of five possible styles of leadership in specific administrative activity: a) authoritarian; b) collective-authoritarian; c) collective (democratic); d) collective-liberal; e) liberal.

A set of people[1] were given 25 assertions characterising style of behaviour in taking important decisions and were required to answer whether such and such a style of decision-making was demonstrated by their leader or not. The lead-

[1] Experimental research by N. I. Vorontsova and R. S. Nemov.

er's self-appraisal was then obtained by the same method. The number of marks for each style was calculated both for highly developed and for less highly developed collectives. The total sum of marks was taken as 100 per cent and the proportion of each of the five styles of administrative decision-making in the activity of each leader was ascertained.

The experiment produced interesting results, especially when the subordinates' evaluations of their leaders' style of decision-making were compared with the leaders' self-appraisals. It was discovered that colleagues of less developed collectives evaluate their leader's style of decision-making as more authoritarian, while the leader regards himself as fully, if not too, democratic and strives to be more authoritarian. In highly developed groups, on the other hand, judging from the evaluations of subordinates, the collective style of decision-making predominates, while leaders regard themselves as too authoritarian and strive for greater democracy in collective relations.

This research enabled us to record another interesting fact. The style of decision-making in highly developed collectives is distinguished by firmness and consistency, manifested in the fact that one type of decision-making clearly dominates over others (mainly the collective type), whereas the remaining types are used far less often (the extreme types—authoritarian or liberal—very rarely indeed). In poorly developed groups, however, all types are often used, including extreme types (about one fifth of all decisions are made using extreme styles of leadership). But, as N. I. Vorontsova points out, by acting inconsistently and using sharply contrasting methods of decision-making (e.g., authoritarian and liberal), the leader merely helps to increase tension in the collective.

The comparison of collectives with varying levels of development in the study of style of leadership reveals their socio-psychological differences. However, it is obvious that they are all distinct from groups which are not collectives. These distinctions are rooted not so much in the area of social psychology as in value factors, but they express themselves in specific socio-psychological traits.

CHAPTER V

Not "They" and "I", but "We"!

Humane Relations and Collectivist Identification

Modern man has grown accustomed to paradoxes. Today, in the latter half of the 20th century, they are regarded as an inevitable attribute of scientific and technological progress. The paradoxes of the theory of relativity are studied as part of academic syllabuses. When, for instance, a report was given at a recent international psychological congress on the work of a psychologist who was teaching children (indeed successfully) to "read" at the age of four months, i.e. before they had learned to speak, this provoked a dispute but was not accompanied by the emotional shock which would have been likely in previous times. No doubt this was why, when the Canadian physiologist and founder of the doctrine on stress, Hans Selye attempted to work out a code of behaviour founded on biological laws and formulated the concept of "altruistic egoism", this paradox stunned no one, and indeed became a subject for thought and analysis.

Selye reasons that a human being is an egoist and is therefore unable to carry out the commandment: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself".[1] This commandment is unbiological, contradicts the laws of nature and the instinct of self-preservation and leads to distress (stress with negative consequences). However, he goes on to say that it does not follow that it is permissible to act against one's neighbour. The instinct of self-preservation does not contradict other natural motives: the striving for altruism, the need to merit the love of one's neighbour. Altruism is just as much a phenomenon as egoism in Selye's view,

[1] St. Matthew, 19:19.

and this is the basis of his "philosophy of altruistic egoism", and also the "good code of behaviour" founded on the knowledge of biology and the realisation of "collective self-love".

It would be much more pleasant for me to agree rather than argue with Professor Selye, who is undoubtedly one of the greatest physiologists today. But when he leaves the bounds of his sovereign domain—the physiology of the adaptation syndrome—as in his conception of "altruistic egoism", it becomes essential to argue since one cannot agree with his principles.

Against this conception one can use the critical arguments put forward by Marxism on the theory of reasonable egoism familiar to the reader who is fluent in the history of philosophy. Let me make just three points in this respect.[1]

Firstly, Selye envisages basing his code of behaviour on universal biological laws which govern all living organisms from the simplest micro-organisms to human beings. However, the above-mentioned phrase: to merit the love of one's neighbour, can in no way be deduced from the laws of the development of organic nature. The animal world prefers to act in accordance with the principle: "The strongest should win," which is beyond the problems of altruism and egoism. Are not principles of human behaviour being attributed here to nature, in order later to return them to social life, but now endowed with the grand title of a "biological law"?

Secondly, as we know, society contains both progressive and reactionary forces. This means that the "good code of behaviour" translated into life will be good for some and unacceptable for others. There cannot be an identical code of behaviour for both cats and mice, to use yet another biological "parallel". Clearly only a social system which excludes economic, political, ideological and other inner conflict can have a common code of behaviour for all. Otherwise, there is no getting away from distress.

Thirdly, the assertion that altruism is a form of collective self-love is highly debatable. This kind of pragmatic approach is fine for describing a colony of polyps but it can by no means always function as a guiding principle of behaviour in developed forms of social life. No

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[1] *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, January 15, 1975.

doubt the relation of a mother to her child can be interpreted in terms of "altruistic egoism", but surely this does not form the real psychological basis of maternal love.

An analysis of Selye's concept shows that he repeats the path of many major natural scientists (e.g., V. M. Bekhterev with his "collective reflexology"), who, having completed their own specific biological doctrines, could not resist the temptation to extend their principles to the sphere of social sciences, where they immediately lost scientific credibility and objectivity. If one contemplates the reasons which prompted Professor Selye to make his excursion into sociology, one comes to the conclusion that inspite of his concept, it is real and not egoistical altruism that lies behind his views. The scientist is worried by the harmful effects of stress caused by the social environment familiar to him. He is selflessly searching for the means to free humanity from suffering, grief and troubles, and to leave it with stress without distress. However, he was unable to find the correct solution to the problem because his views were based on a philosophy which right from the start sets up man against man, individual against group, and individual against society.

The set of questions touched on in the polemic with Selye has a strictly methodological aspect. A necessary condition for solving the central problem is the differentiation between two positions in which the acting subject finds himself and which are virtually indistinguishable by the ordinary consciousness and, unfortunately, have hardly been given a general theoretical interpretation. One of these is the *reflective* position, i.e., the realisation and thus the distinction and correlation by the subject of the components of his own activity: its aims and means, tasks, objects, tools and so on. The second position is the *pre-reflective*. Its essence lies in the fact that the subject does not carry out acts of differentiation between and analysis of these components, is not concerned with the task of interpreting and understanding his own activity, but really *acts*. Thus, when one position, as it were, overlaps the other and they are theoretically indistinguishable, the temptation arises to absolutise another subject, now exclusively as the *aim* of activity, now as its *means*. But, in many cases another individual is a means only within the limits of the reflective position, since an object that is

reflected as an aim is posited through him. On the pre-reflective level, however, a means and an aim are not necessarily separable.

In connection with this let us return to the problem of altruism and egoism. All concepts of reasonable egoism, altruistic egoism and others like them fail to distinguish between the reflective and pre-reflective positions of the subject of activity and personal attitude to other people. For example, a selfless impulse to help can in reality be regarded as a search for personal gain by the subject rendering help, as a means of maintaining a high self-appraisal, etc. In short, it can be interpreted as being prompted by the interests of the subject's Self. However, on the pre-reflective level a person just *acts* without analysing, splitting his action into a) helping another person and b) the pragmatic or moral basis of his impulse. It is precisely action in the name of another person and not in the name of meeting some moral standard as an ultimate aim. Without doubt a moral standard contributes to the altruistic impulse to help another person, not as a goal but as a reason, as a part of the objective content of this act. Reflexion, on the other hand, attempts to put everything in its place, portraying the genuine motive forces of an act in a transformed and sometimes incorrect way.

As abstract psychological and ethical categories egoism and altruism cannot be mechanically combined. At the same time the hopelessness of contrasting altruism and egoism was pointed out by Marx and Engels: "...The communists do not oppose egoism to selflessness or selflessness to egoism, nor do they express this contradiction theoretically either in its sentimental or in its highflown ideological form; they rather demonstrate its material source, with which it disappears of itself".[1]

Neither abstract altruism nor abstract egoism nor their combination in the form of "altruistic" or "reasonable" egoism can serve as the necessary indicator of the presence or absence of genuinely humane interrelations in actual socialist collectives united by socially significant activity. In actual fact, indulgence, compassion, goodness and self-restriction for the sake of another person meet the principles of communist humaneness in certain situations.

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[1] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "The German Ideology", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 247.

However, judging the altruistic act from an ethical point of view, we must understand by which aims and moral values it was mediated, because behaviour of an altruistic tendency can sometimes contradict the principles of communist morality.

Let us suppose, for instance, that a certain member of a work collective turns out to be light-fingered and lazy. He has never had any intention of working hard but is not averse to stealing from his place of work. If the members of the collective were "consistent" altruists, he could expect compassion, sympathy and arguments of the following kind: "He's also human", "He's got small children at home", etc. Of course, the genuinely humane position of the socialist collective makes the manifestation of altruism in such situations impossible. "Communism," wrote Lenin, "begins when the *rank-and-file workers* display an enthusiastic concern that is undaunted by arduous toil to increase the productivity of labour, husband *every pood of grain, coal, iron* and other products, which do not accrue to the workers personally or to their 'close' kith and kin, but to their 'distant' kith and kin, i.e., to society as a whole, to tens and hundreds of millions of people."[1] This is because only at the expense of the whole of society does it become possible to ensure "*full* well-being and free, *all-round* development for *all* the members of society".[2]

In this way, though highly valued in interpersonal relations, altruism cannot function as a socio-psychological indicator of humaneness demonstrated by people in various situations. The "perfection" of altruism by the addition of the attribute of egoism also does not hold water. The fact is that the separation of egoism and altruism to opposite poles (as well as their mechanical combination) reflects the original contradiction of "I" and "They", characteristic of socio-economic formations based on the rule of private property, the exploitation of man by man and general competition. The historically progressive tendency inherent in socialist society envisages the replacement of the antagonism of "I" and "They" by the unifying principle "We":

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[1] V. I. Lenin, "A Great Beginning", *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 427.

[2] V. I. Lenin, "Notes of Plekhanov's Second Draft Programme", *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 52.

that which I do for others is of advantage for others and for me, only because and precisely because it is advantageous for the society to which I belong and which I serve. The real alternative here is the contrasting, to both egoism and altruism, of a special psychological phenomenon of interpersonal relations which envisage the kind of motivation of attitude to a colleague, a member of the collective, when the subject, proceeding from high moral and philosophical principles, actually treats *others as he would himself, and treats himself as he would all the others in his collective*, when the "I" and "They" antagonism is replaced by the concept "We". In the same way as the alternative "conformism or non-conformism" has proved imaginary for the collective, where relations are mediated by the content of joint activity and moral values and where collectivist self-determination of the individual forms a real alternative to both conformism and non-conformism, a phenomenon which we have called *collectivist identification* opposes the alternative "egoism or altruism", which is also imaginary for the collective.

Collectivist identification equally rejects both altruistic indulgence and the egoistic and utilitarian attitude to others. Humaneness, concern for others as well as an exacting attitude to them (cf. Makarenko: maximum trust and maximum exactingness), are standards of collectivist interrelations. This is how a psychological climate favourable for the all-round, harmonious development of the individual is formed. For an individual to apply to himself different moral standards from those he would apply to others in the same or similar situations, and to base his acts on such standards means to violate the principles of collectivist identification.

All that has been said about humane relations and collectivist identification remains on the level of general ethical and psychological theory unless an empirical indicator for these concepts is found and the specific experimental conditions are created under which it becomes possible to record either the indisputable fact of the maintenance of the "I" and "They" antagonism or, on the contrary, its replacement by the collectivist concept of "We". A specific psychological parameter of interpersonal relations able to be experimentally revealed and quantitatively evaluated, was put forward as such an empirical indicator (V. A. Petrovsky). The measurement of the intensity of its

expression made it possible to judge precisely about the existence of collectivist identification in groups.

Initially this parameter was called *active group emotional identification*. It enabled one to indicate the main features of the psychological description of the phenomenon being studied and already contained its detailed characteristics. However, the definition of the interesting psychological phenomenon was altogether too long. In the search for a more successful formula, we turned to the concept "emotional participation". The essence of emotional participation lies in active sharing of joy and sympathy.

Emotional participation is a specific form, one of several possible cases, a modification, of collectivist identification, which is a more general category of interpersonal relations. Collectivist identification can help to describe a group of phenomena in which such interpersonal relations are realised which are in accord with morally justified collectivist principles. Here, sympathy acts as emotional participation.

Thus, sympathy as emotional participation is *collectivist identification, for which an unfavourable occurrence and also the emotions of one of the group's members with regard to it, are posited as motives of behaviour for others, organising their own activity, which is aimed simultaneously at the fulfilment of a group goal and at blocking the effect of the said occurrence (the frustrater).*

A special experimental procedure was used to reveal the existence of emotional participation, which enabled one to see through group interactions to the deeper-hidden interpersonal relations of collectivist identification.

A special system is used for this purpose, with which one can record how each person tested behaves, first, when punishment threatens all members of the group, himself included (integral sanctions), and secondly, when punishment threatens one of his colleagues, also taking part in the experiment (partial sanctions). The type of task is envisaged in the performance of which speed and haste are known to increase the number of punishable mistakes. Only the indicator of speed of performance is calculated in competition with another group, the need for correct and faultless work being merely taken for granted. In this way increasing the speed of task performance was the aim of group activity, however, the rapidity of work increases the probability of mistakes and subsequently the possibility of

punishment. It is this fact that forms the main precondition for the future qualification of the level of emotional participation development in the group.[1]

The hypothesis of this study was that in groups of different levels of development group behaviour that reveals hidden interpersonal relations will be qualitatively different in cases of integral and partial sanctioning and that these qualitative differences can be measured and given quantitative expression. If in a group emotional participation is not at all pronounced, then under conditions of partial punishment (one person pays for all) the group should work considerably faster than under conditions of integral sanctioning. The fact that a work partner in the group is subject to frustration is not taken into account in this case, since all other members together and individually are out of danger. The efforts spent on blocking the frustrater in the first stage of the experiment (under conditions of integral sanctioning), become unnecessary. Because of this the effectiveness of performance rises.

If, however, the time of task performance in situations of both integral and partial punishment is approximately equal, this shows the markedness of emotional participation, of the phenomenon of active emotional identification in the group; although only one member of the group is threatened, all members of the group act as if they too are liable to be directly punished for a mistake. There are grounds for assuming that in this case we have a type of interrelations characterised by equal concern for the condition of others as for one's own condition.

The first and main conclusion from these experiments was the practicability of emotional participation as a specific socio-psychological phenomenon which demonstrates the ability of a group to empathise with any of its members, and making it possible to measure the level of development of collectivist relations in it. The second conclusion is that the most favourable conditions for the emergence of this phenomenon exist in groups close to the collective in type. Emotional participation is hardly noticeable or is completely absent in diffuse groups and groups of criminal offenders. Members of collectives, on the other hand, iden-

[1] The true aim of the experiment is always hidden from the participants who regard it merely as a test of the coordination and effectiveness of activity in competition with other groups.

tify themselves with their colleagues and this re-shapes their behaviour. This is demonstrated by the fact that the time required for the performance of a task in the first and second stages of the main experiment series becomes equal, and also by the emotional statements and gestures of the participants recorded by the experimenter.

Thus, as a manifestation of collectivist identification, emotional participation is a specific indicator of the level of development of interpersonal relations in the group. Collectivist identification includes moral values and patterns of behaviour which correspond to the ethical ideals of the Soviet person, and is most developed in groups such as the collective, which is the main unit of socialist society.

This methodological system largely does away with the perpetual question of the adequacy of the laboratory imitation of the actual activity in which the group being studied is usually involved. For, after all, the psychological phenomenon being analysed is relatively independent of the type of tasks performed: indifference towards a colleague and a caring attitude to one's own well-being can, evidently, be found in any type of activity.

The above-mentioned parameter of group interrelations has been studied in a number of works on previously proposed hypotheses[1], according to which the manifestations of this phenomenon differ fundamentally in groups with different levels of development. For instance, it is believed that there should be an inverse dependence of the intensity of the phenomenon of emotional participation on the number of members in a diffuse group: its intensity is inversely proportional to the number of members. In contrast, according to this hypothesis, the increase in the number of members in a collective should not lead to a decrease in the markedness of this phenomenon.

This hypothesis was proved correct by M. A. Turevsky, who constructed a special system and proposed conditions for the conducting of an experiment enabling one to include groups of growing numbers in interaction. The experimental procedure involved giving one of the group members a spe-

[1] See: V. A. Petrovsky, "Emotional Identification in the Group and the Method of its Discovery", in: *On the Question of Diagnosting the Individual in the Group*, Moscow, 1973 (in Russian); A. V. Petrovsky, "New Aspects of the Elaboration of the Stratometric Conception of Groups and the Collective", *Voprosy Psikhologii*, No. 6, 1976.

cific problem to solve from among those usually arising during his daily professional activity (although he could also be given a neutral task to perform, such as a simple calculation). The group determined the speed of performance. As a rule the group was made up of his work colleagues who had a professional knowledge of the problem set and knew what period of time was required for its solution. According to the instructions, the problems had to be solved as quickly as possible. Meanwhile, the considerable acceleration of pace set by the group was known to lead to the increase in mistakes in the individual's work and thus resulted first in integral and then in partial punishment. The difference in the speed set by the group in situations of integral (the whole group is punished) and partial (only one group member is punished, most often the individual who made the mistake) punishment, functioned as an empirical indicator of the phenomenon of emotional participation. Let me point out that the group members had neither clocks nor stopwatches and determined the time by approximation, and that if the group hurried the individual to move on from an unsolved problem to a new one, this increased the probability of mistakes and punishment.

What were the experimenter's conclusions? In groups of the collective type, the individuals were set approximately identical speeds for the performance of tasks in situations of both integral and partial punishment, regardless of the size of the collective. Even when only part of the collective was included in the experimental group (e.g., 3, 8, 12, 15 or 20 members), in all cases they set the individual approximately the same speed of work on the task. This demonstrated that humane relations do not weaken in proportion to an increase in the number of members in a collective, and that the principle "For yourself as for others, and for others as for yourself" remains valid in the collective regardless of whether the whole or merely a part of the collective is involved in the experiment. Quite a different situation was observed in experimental groups comprising randomly selected people. The bigger this type of group, the more its behaviour differed in situations of integral and partial punishment. Thus, the original hypothesis was fully confirmed.

One could also expect that the level of sympathy as emotional participation in the collective should be main-

tained both in cases when punishment threatens a veteran of the collective and when it is destined for a new member of the collective. As we know, in groups of a low level of development, a new member is often made a scapegoat. Attitude to a new member can be seen to a great extent as a criterion of humane relations in the collective. Collectivist humanism is revealed in the stability of empirical indicators of emotional participation in those cases when the threat of punishment hangs over an individual still unknown to the group, but to whom both the duties and the rights of collective member apply. The hypothesis put forward by A. S. Gorbatenko, who studied the process of the inclusion of new members in the collective, was convincingly proved in experimental research.

One ought to mention that for the collective, the phenomenon of emotional participation is a strictly group phenomenon, transforming typical individual traits of a personality such as emotional coldness, aggressiveness, etc. We possess data showing that collective members, whose individual characteristic features (if one is to believe the results of individual questionnaires) include traits seemingly incompatible with the manifestation of active emotional identification, nevertheless reveal a humane attitude in collective life and activity (Y. V. Romanina).

Here it is worth mentioning the interesting results obtained by L. P. Khokhlova, who showed that collective members included in a group of unfamiliar people demonstrate the phenomenon of emotional participation in the situation of partial punishment. Perhaps it is premature to make any far-reaching conclusions as to the psychology of the individual, but one can, I believe, hypothesise that active emotional identification, as a phenomenon of interpersonal relations and formed in conditions of genuine collectivity, acquires the status of a structural characteristic of the individual as a more or less stable new psychological formation.

Thus, the individual psychological aspect of the personality appears as socio-psychological phenomenon of interpersonal relations, whereas interpersonal relations, by influencing the traits of the individual, reveal stability and a relative independence from the direct environment. This is yet another conclusion which can be made from studying the psychological essence of humane relations in the group.

As a specific form of humane relations in the group, collectivist identification is apparent in practically any collective and appears as its inherent psychological characteristic. In its pronounced form, it is also a formative characteristic of the psychological structure of *the psychotherapeutic collective*, which in recent years has been increasingly attracting the attention of psychiatrists and psychologists dealing with the clinical, psychological and methodological problems of group psychotherapy.

Emerging at the junction of social psychology and psychiatry, group psychotherapy was formed in the West with the aid of theoretical constructions taken from the schools of Kurt Lewin and Carl Rogers, was based on Moreno's conceptions of the "sociodrama" and "psychodrama", and has absorbed, especially over recent years, the experience accumulated during the use of various forms of social training in so-called T-groups.[1] In this connection, the first question one can ask is whether group psychotherapy essentially reflects the theoretical positions of these psychological trends, and whether its application signifies the practical importing of the methodological premises inherent in these trends.

In itself, the transforming effect of the group on the individual, which comprises the psychological foundation of group psychotherapy, is indifferent to this or that theoretical construction, and it has been used for thousands of years in human practice as an effective means of influence on the thoughts and emotions of people (e.g. ritual forms of healing in Africa and Oceania, and public confession among Christians). It is all a matter of which psychological mechanisms the psychotherapist counts on, what potential of interpersonal relations he uses for medical purposes, which motivation he sets and forms during work with the group, and what characteristics this group should have. This is where the differences between theoretical approaches should show, which must be methodologically interpreted.

In the introduction to the book *Clinical Psychological Studies of Group Psychotherapy for Nervous and Mental Illnesses*, M. M. Kabanov, Director of the Bekhterev Psychoneurological Institute, writes: "The development of

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[1] In T-groups people are taught the habits of interpersonal communication by means of specially organised group discussion.

group psychotherapy is impossible without the theoretical substantiation of its main tenets... The mistake of foreign theoreticians in the sphere of research into the mechanisms of group dynamics is their almost total separation of 'micro-relations' from 'macrorelations', and also their ignoring of the essentially important aspect of the formation and functioning of the group. Ideas are developing in modern-day Marxist social psychology which show the inadequacy of taking only emotional-psychological communities into account (as Western social psychologists do), and the need to include the category of socio-psychological group mediated by joint activity (the stratometric conception of group activeness). If one proceeds from this conception, the process of the development of group psychotherapy should be regarded as the transition from an amorphous (diffuse) group to an integrated collective, i.e., as the transformation of *group* psychotherapy into *collective* psychotherapy."[1]

In connection with this, a series of socio-psychological problems arise, above all, the questions of where the fundamental difference lies between the psychology of a psychotherapeutic collective and that of a diffuse psychotherapeutic group and what are the socio-psychological mechanisms of the collective's manifestations, the necessary determinants for the effective treatment and rehabilitation of the patient. For us it is obvious that the phenomenon of collectivist identification, which emerges as a result of the activity-based mediation of interpersonal relations in the psychotherapeutic collective, is one of these mechanisms.

A psychotherapeutic group does not become a psychotherapeutic collective straightaway, nor do relations of collectivist identification suddenly emerge in it. To formulate the main difference between a psychotherapeutic group and a psychotherapeutic collective, it becomes necessary to look at the specific nature of the factors which mediate relations in these two types of group.[2]

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[1] *Clinical Psychological Studies of Group Psychotherapy for Nervous and Mental Illnesses*, Leningrad, 1979, pp. 5-6 (in Russian).

[2] See: A. V. Petrovsky, M. A. Turovsky, "On the Question of the Socio-Psychological Foundations of Group Psychotherapy", in: *Clinical Psychological Studies of Group Psychotherapy for Nervous and Mental Illnesses.*

In the traditional psychotherapeutic group the motive of the activity of each member is the latter's own recovery. But since recovery is reached by means of specially organised intragroup interaction, participation in this activity involving subordination to its laws functions as an aim which corresponds to the motive of each member's activity. It is this type of value notion of the members of a psychotherapeutic group which mediates the interpersonal relations in it. Hence is the interest in the affairs and the feelings of others.

In contrast to the psychotherapeutic group, it is considered normal in the psychotherapeutic collective when the health of another person and how he is re-establishing full contacts with his social environment, his conscious and worthy participation in the life of society, and his future life, appear as an independent value. It is relations mediated by this kind of value notion of the object of joint activity that determine the optimality of the socio-psychological make-up of the psychotherapeutic collective.

One should not forget that the motive which brings a patient into a psychotherapeutic group and the motive which guides the psychotherapeutist in his work with the group are not the same. The psychotherapeutist is concerned about the recovery of each member of the group, of the group as a whole. The patient is initially motivated merely by his own personal problems and does not show concern for the treatment of each member of the group, in whom for the moment he justifiably sees only a chance (perhaps sympathetic, but perhaps antipathetic) fellow companion. During the first stages of group psychotherapy, however, he changes his view somewhat and begins to regard the group as a whole and each member as a kind of "instrument" of psychotherapeutic influence. In other words, he realises the benefit of the group *for himself*. In this way, the transition from diffuse psychotherapeutic group to a group where relations are mediated by the task of joint activity and its objective nature is already outlined. But this is by no means a transition to a psychotherapeutic collective, and not surprisingly, the forefathers of group psychotherapy limit the method to this given stage, and foreign group psychotherapy (above all American) gets stuck precisely at this spot.

A psychotherapeutic group becomes a collective when the motives of the psychotherapist and of each group mem-

ber begin to overlap and coincide, when a system of relations emerges in the group which puts into practice the vital principle of Soviet health care: "the health of each is the wealth of all". The activity of the group is then directed towards solving the problems of each member and thus interpersonal relations and the personal problems of each member are transformed in a direction desirable for the psychotherapist and for the success of treatment. Just as the individual, in the process of effectively organised activity, by working to achieve his aim, thus transforms and corrects his personal defects, the group, in the process of highly motivated activity, by solving its problems and realising its moral values, becomes a collective; in this case, a psychotherapeutic collective in which collectivist identification makes itself apparent.

The parameter of collectivist identification and its empirical indicator, emotional participation, is just beginning to be generally used by Soviet social psychology. Many questions related to its psychological essence still need further elaboration. However, examination of this parameter can even now elucidate much in the complex structure of interpersonal relations, because it enables one to study the personal basis of group interaction.

Cohesion in the Collective

How important and valuable is the harmony of human relations, and how hard this is to attain when one is talking of a specific human group, whether it be a scientific laboratory, a production team, a sports team or an academic group.

But why is it so hard to attain? Because people are all different, circumstances are complex and interests may not coincide. The great complexity of human relations inevitably gives rise to conflicts. But is there perhaps a way round such conflicts? First one has to find out the nature of the conflict and whether it always hinders the cohesion of the people involved in it. And, in fact, one has to understand what cohesion means as the highest manifestation of the harmony of human relations. Let us reflect on cohesion and compatibility, and on the causes and ways of solving the conflicts which arise among people in activity and communication.

It is difficult to think of a psychological problem that has attracted the attention of modern-day Western social psychologists to such a degree as group cohesion. Thousands of works have been devoted to this theme. The economic crisis in the late 1920s-early 1930s, fascism in Germany and Italy, World War II, the persecution and alienation of people during the period of McCarthyism in the USA, the escalation of violence particularly during America's infamous war in Vietnam, and the rise in the strike movement were all factors stimulating research aimed at strengthening intragroup and intergroup relations, the disintegration of which can be seen in the Western world. The problem of cohesion was the focus of attention of dozens of special psychological institutions in the USA, Britain, Japan and West Germany. It is in these countries that the main theoretical principles of the conception of the nature of cohesion, and also methodological approaches to its study emerged. For a long time these theoretical principles and methodological approaches were regarded as the only possible ones for socio-psychological research. However, there were full grounds for expecting that they could lead, and in fact they did lead, the problem of cohesion into a dead-end if only because they destined it to remain within the circle of conceptions which interpreted the small group exclusively as an emotional and communicative association.

Having taken as their point of departure the emotional psychological relations between people, which are manifested in the communicative practice of the small group, and above all, in the frequency, prolongation and order of interaction, Western social psychologists in essence did not set themselves the task of establishing what these relations depended on, nor did they try to trace their sources in the economy, ideology and politics. Thus, the content aspect of group interrelations, including that of the phenomenon of cohesion, was eliminated as a rule from socio-psychological research. The registration of interactions, communicative acts and reciprocal choices and preferences based on sympathies and antipathies became the main way of revealing cohesion, while the psychologist's practical recommendations on increasing group cohesion were mostly related to possible changes in its sociometric structure. "By removing individuals of a low sociometric status from the group and moving into it individuals of high sociometric

status the cohesion of the group improved..."[1] wrote Moreno. Thus, in his view, it is sufficient to make a few transformations in the established structure of the group (for example, the removal of conflicting persons), and a disintegrated group will become cohesive and united. Indeed in certain cases of deep interpersonal conflict perhaps it is right to resort to "ostracism", but this is by no means the general way of increasing cohesion.

It is easy to see that this kind of study of cohesion does not provide for the examination of the standards and values which are formed in the group on its most important foundation, that of joint objective activity which has a definite tendency, social meaning and aim. Not surprisingly, the study of cohesion was almost exclusively carried out in laboratory conditions where the objects of study were artificially formed groups which functioned in hypothetical situations of cooperation or competition, authoritarian or democratic style of leadership, etc., and where group activity itself was altogether artificial. Cohesion as the stability of group structure, its ability to counter forces aimed at weakening or destroying interpersonal links, is interpreted as "the state of the group achieved as a result of an increased frequency of interactions between the group members",[2] and, what is more; "If the frequency of interaction between two or more persons increases, the degree of their liking for one another will increase, and vice versa".[3] These and other similar formulations are to be found in many books on social psychology in the West.

These books describe numerous methods for obtaining cohesion coefficients. By comparing these coefficients, psychologists seek to derive specific information about the peculiar features of intra-group development processes. The methods of studying cohesion adopted in psychology abroad are mostly based on the hypothesis that there is a direct link between the quantity, frequency and intensity of communications in the group and its cohesion, and that, therefore, the quantity and force of reciprocal positive or negative choices is evidence of cohesion.

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[1] J. L. Moreno, *Sociometry, Experimental Method and the Science of Society*, Beacon House Inc., Beacon, N. Y., 1951, p. 110.

[2] *Group Dynamics. Research and Theory*, ed. by D. Cartwright and A. Zander, Tavistock Publications Ltd., London, 1960, p. 74.

[3] G. C. Homans, *The Human Group*, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1950, p. 112.

Moreover, it is not even supposed that the frequency and quantity of interpersonal contacts as well as their prolongation can be themselves the result of the inner cohesion of a group. The opposite conclusion is drawn: the artificial increase of the number of communications between group members eventually makes a less cohesive group more cohesive, while certain individuals gradually begin to resemble one another with regard to their standards and values.

Thus, the sources of group and individual activeness and the formation of attitudes, values and standards, are all seen as derived from the level of interpersonal contacts and the emotional colouring of communications. As a result, American psychologists most often define the group cohesion coefficient as the quotient from the division of the number of mutual links by the number of links theoretically possible for the given group. This coefficient can reflect the intensity of communication in the group, however, the livening up of interpersonal contacts can signify not only the strengthening of friendly and professional interrelations directed towards the benefit of society. Observations have shown that during conflicts the number of contacts noticeably rises and, therefore, it is impossible proceeding merely from the number of group members and the frequency of interactions to form an opinion about the "traits" or "signs" of cohesion.

The American psychologist T. Newcomb uses the concept "consensus" for analysing group cohesion, meaning the uniformity of individual opinions of objects of orientation: "I mean by the term nothing more or less than the existence, on the part of two or more persons, of similar orientations toward something."[1] Newcomb characterises the cohesion of any group by the level of consensus.

However, he relates consensus only to the frequency of interactions and so once again he limits the term, and cohesion is once again reduced to emotional-psychological characteristics. "Let me begin a consideration of those psychological processes by noting the interdependence of consensus and communication ... in some degree and in some manner, the actual consequences of communication ... are consensus-increasing,"[2] writes Newcomb. Consensus is

[1] *Sociology Today. Problems and Prospects*, ed. by R. K. Merton, et al., Basic Books Inc. Publishers, New York, 1960, p. 279.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 280.

also seen as a group characteristic which explains the mechanism of the formation of standards, or as one of the means of transmitting customs and modes from one generation to the next. But here too, consensus is related to the theory of communications and interaction.

Therefore in their attempts to measure operationally the degree of consensus existing among group members, researchers are constantly dissatisfied because they have to resort again and again to analysing the number, prolongation and strength of communications. The reason for this fully understandable dissatisfaction lies in the very approach to the study of cohesion, which ignores the social essence of intra-group processes and their activity-based nature and reduces it to emotional attractiveness. In the same work, Newcomb writes: "From these facts I conclude that the final situation, in which subjects choosing each other tended to resemble each other in choosing the remaining members, was in considerable part determined by the psychological factors revealed by the early, autistic responses...."[1]

Thus, most American social psychologists regard group cohesion above all as mutual attractiveness and consensus with regard to vital objects of orientation. It would seem impossible not to agree with this. And yet, having pointed to the similarity of positions and attitudes as a vital criterion of the group, Bales, Newcomb, Homans and other American psychologists nevertheless ignore this in their research methodology, believing as they do that the similarity of views is, ultimately, determined by the frequency of communications between group members. Newcomb writes: "...The hypothetical conditions and consequences of communicative acts are not limited to groups of two".[2] In itself, the statement that consensus is a condition of the cohesion of individuals does not raise doubts. We accept that without consensus, cooperation is made rather difficult. What we want to know is the following: with respect to what is consensus essential as a source of group cohesion, what determines this consensus, how does one measure it (by the communicative practice of the group or some other way?), can and must all cases of consensus

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[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 288.

[2] T. M. Newcomb, "An Approach to the Study of Communicative Acts", *Psychological Review*, Washington, Vol. 60, No. 6, November 1953, p. 403.

on objects of orientation testify to group cohesion, and finally, how is consensus related to other parameters of interpersonal relations, etc.? The conception of group cohesion accepted in traditional Western social psychology has proved a failure since it is unable to solve many important problems of group dynamics. This to a certain degree has been acknowledged by Western psychologists themselves.

The frequency of contacts and the presence of mutual sociometric choices can be regarded as specific indicators for the diffuse group. However, these indicators are not at all informative for understanding the phenomena which arise in groups like the collective, since the quantity of interactions and choices in the collective is not a system-forming criterion. In the works of Soviet social psychologists collective cohesion is regarded as the collective's most important characteristic, as a measure of its unity caused by the realisation of a community of objectives, tasks and ideals, as well as by interpersonal relations such as friendly contacts and mutual assistance. However, when actually defining cohesion coefficients, researchers as a rule only used two parameters as original premises: the number of group members and the number of communications with a wide range of emotional colourings from hostility through indifference to sympathy.

Thus, while correctly understanding cohesion as an integral socio-psychological characteristic of the collective, many authors applied methods of study which did not correspond to the essence of cohesion among individuals in the collective as a highly developed group, and this has brought experimental solution into conflict with the original methodological views.

The informative content of cohesion coefficients obtained by the calculation of reciprocal sociometric choices and the elucidation of the frequency of members' contacts with one another in the group, has, in fact, deprived the psychologist of the chance to trace or even guess how cohesion is formed and has prevented him from making forecasts about the peculiarities of the social behaviour of the groups tested. The idea of cohesion as an emotional-communicative unity of individuals, which lies at the basis of these methodological procedures, more or less correctly reflects the actual phenomenon of the psychology of diffuse groups, but proves invalid when it becomes the theoretical basis of the experimental study of collectives, united mainly by the aims,

tasks and principles of joint, socially useful activity. It was clear to us that we must analyse the content of joint group activity in order to reveal cohesion and to work out how pronounced it is. This was how the idea arose of cohesion as the value-orientational unity of the collective, related to the stratometric conception.

As an indicator of group cohesion, value-orientational unity functions as an integral characteristic of the system of intra-group relations, showing the degree to which the opinions, appraisals, attitudes and views of group members coincide with regard to objects of most significance for the implementation of the aims of group activity and the realisation in this activity of the group's scale of values. On this basis, a strictly experimental programme for obtaining the index of cohesion could be built (V. V. Shpalinsky), *the frequency of coincidence of the opinions or views of group members with regard to such types of objects*, being regarded as this index.

Having interpreted the indices of cohesion as value-orientational unity, one can compare groups with different levels of development, undertake opportune prophylactic measures to increase the degree of a group's integrative activity, and, in general, obtain data for a deeper understanding of the nature of individual interrelations in the group, than with the use of sociometric indices of cohesion which, as already mentioned, are insufficiently informative.

A high degree of value-orientational unity is created not as a result of the group's communicative practice, but by active, joint, socially useful group activity. It is this that forms the basis of communication between group members and of all the phenomena of interpersonal relations. Therefore, the nature of interactions (communications) in the group is also *the result of the unity of the attitudes and values of the group members* brought about by joint activity of a collectivist type.

The value-orientational unity of a group as an indicator of its cohesion by no means envisages the coincidence of the appraisals and views of group members in all respects, or the levelling of the individual in the group. Value-orientational unity in the collective is above all a drawing together of appraisals in the moral and professional sphere and in the approach to the aims and tasks of joint activity. If, for instance, some members of the group believe that the task set before the group is impracticable or that the

game is not worth the candle, or that the group leader is not capable of ensuring the performance of the task owing to his unsuitability for leadership, while others have quite the opposite opinion, and this kind of disagreement is typical for the given group, then there can be no talk of group cohesion whatsoever.

Alexander Herzen in his book *The Past and Thoughts*, gave an authentic and subtle psychological analysis of the cohesion of people united by a common cause: "...In essence, I remain convinced that in really close relations, identity of *religion*, identity of the individuals' main theoretical beliefs, is essential. Of course, theoretical agreement alone is insufficient for a close link between people; I was closer to Kireyevsky in sympathy than to many others of us. More than that, one can be a good and faithful *ally*, in agreement on a specific cause, while holding different opinions; I have had such relations with people whom I infinitely respected while disagreeing with them on many things, for example Mazzini and Vorzel. I did not seek to convince them, nor they me; we had enough in common in order to walk the same path without argument. But between us, brothers of one family, twins living one life, we could not be at such great variance with one another".[1] In fact what Herzen is talking about here is the contrast of cohesion as an emotional similarity of people and cohesion as the value-orientational unity of allies and, finally, like-minded colleagues. The latter require the existence of "identity of religion", which, as Herzen points out, and his atheistic views need no explanation, signifies an "identity in one's main theoretical beliefs".

As a result of specific experimental research and the analysis of the data obtained, a well-substantiated conclusion has been made to the effect that in collectives the coefficient of value-orientational unity is markedly higher than in diffuse groups. Whereas in groups which, according to their objective indicators, could be referred to as collectives, the cohesion coefficients were close to one (from 0.6 to 0.92), in groups that were not united by joint activity, and which, in their level of development and organisation, belonged to the category of diffuse groups, the group cohesion coefficients ranged from 0.2 to 0.5 All this gives

[1] A. I. Herzen, *Collected Works* in 30 volumes, Vol. 9, Moscow, 1956, pp. 211-212 (in Russian).

one grounds to place cohesion as value-orientational unity in the second stratum of the stratometric structure of the collective, leaving cohesion as an emotional-communicative unity of the group as one of the characteristics of the surface layer of intra-group activity and one of the properties of the diffuse group.

Group cohesion can also be found in the deeper layers of the collective's structure—*in its nucleus*—which determines all the socio-psychological phenomena of the collective. The phenomenon of integration of the collective on the highest level—collective cohesion as *objective value-based unity*,[1] emerges in the deepest, strictly objective layer, as opposed to the "interpersonal" stratum of group activeness. Objective value-based unity functioning as a modification of value-orientational unity on the level of "nuclear" group processes is manifested in the act of mediation of individual activity by the general value content of the object of joint activity.

This position was the starting point for the construction of an experimental programme which enabled the researcher to reveal objective value-based cohesion in school teaching collectives. According to A. I. Dontsov's hypothesis, the main factor of the integration or cohesion of a teaching collective is the objective, value-based unity of the nucleus of intra-group activity. The hypothesis envisaged the discovery of two dependences. *The first supposition*: the community of educational norms with regard to the formation of pupils' personalities (i.e. the objective content of the teacher's activity), objectively implemented in the activity of the teaching collective, is greater than co-ordination of the teacher's subjective notions of the pupil's "standard". *The second supposition*: on the contrary, the degree of co-ordination of the teacher's value criteria is higher in the notions of the teacher's "standard" and lower when they are the actual criteria of interrelations in the teaching collective.

A special methodological system was worked out to check this hypothesis, which made it possible to elucidate the objective value-based foundations of the teacher's activity and the degree of consensus of teachers' views on the pupil

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[1] See: A. I. Dontsov, *Problems of Group Cohesion*, Moscow, 1979 (in Russian).

as the object of education, and also on their own colleagues. This system is an interesting modification of the above-mentioned method for revealing the motivational nucleus of choice. In short, it consists of several experimental procedures used in succession: a) for the teachers' description of their pupils and b) for the teachers' description of other teachers.

What important conclusions could be made from the study? The hypotheses were fully confirmed. An examination of the results of version A (teachers-pupils), showed that the total indices of collective unity on the first parameter (co-ordination of the actual criteria of the appraisal of the pupil) are in all cases higher than on the second parameter (co-ordination of the teachers' subjective notions of the pupil's moral cast). In other words, the objective value-based criteria of the pupil have a greater degree of community when they serve as the basis of the teacher's actual educational practice than when they are an object for conscious appraisal. In contrast, the results of version B (teachers-teachers) revealed an inverse dependence—the degree of community of ideas of the "standard" image of a teacher is greater than the measure of unity of the actual criteria of "professional interrelations".

Apparently, although unexpected, there is nothing paradoxical about these conclusions. After all, the psychologist was dealing with interrelations of different types. In one case these were interrelations conditioned by the objective nature of joint activity (teachers-pupils), when cohesion of the teaching collective during the *realisation* of certain ideas in specific educational work, was greater than its cohesion in the adoption of ideal, but generally non-committal and frequently discussional notions of what the pupils should be like. In the other case, (teachers-teachers), the whole problem was on the plane of the interpersonal relations within the collective of teachers and was, as a matter of fact, deprived to a great extent of objective content, since productive activity in the teaching collective (this is particularly characteristic of this type of collective) is least of all directed at the collective's members, i.e., the teachers themselves, but has as its subject the purposeful education and upbringing of pupils. Therefore it is quite natural that the value criteria of the concept of "a good teacher" here have a greater degree of coordination than the value bases of the actual relations between teachers,

which inevitably include emotional components, sympathies and antipathies.

One can surmise that if the researcher were to continue the experiment and examine version C (pupils-pupils), the results would be closer to version B (teachers-teachers) than to version A (teachers-pupils). And if one assumes the possibility of yet one more version D (pupils-teachers), then in all probability, its results would be very similar to version A (teachers-pupils).

All these suppositions are put forward on the basis of the socio-psychological conception examined here, according to which *interrelations in groups are to a greater or lesser extent mediated by the aims, tasks and values of joint activity, i.e. by its actual content.* One can surmise that versions A and D should reveal the existence of mediation to a greater degree, since the content of joint work in a good educational collective envisages the mediation of interrelations by the aims and results of joint activity. There is a constant pooling of the results of activity between teachers and pupils, relations of responsible dependence emerge, the success or failure of the teacher's activity affects the success or failure of the pupil's activity and, vice versa, the sum of knowledge and moral standards acquired by a pupil as a result of education is a criterion of the educational effectiveness of the teacher's work. The powerful layer of objective relations which take shape in the course of teaching also necessarily gives rise to the phenomena of group activeness which were partially revealed in psychological experimentation and partially put forward by way of a hypothesis.

Are the interrelations of the pupils themselves mediated considerably by the content of their academic activity? What are the grounds for supposing that the hypothetical version C is similar to version B? Naturally it is hard to make any categorical judgements prior to experimental verification. All the more so since much depends on the individual make-up of the specific class collective. However, we believe that the usual nature of academic activity does not in itself sufficiently stimulate cohesion on the objective value-based level. The academic work of the class, even when it works as a whole, in essence does not include the kind of active interaction which provides for an exchange of the products of activity, and responsible dependence among the members of the collective verified by the contrib-

ution of each member to the common result. Therefore, although it is joint work, it is also individual work. The layer of objective value-based cohesion is formed in the inner structure of the class collective mainly owing to joint labour activity, active social voluntary work and other factors that effectively mediate group activeness and not in academic activity which should be most important for the pupil.

This fact is now increasingly drawing the attention of educationalists studying the possibilities of initiating genuinely *collective academic activity*. This important and complex educational problem should be studied and resolved using the results of socio-psychological research.

Value-orientational unity and its modification in the form of objective value-based unity, which clearly reveals the activity-based nature of collective cohesion, is constantly demonstrated in actual work collectives and is becoming the object of the particular attention of social psychologists, sociologists and writers. Scientific collectives, in particular, are provoking great interest and attention. This is quite natural. The rise in the role of science in socialist society, its transformation into a productive force, the huge army of Soviet scientific workers and the successful activity of thousands of highly productive scientific laboratories, are all factors causing special attention to be drawn to the psychology of the scientific collective in search of reserves for enhancing its activity.

The author had the opportunity of participating as a scientific consultant in an interesting film experiment recorded by the Kiev Popular Science Film Studio.[1] The theme of this strictly documentary film was an extraordinary event which took place in a certain very fine, truly creative and well-knit collective that was known for its scientific achievements and had a talented and humane leader. The members of this collective voted by a majority to ask a young and very capable, but very abrupt and unaccommodating employee, who had proposed changing the department's work plans and reorganising its structure, to leave the department. The said employee did subsequently leave. The film experiment was conducted six months after these events. In brief, three episodes were played out and filmed

[1] The film: *The Collective: Successes or Failures*, script by E. A. Dubrovsky, director A. N. Mikulsky.

by the director using professional actors. Two episodes portrayed moral conflicts which sometimes emerge among scientific workers. The third episode, "the expulsion", was essentially a model of ostracism used against a new member. These episodes were shown to the department's employees, followed by a discussion which was also filmed. This enabled the film's authors to conduct a retrospective psychological analysis of the real circumstances in the department, which all of a sudden arose, as if surfacing in the employees' minds, during discussion of the hypothetical, "make-believe" conflicts shown on the screen.

So what was behind this case of ostracism in an actual scientific collective and what did the psychological analysis show?

The fact is that any collective goes through definite phases of development, from a lower to a higher. It seemed that the department which interested the film-makers had already reached the higher phase. It was a well-knit, purposeful and friendly collective, interesting to be in and where work went well. But a collective is a complex system of relations between people in the socially significant activity that unites them, that is combined with a no less complex network of interpersonal relations, and a collective can only be understood in its dynamics, in the development of these relations. No authoritative mark of quality can guarantee indefinitely that the development of this system will not reverse.

The present and future of a collective depend on what dominates and prevails in the structure of intra-collective links: relations of responsible dependence determined by the socially significant aim of joint activity, or emotional contacts brought about by intra-group communication. Despite the great value of the latter and the need for them in the normal functioning of the collective, they should be determined and not determining, and only in this way can cohesion be ensured.

In essence, the film reproduced the situation of the prevalence (even in a good scientific collective) of regressive tendencies. As a scientific collective, the department had dropped down one rung on the ladder of its development, its personal relations had become more important than scientific ideas, conformist and time-serving reactions had emerged and the critical approach of the collective had weakened giving way to placidity and liberal indulgence.

Between the time of the employee's expulsion and the film experiment only six months had passed, and in that time the backward movement of the collective had hardly manifested itself, but it was clearly evident in the experimental situation. A crisis of objective can throw a collective back much further than happened in this department, and cause much deeper conflicts and even lead to the collapse of the collective as a highly developed group.

One should point out that nothing so dramatic happened in the actual collective which was the object of this study. This was mainly because the department was part of a strong, promising and efficient institute (unfortunately the institute was not included in the film experiment which was only a local one). Meanwhile, it was the institute, its social organisations and management, who noticed certain latent processes emerging in the department in time and managed to help it get back on to the right path. The department was the object of study at a crucial and difficult moment in its development, just as it was beginning to break down and crisis was becoming imminent. The resolution of the crisis opened a new phase in the movement towards the aim and thus towards the normalisation of interpersonal relations, the improvement of the psychological climate and the rise in cohesion as value-orientational unity. The collective's subsequent achievements confirmed its creative potential.

Value-orientational unity and objective value-based unity are not the only characteristics of cohesion of the collective, considered in the light of the principles of activity-based mediation. Other approaches to the problem of cohesion are also possible from the same theoretical positions.

For example, *compatibility of the people* can be recognised as one of the aspects or components of the general cohesion of a collective. Leaving aside the wealth of literature devoted to the problem of psychological compatibility,[1] let me merely say that traditionally the homeostatic approach has been almost the leading method of revealing the compatibility of individuals in the group. By performing a task on an apparatus resembling a homeostat, group members

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[1] See: R. L. Krichevsky, "The Problem of Interpersonal Compatibility in Foreign Social Psychology", *Voprosy Psikhologii*, No. 5, 1979.

may or may not attain a coordination of sensori-motor actions, which is seen as demonstration of the presence or absence of compatibility. Evidently, compatibility as the coordination of people in a group during the performance of basic joint actions can indeed be revealed using this method. But can we on this basis make conclusions as to the compatibility in the group when one is referring to the more complex forms of activity which it carries out? People who cannot make the hands of the homeostat turn in such a way as to help and not hinder one another, are indeed incompatible in this activity, but does this give us grounds to conclude that they will be incompatible in designing, tactical military or creative artistic activity as well? It seems highly unlikely that it is the presence of coordination in sensori-motor action that ensures the compatibility of group members during the transition to other forms of activity.

The above-mentioned points compel us to search for the basis of psychological compatibility not in coordination during the performance of an individual operation, but in coordination within integral, jointly performed, collective activity which is determined for the subject by the common task and the structure of which implies the characteristics of its participants (their abilities, intentions and ideas about the methods of carrying out tasks, etc.). This approach is fundamental in studying group cohesion as the *coordination of functional-role expectations* (V. V. Avdeyev), i.e., coordination of the ideas of the participants in joint activity as to *what exactly each member of the collective should do, with whom and in which succession* for the realisation of the socially significant aim which is common to all. Thus, during the study of groups technically servicing electronic computer systems, it was discovered that this type of activity requires co-ordination in the interaction of group members with regard to participation in jointly performed function, to the sequence of the carrying out of operations, etc. This approach envisages the preliminary modelling of the situation of actual joint activity and the coordination of the views of each participant on the basis of the collective idea of this activity. As specific research has shown, the lack of coordination of functional-role expectations can become the source of conflict and one of the causes of the erosion of cohesion and of the appearance of signs of psychological incompatibility in the group.

However, it would be a mistake to conclude that from the point of view of the theory of activity-based mediation of interpersonal relations it is the coordination of functional-role expectations which is the determinant of cohesion and compatibility in the collective. It becomes possible to coordinate functional-role expectations when the structure of activity is completely established and when roles and functions have been clearly distributed. But the group and group activity are dynamic phenomena. It is by no means always possible to allot all functions to all members of the group and coordinate all functional-role expectations opportunely, especially when the activity is of a creative type. In such a case, cohesion as coordination of functional-role expectations cannot ensure the genuine integration of the individual in the collective. Besides, and this is very important, the study of the coordination of functional-role expectations does not enable one to distinguish the collective from any other developed group united on the basis of joint activity.

This fact compels us to return once again to the idea of value-orientational unity as the main and most important indicator of collective cohesion, but now turning not so much to the objective content of the subject-matter and the goal of group activity as to its *moral foundation*, manifested in the personal position of each member of the collective in relation to the colleague with whom he is connected by a common aim.

All the forms of value-orientational unity which have been examined so far describe cohesion as the result of the coincidence of orientations to a certain object (an aim, tasks, leader, etc.), when all are, as it were, looking in the same direction. Next we should, at least briefly, examine cases of unity which manifests itself when all in the group see each other and relate to each other from a single moral stand. We have already examined this type of value-orientational unity in the chapter on collectivist identification. Let me mention just one more closely related and partly coincident form of integration of the individual in the collective, the violation of which is an inevitable cause of intra-group incompatibility. This form is *the phenomenon of the attribution of responsibility*, i.e., an individual's stable position manifested in the recognition of the legitimacy of taking possible social sanctions in the form o approval of success and punishment for failure in joint

activity against both himself and other members of the group.

The phenomenon of the attribution of responsibility has been studied in Western social psychology as an individual psychological characteristic of a person, either manifested or not depending on who the other individual is, to whom responsibility for failure or homage for success can be attributed, and what kind of activity is involved—cooperative or competitive (Kelly and others). For example, the Canadian psychologists showed the dependence of acts of attributing responsibility on the physical attractiveness of the other person. It was revealed that responsibility for good deeds and successful work is attributed to pretty women while unattractive women are blamed for failures and bad deeds. Usually, acts of attributing responsibility were studied in artificial conditions unrelated to the specific social environment or the significant joint activity in groups. As a result, a phenomenon that was in itself interesting, was not in fact explained or used to interpret processes and phenomena of intra-group activeness.

The phenomenon of the attribution of responsibility was first explained from the standpoint of the theory of activity-based mediation in the works of L. A. Sukhinskaya.[1] Her experiments showed that the nature of the attribution of responsibility depends on the level of development of the group. The hypothesis was confirmed that acts of attributing responsibility in the collective are mainly objective and that the individual contribution of each member, virtually regardless of the ultimate success or failure of joint activity, is adequately evaluated. A totally different picture was observed in the poorly developed group, in which the subject of appraisal frequently notes his own merit in cases of success in joint activity, whereas in cases of failure, he is willing to lay the blame on all others or, at least, on "objective circumstances". One can conjecture that in this type of group, acts of attributing responsibility are mainly conditioned by the individual psychological features of the subject of appraisal, and this is the very same sphere in which all those laws and dependences operate which were

[1] See: L. A. Sukhinskaya, "The Attribution and Acceptance of Responsibility in Conditions of Collective Activity", in: *Psychology of Collective Activity*; L. A. Sukhinskaya, "The Attribution of Responsibility for Success and Failure in Groups with Different Levels of Development", *Voprosy Psikhologii*, No. 2, 1978.

experimentally discovered by Western social psychologists and wrongly used to describe small groups in general.

Inadequacy in the attribution of responsibility for the success or failure of actually performed and socially estimated activity is a factor stimulating conflict in any group. Since the participants in joint activity are very often not in a position to measure their own contribution to the common cause objectively, their appraisals are highly subjective. The moral strength of the collective, by blocking the extremes of subjectivity, creates the conditions for compatibility on the basis of moral standards recognised by all members of the collective: i.e., do not evade responsibility if you are to blame; do not pass the blame; do not attribute success to yourself; do not belittle the role and significance of others in joint achievements; do not explain the failure by "objective circumstances", etc.

To sum up generally, we can say that the cohesion of a collective and the compatibility of its members form a kind of hierarchy of levels.

Right at the bottom lie cohesion manifested in the intensity of a group's communicative practice, compatibility as the presence of reciprocal sociometric choices, the psychophysiological compatibility of characters and temperaments, the coordination of sensori-motor operations during the performance of actions, etc. On this level, cohesion is a necessary condition for the integration of the individual in the group, where interpersonal relations are minimally mediated by the content and values of social activity. While necessary and sufficient for describing the diffuse group, they are inadequate and of no fundamental importance for describing the collective.

The fact of the mediation of interpersonal relations by the content of joint activity, which poses before every participant in this activity the question: "What must I do in order to meet the demands and expectations of my work partners in conditions of the division of labour?", raises the group to a new level of cohesion. This form of cohesion is necessary for certain sufficiently stable stages of the development of joint activity and is a sign of the non-diffuseness of the group. However, it cannot differentiate groups into collectives and non-collectives, since it ignores the question of for the sake of what activity is carried out and the functional-role expectations of its members coordinated.

The highest level of cohesion and compatibility in joint activity, characteristic of the collective, appears in the form of the unity of objective goal and value orientations, on the one hand, and collectivist identification and adequacy of the attribution of responsibility, on the other. The integration of the individual in the collective takes place through the mastering of the highest spiritual values of socialist society, and the realisation of its constructive aims and tasks.





CHAPTER VI

The Stratometric Conception and Educational Psychology[1]

The educational process is carried out in the collective and with the help of the collective. But what exactly is this instrument for educating the individual in the psychological respect? And does the word "instrument" not sound too technical? For, after all, a collective is made up of very different living people connected by a complex system of interpersonal relations, striving for one goal but willing to achieve it by different means. To understand the general laws of the emergence and functioning of the collective is to obtain the possibility of purposefully and effectively influencing the individual and to restructure, if necessary, the entire psychological climate in the collective.

The specific historical approach to the study of socio-psychological phenomena based on the stratometric conception makes it possible to find new ways of studying the social behaviour of the individual within the system of his objective communications. One should study not the individual in general, nor the small group in general, but the individual in the group, the content of whose relations is determined by the objective conditions of social development. This is how "men, not in any fantastic isolation and fixity, but in their actual, empirically perceptible process of development under definite conditions"[2] should be studied.

The stratometric approach to group structure assumes that the nucleus of group interrelations, which includes

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[1] This chapter makes use of material written in cooperation with T. V. Snegireva and Y. V. Yanotovskaya.

[2] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "The German Ideology", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 37.

the aims and tasks of socially useful activity, mediates interpersonal relations, determining their content. The effectiveness of the management of various groups (academic and production groups, etc.) is conditioned by the extent to which the specific features of the group's main type of activity are taken into account in leadership practice, in so much as it is these features which constitute an objective factor of group development.

It is generally believed that academic activity is the main type of group activity in collectives of schoolchildren.

The importance of academic activity is hard to overestimate. Well organised academic activity promotes the assimilation of essential knowledge and the development of skills, the formation of the pupil's views and independence and the shaping of the individual's important traits, convictions and ideals. One of the most important aims of our education system is the formation of academic activity on a high level making it possible to develop the pupils' cognitive abilities.

At the same time, certain specific characteristics of academic activity cannot help affecting the structuring of the interpersonal relations of schoolchildren. Although apparently joint activity—for the teacher works directly with the whole class—academic activity mainly envisages an individualised process of mastering knowledge and is therefore, essentially, the sum of individual academic achievements. The need for working interaction under conditions of generally accepted forms of academic activity is minimal and episodic. This is particularly the case with the lesson which to this day remains the main element of school work. Interaction during the lesson (any kind of conference, prompting or the collective performance of work, etc.) is regarded as an undesirable and, frequently, a punishable form of behaviour. It is true that various forms of mutual help are encouraged, and rightly so, during extra-curricula time: the helping of slower pupils by the best pupils, joint preparation for examinations, etc. Indeed there are quite a few interesting ways of organising joint academic activity. To mention one example, A. I. Lipkina formulated and psychologically substantiated the method of using a weak pupil of a senior class to help a weak pupil in a junior class. As a result of this, not only is a certain teaching effect achieved, but noticeable changes take place in the personal traits: the senior pupil's level of preten-

sions and self-appraisal in the sphere of academic activity rise and the junior pupil's consciousness of his academic "inferiority" is not increased. Nevertheless, as we have already said, the lesson remains the predominant form of educational work in school, but it is during the lesson that the academic activity of a pupil today is least of all collective.

Academic activity during lessons, of course, compares poorly with industrial, work activity which ensures high results in the formation of collectives. As we know, production activity is, above all, joint, common work. This community of work, recorded in the division and results of labour, is real. The interdependence of participants in the production process is realised in the materialised products of labour. The success of one conditions the success of others and the failure of one affects all areas of common work. The existence of objective criteria for measuring the contribution of each person to the total product of activity, is the objective basis of mutual appraisal. Developing in real objective activity, interpersonal relations in production are of a mediated kind and thus ensure the collective-forming process.

So how then do the emergence and formation of collectives in secondary schools take place (and we have no doubt that sufficiently developed groups, which can on a number of parameters be regarded as collectives, do emerge and function there)? Of course, this question should be carefully studied using extensive material. However, one can assume that here, too, the main collective-forming factor is *the pupils' labour activity*, in the form of feasible participation in socially useful activity, the work of interest groups and of the Pioneer and Komsomol organisations, and finally, as mentioned already, in the various forms of extra-curricula academic activity where interaction and mutual help are possible.

The problem of using the lesson and the academic activity in the lesson to fulfill the tasks of forming pupils' collectives and collectivist interpersonal relations, which would be actually mediated by the content and values of joint activity, has been given socio-psychological substantiation.

Recently Soviet schools have begun putting new, group forms of class work into practice, but they are as yet in the experimental stage. One of their distinctive features is the "direct interaction between pupils, and their joint,

coordinated activity"[1] during work on academic material.

The application of group work introduces important changes not only into the teaching process, but also into the process of upbringing. Owing to group work conducted in an atmosphere of the joint coordinated interaction of pupils, envisaging the exchange of the products of activity and thus the emergence of relations of interdependence and mutual control, the process of *learning* can acquire traits of genuine collectivity. *Communication* with peers, which is a vital factor of the development of a pupil's personality and which is found, as a rule, beyond the limits of the strictly academic activity of children, becomes its attribute under new conditions, while the products of work during the lesson, i.e., the intellectual acquisitions of the pupils, knowledge and interests, become the direct object of communication. In this way, the activity of children during the lesson acquires the nature of active subject-subject-object relations.

Such fundamental changes in academic activity, in learning and communication, which occupy an important place in the pupil's life, cannot help but result in the emergence of corresponding new features in the development of the adolescent's personality and of qualitatively new socio-psychological phenomena in the life of the group, and enhance the level of its development. Indeed, teachers practising forms of group work have noticed their indisputable influence on the formation of the pupil's personality.

Above all, as one might expect, changes occur in the pupil's motivational sphere. We know that adolescents value most highly the kind of activity which allows them to communicate with one another. It is not excluded, therefore, that at first it is the opportunity for communication, simply for common participation in the solving of a general cognitive task, and the desire to find one's place in the group that determine the involvement of an adolescent in academic group work. But it soon appears that the specific character of the relations being formed demands from each person involvement in joint intellectual activity, and the pooling of mental efforts in order to overcome difficulties. Under these conditions communication of a higher type takes shape, related to the essence of joint work. As already

[1] Kh. I. Liimets, *Group Work at the Lesson*, Moscow, 1975, p. 13 (in Russian).

stressed, subject-subject-object relations are formed; whereas at the first stage, the pupil turned to the academic subject for the sake of communication with another pupil, now he cooperates and establishes contact with the other pupil in order to understand the subject of study better.

If one proceeds from the distinction which A. N. Leontiev made between activity as a process which meets a need of the subject, and action as a process whose motive does not coincide with its object, its aim (it is these signs which distinguish communication and learning in the situation described here), then one can contemplate a mechanism of shifting the motive of activity to the object, the aim of action, which gives rise to a new attitude of the child towards reality, i.e., one can point out a new type and level of interpersonal communication.

In accordance with the dynamics of group development which accompanies collective forms of teaching, the trend of the adolescent's personality can undergo considerable changes, as can the methods of his self-assertion, which until now have been regarded as relatively static characteristics.

Relations of work interaction and interdependence also give rise to the need for a more precise perception of others and the self (social apperception), which is bound to stimulate the development of self-appraisal and self-direction. An adolescent has to evaluate numerous external and internal factors. He has to perceive and understand correctly the demands which are made on him by others and by the general situation, to evaluate his potentialities in accordance with these demands, to make demands on himself, to be able to overcome inner obstacles and desires which impede the fulfilment of the demands made on him, to evaluate correctly the results of his activity and to analyse precisely difficulties and the reasons for failure, etc. In other words, in activity and via activity in the group, he becomes aware of himself and forms an image of his own Self.

Involved directly in academic activity, self-cognition and self-appraisal are not only activated, but, as we see it, their content should undergo considerable changes. The adolescent is now compelled not merely to evaluate a greater number of factors, but also to determine the place occupied by some of these factors in the general structure of the values which determine his attitude to himself and to

others. Thus, relations connected with *work* by no means always occupy a dominant place in the appraisal of the self and of peers in traditional forms of academic activity. However, in conditions of mutual dependence, mutual control and responsibility in the joint performance of a task, they involuntarily move into the foreground. What is more, there is no place left for egoistic tendencies. This is one of the preconditions for the attaining of moral maturity by the adolescent.

Each of the problems enumerated is of independent theoretical and practical interest, while at the same time being an aspect of a more general problem which establishes such an approach to the study of the group and the individual in the group, when the researcher proceeds from an analysis of developing activity itself and envisages an influence above all on activity, and only then through mediation by activity, on the group and the individual.

Of interest from this standpoint is the problem of the formation of the adolescent's conscious, purposeful self-direction during academic activity.

Educational experience has shown that there is a series of situations during which the process of mastering and assimilating the object of activity and its logic is to a greater or lesser extent disorganised. The conditions under which such a break in the course of activity occurs, as well as the resulting state of the individual, is a problem studied by many psychologists. However, the complex conditions of objective activity are examined *per se* as a rule, without any attempts to include them in the wider social context, and in particular, in the context of examination which takes the group's level of development as a collective into account. Meanwhile, the individual's behaviour and general state, determined by the complex conditions of activity, should evidently differ in the diffuse group and in the collective.

Let us look at the adolescent's activity and its inherent features in group forms of learning from this point of view. The individual's position in this situation is altogether contradictory. On the one hand, as we mentioned above, group work creates good conditions for the mutual enrichment of pupils and for individual self-assertion, since every adolescent is given the chance to activise the knowledge and skills obtained outside the lesson. On the other hand, if one goes by the almost unanimous opinion of teachers

who practice group work, the latter "causes great tension and can hardly be used for more than two lessons a day."[1]

What causes this tension? It apparently is caused not merely by the more rapid pace of work (there is always someone in a group who performs a task more rapidly than at the average speed), but mainly by the activation of the processes of social perception and social comparison, which can produce anxiety and tension among pupils. Moreover, the competence of some can only increase tension among other adolescents.

The question arises as to how one should treat these phenomena. Of course, it is possible merely to emphasise their undesirableness, but one can also regard them differently, as conditions the overcoming of which is a prerequisite for the genuinely active intellectual and spiritual growth of the individual, for his development and maturity. However, aspects of social comparison can acquire these qualities only in special conditions, which neutralise circumstances capable of producing in an adolescent a feeling of personal threat. One such condition is so-called cooperative education, the principles of which were disseminated in Soviet educational theory by V. A. Sukhomlinsky and in psychology by D. N. Uznadze, and later by S. A. Amonashvili.[2]

When formulating these principles, the necessity is usually stressed for relations of reliability in the collective, as well as an atmosphere of mutual trust and frankness, respect for the personality of the child, the sympathetic understanding of his inner world, etc. But the principles of cooperative education can go even further involving educational influences intended to develop in the adolescent the attitude of active overcoming of situations of frustration without which there is no development or growth.

In group work, this active attitude is developed in the individual without any special effort, as tasks which make up the content of the activity of learning and collective interaction are performed. At the same time, correctly organised group work does not reject, but necessarily stipulates the leading role of the teacher.

The significance of this condition is particularly great

[1] Kh. I. Liimets, *Group Work at the Lesson*, p. 53.

[2] See: S. A. Amonashvili, "Psychological and Didactic Features of Teaching as Components of Academic Activity", *Voprosy Psikhologii*, No. 4, 1975.

with regard to the adolescent's activity of self-cognition and cognition of others and of social comparison and self-direction. It must be emphasised here that *the development of the collective and the development of the individual are particularly closely connected in this process.* They are directed, as Makarenko put it, by "a single educational method".

One can assume that in highly developed groups it is more than likely that adolescents will show a preciseness of perception of themselves and others and a constructive strategy of actions, while diffuse groups in similar conditions will more spontaneously demonstrate "defensive" rather than constructive decisions, and possibly even the disorganisation of activity, a fall in self-appraisal, etc.

A specific programme of experimentation can provide for the differentiation of development levels of the groups as collectives, and the selected aspects of the adolescent's self-awareness and self-direction can be studied under different conditions: during ordinary work with the class, during group work where the experimenter adopts a neutral attitude to the people tested, in group work under the conditions of an experiment the aim of which is the mastering by the pupils, in the course of specially organised group interaction, of methods of purposeful, conscious self-direction which presuppose a precise "feedback" in the group and the correspondence of pupil's actions to the tasks of group activity.

The Soviet system of education has from the very start aimed to develop in children the ability to live and work collectively. By tackling the task today of combining scientific knowledge with practice, social psychology can help to achieve the fullest possible education of academic collectives.

The need for an expansion of the social interaction of pupils, which is contributing to the formation of the Soviet individual's active attitude, has accelerated the search for ways of optimising the educational process. At present, attempts to overcome to a certain extent the contradiction between individual conditions of mastering social experience in the sphere of academic activity, and collective conditions in the sphere of socially useful labour and free communication, are being made mainly in two directions. One of these envisages the creation of "multi-activity" collectives whose structural and functional characteristics will

be determined by the presence of several main types of group activity—academic, socially useful, sporting, etc.[1] The other has already been mentioned above: it is orientated towards the search for group forms of organising academic activity. The involvement of the pupil as a subject in the process of collective cognitive activity shapes the individual's active attitude more effectively than in ordinary forms of teaching. The new forms of organising the educational process will cause new motivational components to emerge, such as social approval of the fact of participation in and extent of the contribution to the achievement of socially useful results of each member of the class, the opportunity for cooperation in activity and the awareness of oneself as the subject of activity, etc. Bearing this in mind, the fulfilment of educational tasks designed to ensure the good progress of each pupil, by appealing to certain strictly personal qualities (responsibility, conscientiousness, etc.), can be more effective in the presence of mediated forms of educational influence via reference groups.

In this respect, the problem of referential relations represents a vital psychological and pedagogical aspect of the application of the stratometric conception in education.

As already demonstrated, any group can contain a set of people whose demands are taken into consideration by group members and whose views form a point of orientation. This set of people is defined as a significant circle of communication. The referentiality of certain persons for a given individual first of all presupposes their significance for him when solving problems of understanding something, relating to something or someone, including himself. By applying "referenceometry", we can elucidate the circle of people that is significant for the pupil and whose opinion and views he (often unconsciously) takes into consideration.

This method may turn out to be highly promising for the practical needs of the process of education. Its development and application makes it possible to help the teacher by showing him the targets for selective educational influence. A teacher's influence directed at a pupil who acts as a reference point for those who are drawn to him, will enable one to have an indirect, but none the less strong influence on several of his friends. This is possibly one of the ways

[1] See: D. I. Feldstein, "Psychological Features of the Child Collective and the Formation of Collectivist Personal Traits in Pre-School Children", *Voprosy Psikhologii*, No. 2, 1977.

to overcome the false alternative of either common or individual educational influences.

The use of socio-psychological opportunities of group activity, where interpersonal relations are mediated by the common goal, and the application of "referenceometric" methods for a better understanding of intra-collective differentiation and the use of guiding educational influence, are naturally not the only possible ways of using the stratometric conception directly in the sphere of communist education. Let us briefly mention a few of its practical applications in educational psychology related to the interpretation of the phenomena of interpersonal relations dealt with in this work.

Of considerable practical value were the results of A. A. Turovskaya's research, which showed that a high degree of involvement by the group in the realisation of a socially significant aim helps to actualise tendencies of collectivist self-determination and blocks the emergence of conformist behaviour. Turovskaya's experiments revealed a possible weak spot in the activity of certain form teachers. Analysis of the data obtained showed that in groups where the aim was merely formulated and where work for the interiorisation of the aim was not conducted, pupils easily rejected it, demonstrating conformity to the influence of a dummy group. Consequently, the socially useful aim did not become significant for the individuals making up the group: since it was not interiorised, it remained a purely ulterior phenomenon for the given group.

Evidently, the method used by A. A. Turovskaya has a wide range of diagnostic potentialities. It enables one to give an objective evaluation of *the quality of the educational work* carried out by the teacher, since the assimilation of the group goal depends directly on the teacher's quality of work; with time, the psychologist may be able to use this method as an indicator of the effectiveness of educational influences. The sphere of application of this methodological procedure includes the school, the secondary technical school, the vocational school, the Pioneer camp, in short, any group of children or adolescents.

Another educational psychological problem which can be solved by the stratometric approach, is the question of what forms the basis of reciprocal preferences in adolescence.

Of course this question is not new to teachers and psychologists. However, until now no reliable ways of obtaining

empirical indices demonstrating the motives of choices and preferences have been suggested. The main questions formulated by the stratometric conception are whether the motivation of interpersonal orientations is conditioned by the subject's amorphous need for a certain person which cannot be analysed, or whether the motives of choice should be regarded not only as a personal phenomenon, but also as a phenomenon of interpersonal relations derived from the social interrelations existing in the collective. These questions acquire a different meaning if one bears in mind that the process of changing the structure of the motives of a choice of partner for interpersonal communication is characterised by the influence of those interrelations which are formed in joint activity. The realisation of the demands arising out of activity forms new requirements and thus alters the motivation of choice in the system of interpersonal relations.

The elucidation of the motivational nucleus of choice is useful for the teacher and the psychologist whenever questions arise as to why one group member prefers so-and-so, why a certain part of the class is in the category of "favourites" and another in the "outcasts", in short, why the sociometric picture of the class is the way it is? The content of the motivational nucleus of choice can also serve as an indicator of the level reached by the group as a collective. Thus, whereas at the initial formation stage of the collective, the attention of girls and boys is directed mainly at the physical aspects of their friends (communicativeness, attractiveness, style of dress, etc.), at a higher stage of the collective's development, choice is increasingly oriented towards personal traits which are manifested in joint activity. The work to reveal this parameter related, as we can see, to a vital problem for teachers and educators, has convincingly shown that the nature and social value of interpersonal preferences depend on the group's level of development and the specific character of its activity. What would seem a strictly personal phenomenon—individual preference—is increasingly transformed by socially significant factors as the group becomes a collective, and appears as a typical social phenomenon.

All this gives us grounds for looking from a different angle at the sociometric study of school collectives, for establishing the real possibilities of sociometry.

Of course, sociometry is a method which allows one to

clarify sufficiently rapidly the picture of emotional preferences within any group. As already mentioned, while not questioning the expediency of traditional sociometry, one should, however, doubt whether it gives an authentic description of group differentiation. Above all, the problem consists in revealing what lies behind interpersonal choice. In actual fact it is frequently much less important to know that a given group member is chosen by his companions, than to know why he is chosen. The elucidation of the system of motives of interpersonal choice gives a more comprehensive description of group differentiation. It is this problem which can be solved by the method of revealing the motivational nucleus of choice in the system of interpersonal preferences, which is introduced in the framework of the stratometric conception.

The method of revealing the motivational nucleus of choice in the system of interpersonal relations can no doubt be regarded as a prototype of a diagnostic method which will give new content to, or in any case, considerably supplement the sociometric methods widely used in the study of pupils' collectives. The research of N. M. Shvaleva (1978), mentioned earlier, showed that in collectives the prestige of traits formed in joint activity rises in the presence of reciprocal choice.

The mention of the fact of the predominance in the collective of work orientations, which form the substantial basis of the motivational nucleus of choice in highly developed groups, should not cause any fears as to the possible impoverishment of the emotional side of interpersonal relations when they are interpreted on the basis of the stratometric conception.

It is sufficient to point out the phenomenon of effective group emotional identification introduced into scientific currency in a number of studies based on the stratometric conception. This phenomenon demonstrates the humanistic principle "for others as for oneself", "to oneself, as to others". It is a trait of genuine collectivism which serves as the basis for differentiating between collectives and other groups of a lower level of development. Characteristic features of the real work collective are mutual aid and assistance, good-will, humaneness, and an emotional warmth of interrelations, whereas in groups of an anti-social nature, experimentation mainly reveals concern for the self and indifference to one's companions.

The presence or absence of this phenomenon in the school collective is manifested particularly clearly with respect to the new member, entering the academic collective for the first time. Even in the presence of effective group emotional identification within the class the fact of its absence in relation to a new member is a grave sign that not all is well in the system of interpersonal relations in the given group of pupils.

The problem, in the solution of which effective group emotional identification functions as an orientation, is particularly acute in the determination of ways of improving educational and psychological work in work-reform schools. The problem of the formation of collectives is first and foremost here. Undoubtedly, labour is a powerful factor in the correction of an offender's personality. But I say this with one serious reservation: one can only count on the corrective function of labour if the interpersonal relations which are mediated by that labour, are characterised by collectivism and genuine humaneness. Consideration of the parameter showing the presence or absence of this genuine humaneness and collectivism can be useful in elaborating socio-psychological and educational psychological diagnostic methods.

Let us mention one more aspect of the stratometric approach relating to the problem of collective cohesion. In the very general sense it is clear what collective cohesion means. It comprises mutual aid and assistance, frank and well-intentioned criticism, a striving to empathise, persistence in the attainment of goals, and other qualities. This is all correct. But the descriptive characterisation of the collective, is not enough. An experimentally checked, qualitative and quantitative evaluation of its actual cohesion is required. As we showed, the stratometric conception ensured the discovery of this parameter. An hypothesis was put forward and experimentally confirmed that in groups united by prolonged socially significant joint activity, a high level of cohesion emerges as the value-orientational unity of the collective and its general positive attitude to socially significant group aims and values. If one bears in mind how important it is for the teacher to grasp the real level of cohesion of a child collective, then the significance of objective indicators of value-orientational unity becomes apparent. Collective cohesion is a precondition of the group's ability to cope with difficulties, work in a friendly manner, create the best opportu-

nities for the development of the personality of every group member, and remain as a united whole in various, including unfavourable, conditions.

The parameters indicated by the stratometric conception must be borne in mind when elaborating diagnostic methods aimed at solving the vital tasks of the communist education of the individual in the collective. They can already provide the teacher with the necessary guidelines for understanding the formation of collectives and the laws of the functioning of interpersonal relations, and show him ways of exerting a guiding and effective educational influence.

CHAPTER VII

Can the Family be a Collective?

The conception of the activity-based mediation of interpersonal relations has been experimentally tested in industrial, scientific, educational and sporting collectives. Here, things are fairly straightforward. The nucleus of interpersonal relations in groups that are occupied in common work is real cooperation, in the course of which individualism is overcome and collectivist traits are formed. As a result of cooperation, an aggregate of people acquires a special quality, and is transformed into a special type of group, a collective. However, can the principle of activity-based mediation be extended to include a specific formation like the family? Can the family be a collective? This question can only be answered if we elucidate the possibility of real cooperation between family members.

Cooperation: the Basis of Stability in Family Interrelations

So, it is cooperation, and not guardianship, non-interference and co-existence, that appears to be the optimal means of organising relations between the older and younger generations. However, can one speak of cooperation between, say, a man and woman aged about 33-36 and their twelve-year-old daughter? Cooperation, maybe, but not on an equal basis. I do not think there is any contradiction here. I do not wish merely to reiterate the examples of the successful participation of children in housework (feasible cleaning and tidying, shopping, dish-washing, care of younger children, etc.), given extensive coverage in popular educational literature. This, of course, is an important aspect of joint activity and one that should not be neglected.

Its role increases immensely in the countryside where children are very often reliable and responsible helpers, working with their parents in the fields, the forest, the garden and the home.

Great significance is attributed in the USSR to labour training and to the development of a conscious communist attitude to work. Work created man and was one of the main conditions distinguishing him from animals. Today, work continues to create and form human beings. Everything of a genuinely human nature in people is formed through their participation in socially useful work and through communication with other people.

We are striving for work, as the creator of all material and cultural benefits, to be transformed within the family into the prime requirement of life. But there is yet one more strictly psychological aspect of the problem of cooperation between the generations.

It should be remembered that socialist society makes high demands on each person, both the adult and the child. This set of demands is contained in production quotas, rules of behaviour, moral criteria, socialist obligations, etc. The social appraisal of a person depends on the extent to which he meets these criteria, rules and quotas, and fulfils these obligations. Here lies yet another aspect of the cooperation of children and parents, the concept we already know, of "emotional participation".

Active emotional involvement in the affairs of others, sympathy, empathy, are all part of emotional participation, which cements the interrelations between generations in the family, leaving no room for indifference, callousness and egoism. Immediate responsiveness in times of trouble is a form of emotional participation and evidence of a person's willingness to cooperate and support. Harmonious family relations presuppose reciprocity in the manifestation of emotional participation. It is usual, of course, for parents to manifest this trait by offering help and supporting their child (help in studies, teaching him practical and sporting skills, showing an interest in his affairs). However, is emotional participation always inherent in the object of parental emotions? Unfortunately, it is far from always mutual.

Adult life is full of complicated, sometimes simply difficult, sometimes dramatic situations. If we want our son or daughter to become closer to us (note that we are talking

of the child becoming closer to its parents and not the other way round, since, as a rule, this is unnecessary), then the first rule is not to protect them from adult sorrows and joys, but to make them not merely witnesses but direct participants in adult experience. What is more, this should be done as early as possible, straightforwardly and boldly, providing comprehensible explanations (depending on age).

Here is an example. A woman anxiously and doubtfully addresses her child's form teacher: "You see, my husband has to have an operation. It's very serious. And his heart isn't too good... Well, anyway, what would you advise me? Should I tell Alyosha or not? My husband says I shouldn't worry him, he's too young, but should say that he's gone away on business. What should I do?"

In such cases one should definitely tell the child! One should find the necessary words so as not to alarm, and, of course, not exaggerate. But one should definitely share one's hopes about the outcome. Under no circumstances should the child be left in the dark. The child will worry and perhaps even cry, but this is only natural since he is a member of the family with all the rights and duties that this involves. Everything must be shared, joy and sorrow, tears and laughter. Common feelings, hopes and dreams are what binds a family, and strengthens its foundation.

The teacher answers: "Let us hope that your husband will recover. Let that be the greatest source of happiness for Alyosha. Let him dream of the day when his father will come out of hospital leaning on his shoulder. He'll just love to help you look after his father in his convalescence, to feel needed and useful and a support for his father and mother. No, no! He must know. Don't hide life from him!"

This is how the emotional participation arises without which cooperation between generations is inconceivable. A family of three or four persons, united by ties of kinship, may or may not become a collective depending on the nature of the interpersonal relations within it.

Cooperation presupposes cooperators. But here the question arises of how many cooperators are needed for successful cooperation. No doubt some will hasten to say three (father, mother and child). Others will say five, i.e., taking grandmother and grandfather into account. And indeed, they should not be overlooked since their contribution to family cooperation is by no means small. And only seldom is this figure increased by expanding the younger contingent. At

any rate, it is unlikely that anyone will go beyond the magic number seven. On one occasion I even came across the attempt to back up the desire not to increase family size by citing the very latest results of socio-psychological research. My interlocutor was an American psychologist. His argument went roughly as follows: what kind of cooperation can there be in a family with ten or more members? Cooperation signifies sympathy, mutual compassion, special sensitivity and, most important, effective help. Without all this cooperation is inconceivable. He reminded me of the experiments of Bill Latane, who proved experimentally that the more witnesses there are of a person's misfortune, the less chance the victim has of receiving help. Apparently everyone assumes that someone else should go to the aid of the person in distress. In a large family this approach is probable, or rather, inevitable. There are so many children that the "value" of each one unavoidably falls. The family's stock of empathy is divided equally among all the members and the divisor is so great that the result is negligible. Love, mutual understanding and cooperation are all things for a small group of closely bound people. The smaller the family, the more chances it has of cohering emotionally and of cooperating successfully in solving family problems.

I had to argue. Indeed, Latane's experiments were well known and I did not regard it as possible to doubt their worth. However, I did doubt the possibility of making far-reaching conclusions from these experiments. We have already had grounds on several occasions to assert that the results of experiments conducted in random groups of people should not be extended to collectives. And, indeed, the people who took part in Latane's socio-psychological experiments bore the mark of the social system in which they lived. Unless one bears these points in mind, one can, like my interlocutor, make serious psychological errors. And I have been convinced not only under conditions of strict laboratory experimentation that Latane's conclusions cannot be used in reference to Soviet people and even less to cohesive collectives. Let me give an example.

On one occasion, a group of cinematographers and I took a popular science film, of a strictly documentary nature.[1]

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[1] *Who Will If I Won't?* Author of film scenario is Y. Zagdansky, director, A. Mikulsky, scientific consultant, A. Petrovsky. Kievnauchfilm, 1973.

The events took place on a ship sailing from Batumi to Odessa with foreign tourists on board. Our intention was to film the reactions of the crew members of the liner to the following events. A hidden camera was used and only the Captain was informed of our intentions.

A message was given over the ship's radio system (for the crew only) to the effect that a passenger, the fourteen-year-old son of a tractor driver from the GDR, had been badly burned and required a skin transplant. In response crew members rushed from various parts of the ship to the passengers' lounge. There were far too many of them to save just one boy. The Captain came in and said: "Will two people please remain, the rest can go." Nobody left. Then the Captain said: "The operation is very painful. It will hurt!" Still nobody left. Then the Captain said: "The donors will inevitably be scarred." Among those gathered in the passengers' lounge were women and young girls. Nobody left. A little while later it was announced that the transplant could only be done on land in a hospital. Only then did the crew members disperse...

Does this not convincingly show that the "Latane effect" does not work in social conditions where people reason thus: "If I don't offer help, then who can I expect to do so?" Neither is this effect relevant with regard to the family collective. Experience has shown that in large families with eight to ten children, a real small working and educational collective is formed on the basis of cooperation, in which duties are fairly and strictly distributed and the older children are responsible for the younger children, an increase in group size does not lead to a weakening of emotional bonds and the family stock of empathy is not exhausted, but rather increased as a result of mutual contributions. In the Soviet Central Asian republics, where large families are the rule rather than the exception, one sees proof of this literally all the time.

However, it would be a mistake to regard family size as the only, or even the determining, characteristic of the family. In the end it is all a matter of the family's moral climate, of the goals which it sets itself, and of the general strategic course of its development. The point is that in large families collective-forming processes run more fluently, individualism is more easily overcome and conditions for the development of humane interrelations are more easily established.

Thus, returning to the problem of the family, let us pose the question of whether we can discover a socially valuable activity, common to all family members and realisable with the help of "cooperators", which could mediate relations within the family? If we can point to such an activity with regard to a given family, then we can say we have discovered the preconditions for the formation of the family as a collective. It should be said straightaway that it is much harder to achieve this with respect to the family than with regard to industrial, military, sporting and other collectives, in which activity that is common to all, is officially organised and formally fixed in plans, regulations and norms, etc. In the family, on the other hand, the father and mother work, the children go to school and granny is busy around the house: everyone is occupied in different work.

Although this task is harder, it is not impossible. The family is a unit of society with a vital social function of bringing up the younger generation and ensuring personal happiness, something which demands mutual moral responsibility and effective mutual help. Securing the personal happiness of each family member and bringing up fully developed citizens of socialist society is what characterises the activity common to the whole family, the aims of which stretch beyond the limits of relations within the family and are socially valuable and socially fixed. If this is characteristic of a given family, we have every reason to suppose that the necessary pre-conditions for the shaping of a collective as a highly developed group are forming within this family. One can assume that the socio-psychological phenomena which have been revealed many times in psychological study of the collective, will definitely be manifested in this family.

Let us take, for instance, cohesion as the value-orientational unity of all members of a family, which is so important for describing interpersonal relations in the collective. Value-orientational unity, as we know, signifies that the opinions, views and beliefs of the members of a family on issues of importance to a great extent resemble or coincide with one another. This is the basis of its cohesion. And, at the same time, this is an essential condition of the effectiveness of bringing up children in the family, i.e., of the successful fulfilment of one of its most important functions.

There is nothing wrong if a family disagrees on films, the virtues of a football team, the daughter's hairstyle or the father's new suit. But it is unfortunate if there is disagreement in views on how to spend holidays, how to deal with money, which friends are suitable and which are not, etc. And it is quite wrong for there to be constant disputes about the behaviour of the children in various situations. Like a sensitive instrument, a child reacts to the slightest disagreement between adults. The barely noticeable dissatisfaction of a mother with a father's strictness, the pursed lips of a granny, who leaves the room slamming the door behind her, not to mention direct arguments about a child's behaviour in his presence, will all be used by the child to strengthen his or her influence on the older members of the family. Having never heard of the perfidious political manoeuvre of "divide and rule", the child uses it to great effect in his interrelations with adults, by seeking out cracks in the monolith of family cohesion.

Unity of demands made on the child, unanimity in the appraisal of his behaviour, and a value-orientational unity in general, are vital principles of education within the family, important characteristics of the family as a collective.

But what if an act of misbehaviour has been committed and it is necessary to respond immediately, with no time to work out a common opinion or come to an agreement? What is one to do? Probably, in such cases it is a good idea for one of the adults to take on the responsibility of making an immediate decision and later, when the adults are alone, to discuss the situation and the decision taken. Even if it was mistaken, there is an advantage in the long run, since the child or adolescent will have seen the family's firm stand and its collective authority. This is what is most important.

One of the most significant features of collectivist relations in general, and in the family in particular, is fairness in praizing for success or the attribution of responsibility for failure in joint activity. Let me try to explain this with a specific example.

It is a special occasion. Father and daughter have made the dinner specially for Mother. But their lack of experience shows and the meal is a failure: the meat is burned, the salad is oversalted and the fruit juice is too sweet. First the Father takes the blame but his daughter disputes this saying it is her fault.

This is quite an ordinary failure and as usual it is hard to determine the share of responsibility of each person or to say definitely whose actions led to the failure of joint activity. But in order to discover the nature of collectivist relations, one should study how responsibility is attributed for failure, whether people blame everything on others or take responsibility themselves. Incidentally, situations of success are just as significant in this respect.

For example, a boy shows his school report to his parents. His results are excellent and his father proceeds to congratulate him, saying that he should thank his mother for all the help she has given him in catching up with school work following his illness. The mother objects to all the praise, pointing out where the father has also helped his son.

It is also difficult to determine the contribution of each person to a success, but in a good collective it is more likely that credit will be attributed to others rather than to the self.

A family in which correct attribution of responsibility for joint activity is typical is a real collective. In cases of joint success one will not hear words of self praise and in cases of failure the blame will not be passed on to others.

The adequate attribution of responsibility is not only a sign of a good psychological climate in the family, but also a condition of the compatibility of the members of the family collective. If people are incapable of justly appraising the contribution of each person to joint activity, this inevitably results in conflict and shakes the foundations of family cohesion. This is just as much the case with the older as with the younger members.

For a family, which under any circumstances remains a small group, to manifest the qualities of a collective, it must not only show objectivity in the attribution of responsibility for past actions, but also fairness in the distribution of work and duties.

I was consultant for a popular science film devoted to interrelations in the family, the aim of which was to show the nature of the distribution of duties within the family. Of course, we could simply have asked family members questions, but we did not want to do this since direct questions are not very reliable. Often something desired is made out to be something real. So we decided to operate in a roundabout way, through children.

The experiment was filmed[1] in a kindergarten where the children were introduced to a new game. They were given numerous coloured pictures showing household items such as saucepans, a television, a hammer, plates, an armchair, a tape-recorder, a mincer, a needle and thread, a newspaper, a vacuum cleaner, a shopping bag, and so on. The children were then told to sort out "Daddy's pictures" and "Mummy's pictures". Everything became clear almost immediately. A lot of children chose a "gentleman's set" for their fathers: the television, newspaper, armchair, couch and occasionally a hammer and nails. The mothers were left with all the rest: the saucepans, plates, vacuum cleaner, mincer, shopping bag and so on. There was no doubt that in many homes, household activities were distributed precisely in this way. Children see this and make their own conclusions, which are not envisaged in the programme of family education.

A family collective exists when fairness and reciprocal attentiveness in the distribution of the numerous and complex household duties are a law for each family member. Let us not ignore the historical division of "family roles". Yes, women have from time immemorial had to prepare food and look after children, while no one liberated them from exhausting work in the field. But one should also remember that in the past men had quite a different "gentleman's set" for use in the home. This included the axe and saw for cutting and sawing wood in the forest, the awl and waxed thread for mending boots and harness and many other things. To replace this with the television and the armchair is to seriously upset the balance in the rights and duties of the members of a family. This injustice is out of the question in good families where the principles of genuine collectivism and cooperation predominate. If duties are distributed among all, including the children, then the family becomes conscious of itself as a collective. And, incidentally, this is universally beneficial: the resentment and irritation felt by the woman disappears and the man gains the respect of his wife and children, and becomes the strongest and most reliable work mate. As for the children, they find their place in the common work of the family. This is the very beginning of their labour training.

[1] "...And Happiness in Your Personal Life". Authors of the scenario—Y. Alikov and G. Melnikova, director—V. Rytchenkov, scientific consultant—A. Petrovsky. Tsentrnauchfilm, 1980.

I wonder whether the reader has ever thought about the following essentially pragmatic psychological task. Here are two arguments of different content. The first:

"You should do that. It's your business, not mine!"

"Why should I do it? Do it yourself! Why do you lump it all on me?"

Usually this kind of argument ends either with the task not being fulfilled at all, or with one person giving in (today one person, tomorrow the other). But in all cases, the irritation, dissatisfaction and mutual hostility of those involved are guaranteed.

The second argument:

"Listen, leave it, I'll do everything, I'll manage it all! Don't worry please. I'll take responsibility for it."

"No, why should you? It'll be difficult for you. Let me do it, I'll manage. I won't let you down."

What about the result here? Here too, someone will give in (today one, tomorrow the other). But there will be no anger, hurt, envy or irritation. This kind of "argument" only strengthens the good relations of the people involved. The advantage of the latter argument over the former is obvious. And in the final outcome, the work does not suffer, but rather benefits. How important it is to apply this system, this daily method of solving any difficult or unpleasant problems which arise in joint family activity, in building interrelations! It is enough just to try (but this attempt must be reciprocal and mutual) for one to see how relations improve, work benefits, the family is strengthened and the children are given the correct moral guidance. In other words, the tactics of cooperation most important for the family collective, presuppose the corresponding tactics of mutual attentiveness in joint activity.

There is one other question directly related to the interpretation of the family as a collective.

Following one of my talks for parents on national television, I received a letter containing a peculiar credo which the listener considered it necessary to share with me. This is what he wrote: "Listening to you, educationalists, the main thing in family education is to make endless demands of one's child. But do you know what lies behind these demands? Our egoism! Our children bother us with their loud cries so we say: 'Don't shout, it's not nice!' We are ashamed in front of colleagues, teachers and neighbours if our children get bad marks. It's expensive to dress our children

fashionably and differently so we tell them we won't allow them to show off their clothes and dress fancily. We are egoists and we make this egoism the main principle in bringing up our children, concealing this with impressive words about the family collective and the tasks of education..."

It was a malicious and, I fear, an unfair letter. What in fact did the author want and did he have the right to explain all the acts of parents as a result of their egoism? And, at the same time, would we claim that parents are first and foremost altruists?

We have already discussed this age-old philosophical problem of reasonable egoism, according to which everything good and correct that we do is explained by our egoistic motives. Supposedly a person does a good deed because he does not want to suffer from pangs of conscience and thus feel distressed, and because he counts on gratitude, etc. As a result, altruism, the selfless concern for the welfare of other people and the willingness to sacrifice one's own interests for them, turns out to be egoism inside-out rather than the opposite of egoism: in striving to do good to another I am thus mainly concerned for myself. All good is suspect and one has to work out what are the ambitions and pretensions that motivate a given noble deed.

The main mistake of the speculative theories of the author of this letter lies in his belief that egoism is the only alternative to altruism. Either parents act from altruistic motivations, giving everything to their children and leaving nothing for themselves, completely dissolving into their offspring and forgetting their own personal interests, or they are egoistic, and when they do something for their children it is only for the sake of personal gain and their personal ends. It is as if there were no third possibility. This is typical of the metaphysical "either-or" way of thinking.

We have to be able to overcome this annoying metaphysical thinking in education. But first let me say that there are parents who personify both these extremes.

How much time and effort are sometimes spent by parents forcing their child to play the violin or piano regardless of the child's abilities and ignoring the open hatred felt by the latter towards this occupation. The desire for prestige, disregard for the child's personality and the importance given to the principle of "keeping up with the Jones", are all evidence of blind parental egoism, however noble it may be made to look.

So, if parental egoism is not what we need for solving the tasks of family education, then perhaps parental altruism and self-sacrifice is the psychological basis of education in the family, the cornerstone of the family collective. Unfortunately, this too is not a very successful way out of the situation. A cohesive family collective can not be built on the basis of faultless altruism. A child to whom his parents "sacrifice all" and "give themselves wholly", quickly learns to exploit the fruits of his parents' sacrificial behaviour and if they are slow to give him what he wants, he expresses dissatisfaction about their egoism. It is paradoxical, but I have frequently observed that it is parents who behave themselves like confirmed altruists that are most often regarded by their offspring as callous egoists. Evidently, however much they give their children, they do in fact leave themselves something, and they are not forgiven for this. How can they dare to keep something to themselves? The child begins, possibly even unconsciously, to adhere to the dependent principle: "an egoist is a person who is more concerned with himself than with me."

So, where does the correct path lie, if neither pure egoism nor pure altruism promise anything good? Perhaps one should combine a little bit of both traits, to sacrifice oneself one day and take everything away the next? Inconsistency, half-heartedness and duplicity produce even more lamentable results. So what should one do?

For a family that is a real collective, the alternative "either egoism or altruism" is imaginary and unreal. The real alternative to both altruism and egoism in the developed family collective is the psychological phenomenon of collectivist identification, dealt with above. It consists of the kind of motivation of interrelations in which every person (adult, adolescent and youth) really treats all others as he would himself and himself as he would others, proceeding from the [illegible]morally justified principles.

Collectivist identification envisages to an equal degree the rejection of altruistic indulgence and sacrifice and of the egoistic, utilitarian treatment of the child. Effective concern about children and their welfare at the same time as the making of demands on them which the parents would have made on themselves were they in the child's position, is what is implied by collectivist identification. The type of relations which meets to the fullest extent the genuine collectivism and true humanity of Soviet people, presuppo-

ses the existence of a single moral standard based on communist moral principles: to myself as to others and to others as to myself, both at home and at work.

The Specific Features of the Family as a Collective

The author has tried to prove that the family possesses the signs of a collective which have been established by social psychology in industrial, military, sporting, academic and other groups, and that, in the final analysis, the same well-known socio-psychological laws operate in the family too. In spite of this, the obvious similarity, the presence of definite analogues, should not be regarded as an identity. The uniqueness of the family as a collective is indisputable.

First of all, in the family as a collective there is a significantly more rigid role structure than perhaps in any other group. The concept "role" in social psychology means the normally acceptable model of behaviour expected of every person who occupies a given position. In other words, a given individual (father, mother, grandmother, grandfather, son, daughter, brother, sister, grandson) finds that willy-nilly he or she is expected to behave in a way corresponding to a certain model (for instance, the "fulfilment of the role" of mother). The way this role is fulfilled is undoubtedly evaluated by society and any considerable deviation from the model is discussed.

The idea that parents should be kind, affectionate and lenient towards childish faults meets role expectations, is socially approved and is regarded as something to be fully encouraged. But the slightest excess of parental affection and indulgence is spotted immediately by the keen eyes of those around, and strongly censured. A phrase like: "She's spoilt her son. Soon he'll be ordering others about as well as her", is a categorical and possibly unjust verdict, but it clearly shows the "upper limit" of role expectations with regard to maternal kindness.

Another guideline for parents is that they should be strict and demanding towards their children. Here, too, social appraisal establishes the limit of these expectations, this time a lower limit. For instance, the following statement spoken behind one's back: "He doesn't dare say a word in his mother's presence, she's terrified him so much!"

Thus, there is a certain range in which the "fulfilment of the role" of mother is regarded as socially acceptable. The very same is the case with the other members of the family belonging to the older generation. As for the child, the list of role expectations related to obedience, respect for elders, good marks in school work, tidiness, diligence, etc., is well known and needs no comment. All the people who surround a child, not just within the family, openly inform a child (be it a young child or an adolescent) whether he meets his role expectations.

I think it would be hard to find any other official or unofficial (sometimes the terms "formal" and "informal" are used) group, in which roles are so rigidly established and in which all the surrounding people are so concerned with the strict fulfilment of these roles. Evidently this has been historically conditioned, the family was assigned the function of "socialising" the growing generation earlier and to a greater extent than any other social institution.

However, this does not mean that one can regard the individual as the "fulfiller of a role" and the individual as a personality as identical. The meeting of social expectations is a necessary but a far from complete characteristic of the individual in any group, and even less so in the family collective. A "role" is a characteristic of a person's behaviour, his correspondence to a socially approved model. The concept "personality" presupposes the existence of the individual's own view with respect not only to those people to whom certain expectations are ascribed, but also to the role which he fulfils according to these expectations. The personality is a far richer concept than the functional role. And it is in the collective that the personality manifests all its properties and traits.

First of all, let us note that roles can be adopted purely formally. It is quite common for the actual views of an individual to contradict deep down the role which he has adopted. There are numerous examples of this, particularly in the bourgeois family. Leaving aside the classics such as Balzac, Flaubert, Galsworthy and Dickens, the world-famous "queen" of detective stories, the English writer Agatha Christie, reproduces virtually one and the same socio-psychological situation in almost all her novels. A decent and wealthy family, in which the fathers, mothers, uncles, aunts, sons, daughters, nephews, nieces, lady's companions, and close friends fulfil their roles irreproachably, not for

one moment deviating from their role expectations, but who, on closer inspection (with the aid of the ubiquitous Hercule Poirot) turn out to be potential or actual criminals, whose only concern is to find the most devious way of killing their rich relative. It turns out that the "role" is an obligatory uniform put on a living, specific and, indeed, unique person, for whom it may be totally unsuitable.

The lower the level of development of the family as a social group, the more likely there is to be a conflict between the roles and personalities of members of this family. In fact, a man who is by social role a father, but whose personality is at the same time immoral, say he is an alcoholic, is a combination which is sure to create conflict and which promises nothing but harm, both for the family's well-being and for the children's upbringing. Here, respect is dictated by the role, while the personality deserves contempt.

The family as a collective presupposes the relative coincidence of the role and personality of the parents, or at any rate the absence of marked contradictions between them. One should stress here the word "relative". The fact is that the attribution of roles to a certain degree standardises relations. The personality cannot and should not be made to fit the bed of Procrustes. If it is, the person turns into a puppet controlled by the strings of social expectations.

Of course, one cannot simply define the specific characteristic of the family as a collective as being the greater rigidity of role structure than in any other group (few people know what expectations a technical editor, for example, should meet, while everyone knows the model to which a mother's or daughter's behaviour should correspond), or as the essential unity of the role and the personality of its "fulfiller", or the reasonable, socially acceptable solution of difficult "role coflicts" in a clash of views on roles (for example, a son commits an anti-social act and his father, naturally, tries to protect his son from censure and punishment, while as a citizen he is unable to hold an unprincipled position). One could point out several other psychological features of the family collective, but in conclusion let me point to what is perhaps the dominant feature.

The ties which bind a family together to form a whole are mainly emotional (in describing the specific type of family relations, I would even go so far as to use the somewhat old-fashioned definition—"passionate"). It is clear

that the links between members of a family are mediated by their activity and by the tasks which face the family collective as a whole. But the very high degree of emotional intimacy is a special trait of the real family and it is hard to imagine any other group in which such a trait would be so developed. Let me say straightaway that here lies both the strength and the potential weakness of the relations which form within the family.

In his immortal book *The Adventures of Tom Sawyer*, having related the ruthless escapade of Tom and his friends, who hid on Jackson Island and were believed drowned, to the immense grief of their relatives and friends, Mark Twain goes on to tell how, when Aunt Polly found Tom's kind note scratched on a piece of bark, the only fact mitigating his guilt, she burst into tears and said: "I could forgive the boy now, if he'd committed a million sins!"[1]

"A million sins" on one side and a few loving words on the other, and everything balances out. This is a typical situation and it makes no difference that we are dealing here with fictional characters or that the action takes place at the end of last century in North America. The psychological essence of parental indulgence towards their children remains unchanged. However, things are made more complicated by the fact that a child's behaviour is evaluated by many other observers and judges besides his parents. A great deal depends on their evaluations, which are by no means based on emotions, and the judges are guided mainly by the role and not the personality of the child and the mother. The essence of the conflict between the inexhaustible patience of the parents and the limited patience of other people, is obvious.

The optimal position for parents to choose in evaluating the behaviour of their child is to be guided by the social norms which they take into consideration themselves in all their interrelations with other people outside the home, and which they should teach their children to take into consideration as well. Nobody thinks that a mother should treat her son in all cases in the same way as the school head or a neighbour. But if, while differing in the emotional nature of their reactions, everyone bases himself on similar moral norms of socialist society, this will ensure the unity of fa-

[1] Mark Twain, *The Adventures of Tom Sawyer*, Purnell and Sons Ltd., Paulton (Somerset) and London, 1978, p. 149.

mily and society and will not lead to the distortion of the child's personality or cause irreparable damage to his development.

Once more then, a family should maintain cohesion as the value-orientational unity of the family collective. Its real content should comprise moral values which form the ideological foundation of a child's upbringing and the shaping of the human personality.

CHAPTER VIII

The Individual and the Personality[1]

The problem of the personality and its psychological characteristics became exceptionally topical and evoked lively discussion in the 1960s and 1970s. By the mid seventies the "accumulative" approach which transformed the personality into a sphere containing traits of temperament and character, predominant needs and interests, capabilities, inclinations, etc., has been overcome. It regarded the personality as a collection of the traits, properties, characteristics and features of a person. This approach reduced the psychologist's task to the mere cataloguing of all these traits and revealing the uniqueness of their combination in each individual. One could name several works, mainly dating from the 1950s and 1960s, in which this "accumulative" approach is predominant.

The Shift Away from the "Accumulative" Towards the Systems Approach

The idea of the personality as a collection of personal traits was surprisingly unhelpful if only because it effaced the line dividing the concept "individual" from the concept "personality", broke up the personality into separate juxtaposed parts, and because it deprived the concept "personality" of its categorial content, that "highest degree of generalisation" (M. G. Yaroshevsky), without which no single psychological conception can be formed.

[1] This chapter cites material from: A. V. Petrovsky, V. A. Petrovsky, "The Individual and His Need to Be a Personality", *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 3, 1982; A. V. Petrovsky, V. A. Petrovsky, "Vygotsky and the Problem of the Personality in Contemporary Psychology", *Psikhologia. Vestnik MGU*, No. 4, 1982.

The implementation of the "accumulative" approach rapidly caused problems to arise related to the transition from the general psychological interpretation of the personality to the examination of the problems of personality formation in age-group and educational psychology, to its rehabilitation in medical psychology and pathopsychology, and, finally, to the study of the personality within the system of interpersonal relations and social psychology. All this highlighted the need for a structuring of the numerous personal traits (then reckoned to number one and a half thousand or more). Beginning from the mid-sixties efforts were made to elucidate the general structure of the personality. This was undoubtedly a step forward compared with the interpretations of psychology of the personality as a number of traits which had predominated in the past.

However, it very soon became clear that the general structure of the personality was seen mainly as a type of mixture of the personality's biologically and socially conditioned characteristics. Henceforth, the problem of the correlation of the biological and the social became almost central to psychology of the personality. The All-Union Symposium on Problems of Personality (1969) laid great emphasis on the conception of the individual as a biosocial being, and on the structural approach to the personality. One of the main papers at the symposium opened with the words: "Today there is probably not a single Soviet psychologist or sociologist who, when referring to the personality, does not use the word 'structure'."[1]

And although there was disagreement on the conception of the structure of the personality, the opinion was becoming increasingly widespread that an "exclusively socially conditioned substructure" and a "biologically conditioned substructure" should be distinguished within the personality. True enough, the existence of two other substructures was sometimes mentioned: experience and the individual features of forms of reflection, but their attribution to the social or biological sphere was not elucidated, and their intermediate, marginal nature was only vaguely outlined.

This would be understandable if we were dealing with

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[1] *Problems of the Personality. Symposium Materials*, Moscow, 1969, p. 51 (in Russian).

a human being, an individual. The biosocial nature and individuality of a person are indisputable. But the personality, the subject and product of social development which has transformed the biological species into a creator of the historical process, obviously could not maintain a biological substructure side by side with a social substructure. It was wrong to regard the concepts "personality" and "person", "personality" and "individual" as identical, and even more so to forget this when dealing with the problem of the correlation of the social and the biological.

Undoubtedly an individual's body, his endocrine system and the advantages and defects of his physical organism have a powerful effect on the course of his psychic processes and on the formation of his special psychic features. But it does not follow therefrom that a quarter or, say, a third of his personality should be given over entirely to biology as a particular substructure. Entering an individual's personality, the biological becomes, is transformed, or "dissolves" into the social. For example, brain pathology gives rise in the individual to biologically conditioned psychological traits within the structure of his individuality, but whether or not they become personal traits or actual features of his personality depends on social determination. Innate, organic aspects and traits appear as socially conditioned elements within the structure of the personality. And there is no need to assign them special non-social substructures. Biological aspects exist in the personality in a transformed state, as social aspects.

By the late 1970s, there was a shift away from the structural towards a systems approach to the problem of the personality (B. F. Lomov). The question of whether one can talk here of a new stage in the development of psychological theory is relevant when one bears in mind that it is not that easy to grasp the difference between the use of the concepts "structural approach" and "systems approach". Indeed, not surprisingly, the two words are often hyphenated (structural-systems approach). And yet there are definite grounds for pointing to a new stage in theoretical development. In actual fact, it is not a matter of the increasing similarity (and perhaps even indistinguishability) of the concepts "structure" and "system", but rather of what really underlies the use of each concept in actual psychological experimentation. The methodological and experimental work conducted on the basis of the structural approach

concentrated the attention of psychologists on the following classic question (well-known during the heyday of Gestalt philosophy): how does the part relate to the whole and the whole to the part; the integral structure of the personality to its various substructures, and vice versa? In the main everything revolved around this.

Somewhat earlier, the consequences of this kind of correlation of structures and substructures were demonstrated and the way was shown in which the temptation to interpret them mechanistically could be resisted. But obviously the main problem was that "structuralist" declarations were not substantiated or based on preliminary methodological study; the psychological analysis of the structure of the personality was not preceded by philosophical analysis. And this could not fail to affect the results.

The situation is quite different in the case of the systems approach to the elaboration of a psychological theory of the personality. Its use in psychology is founded on the lengthy and effective work of "systematists" and on well-known works by E. G. Yudin, I. V. Blauberg, V. P. Kuzmin, V. N. Sadovsky and many others. This is precisely the essential methodological work without which one cannot seriously undertake to solve actual psychological problems. It was necessary, first of all, to master the general principles of systems analysis, after which it became possible to transfer it to psychology of the personality. One cannot say, however, that this transfer is particularly easy or simple to carry out. To give an example, the principles of systems analysis, essential for constructing a theory of the personality, require the elucidation of the "system-forming criterion" of the personality. Moreover, this criterion must be found not in general ideas of a system but in the fabric of psychological reality itself. Later on we will designate a possible direction in the search for this system-forming criterion. The recognition of the indisputable unity but not identity of the concepts "personality" and "individual" (B. G. Ananyev, A. N. Leontiev, B. F. Lomov and others) gave rise to several questions: for example, what is this special system quality of an individual called the "personality"[1], which cannot be reduced merely to the biological preconditions contained within the nature of its bearer, i.e., the individual. A. N. Leontiev

[1] See: A. N. Leontiev, *Activity. Consciousness. Personality.*

wrote: "The personality is a special *quality* which the individual *acquires* in society in the sum total of relations of a social kind, in which the individual is involved... The essence of the personality is in the 'ether' (Marx) of these relations... The personality is a *system* and therefore a '*supersensual*' quality even though the bearer of this quality is a fully sensual, corporeal individual with all his inborn and acquired properties."[1] Leontiev also states: "From this point of view, the problem of the personality acquires a new psychological dimension: a dimension different from that in which research is conducted into various human psychic processes, properties and states; it is the study of his place and position in the system of social links, communications (Verkehr), which are open to him, the study of how and why a person uses his inborn and acquired qualities..."[2]

In our view, the conception of activity-based mediation of interpersonal relations fits Leontiev's interpretation of the correlation of the individual and personality lying in the "new psychological dimension", different from that in which research is conducted into human psychic processes, properties and states (in other words, beyond the limits of the traditional "individually or differentially psychological" sphere of general psychology.[3] From the point of view of activity-based mediation, the personality can only be comprehended within the system of stable interpersonal relations which are mediated by the content, values and meaning of joint activity for each participant. These interpersonal links are practically indissoluble, completely real, but essentially "supersensual"; they are contained within, but are not reducible to, actual individual qualities; they are posited for the researcher in the manifestations of each group member's personality, but at the same time form a special quality of group activity itself, mediating these manifestations of personality and determin-

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[1] A. N. Leontiev's unpublished manuscript. Cited in: A. G. Asmolov, et al., "On Certain Prospects for the Study of Intellectual Aspects of the Personality", *Voprosy Psikhologii*, No. 4, 1979.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] See: A. V. Petrovsky, "On the Construction of a Socio-Psychological Theory of the Collective", *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 12, 1973; A. V. Petrovsky, *The Psychological Theory of the Collective*, Moscow, 1979 (in Russian); A. V. Petrovsky, "The Personality in Psychology from the Viewpoint of the Systems Approach", *Voprosy Psikhologii*, No. 1, 1981.

ing the special position of each person in the system of interpersonal links and, more broadly speaking, in the system of social relations.

So, how can one pick out the subject's personal characteristics as such which would not coincide with the general psychological or, more precisely, the differential psychological tradition of studying the individual, and which would not dissolve without trace in interpersonal links as the subject of socio-psychological research?

In the first version this question was formulated as the problem of the correlation of the group and the personal or of the individual psychological and the socio-psychological in the personality. Let us trace the course of our reasoning.

One can only predict a person's behaviour if it is based on the stable structure of his personality. But, in addition to the elucidation of the stability of personality structures, it is important to realise their relativeness. Thus, the psychological problem of the structure of the personality seems to us to be more social than individual.

Western psychology has played a leading role in revealing the numerous psychological phenomena of personality (conformity, aggressiveness, pretentiousness, anxiousness, etc.) which, taken together, ensure the individual uniqueness of the personality. These psychological phenomena are essentially *correlative*, i.e., a specific social environment is presupposed or suspected, in relation to which the personality manifests conformity, aggressiveness, anxiousness and so on. But, whereas the features of personality are seen in these studies as flexible, changeable and of diverse content, the social environment is regarded as invariable, amorphous and empty (the social environment in general). This now traditional and virtually mechanistic interpretation of the social surroundings in the correlation "personality-environment", which has generated countless studies of the dependence of "changes in attitudes" of the personality on "changes in the environment", interprets the environment either as an object which can be influenced by an active individual, or as a force of group pressure on the individual. The idea of the active nature of interaction between the individual and its social environment was interwoven neither into the theoretical construction of the psychology of the personality, nor into the experimental psychological methods of studying the individual in the group. How-

ever, the approach to social surroundings as well as to the environment in general has inevitably given rise to theoretical ideas of the personality in general, regardless of the system of socially determined interrelations in which it exists, functions and develops. Incidentally, virtually all the personality tests used in traditional Western psychology of the personality are based on the idea of the amorphous social environment.

Meanwhile, within actual social groups, traits of personality exist in the form of phenomena of interpersonal relations. Individual behaviour changes considerably during the joint objective activity and communication characteristic of the given group's level of development. *The individually typical aspect of the personality appears as a socio-psychological aspect.* This hypothesis has now been checked and confirmed in a number of practical studies. For instance, the task of one such study (L. A. Glazova) was to test the above-mentioned hypothesis with respect to suggestibility as a personality trait and also with respect to its opposite, collectivist self-determination as a phenomenon of interpersonal relations in the group.

The hypothesis was put to the test in the following experimental procedure. A series of actual groups formed a hierarchy of levels of group development ranging from the diffuse group to the genuine collective. According to the experiment, approximately one third of the people tested in each group, regardless of the group's level of development, demonstrated a tendency to conformity in an insignificant situation. The aim was to find out how these people behave in an experiment on the phenomenon of collectivist self-determination in groups with different levels of development. The experimental data confirmed that individuals belonging to a highly developed group who had shown themselves to be [illegible] to group pressure in cases when insignificant influence was exerted, manifested genuine collectivist self-determination, i.e., the ability to resist group pressure, when defending collective values. In other words, an individual psychological trait such as suggestibility is transformed [illegible]

Another experimental study (Y. V. Romanina) revealed the existence of the well-known personality trait of *extrapunitiveness*.

By definition, extrapunitiveness lies at the opposite end of the scale to the various modifications of emotionally

positive behaviour. What was the result of this experimental study? In highly developed groups of sportsmen, persons who were by all accounts extrapunitive, showed themselves to be capable of sympathy as a form of emotional participation, and manifested features of collectivist identification, that is, demonstrated extremely humane traits of personality.

As applied to the problem of the psychology of the personality, this approach to the question of the relative stability of personal traits opposes both the boundless *relativism of the theory of social roles*, and the notion of the stability of the personality as a kind of integral of its *invariable component qualities.*

All this enables us to raise the question of the correlation of the concepts "individual", "personality" and "group" ("collective").

Individual—Personality

The concept "individual" is logically the starting point for subsequent discussion of this problem. The concept is taken to mean an individual representative of human society. The personality characterises the individual by virtue of the latter's involvement in society as a whole. We refer to the personality of an individual (the personal) as a specific quality which characterises the individual from the viewpoint of his links with other individuals in the community to which he belongs, i.e., his "system quality". Thus, we are faced with the problem of describing and correlating actual objects that correspond to these concepts and, most important, with the question of how the personal blends into the sphere of the individual's existence. Sometimes the question is formulated thus: "Where (in what sphere) does the personality exist?" (E. V. Ilyenkov).

If one bears in mind the unity but not identity of the personality and the individual, one can see the personality not in just one "sphere" or "psychological dimension", but in three overlapping, or rather, intersecting spheres in the social life of the individual. In accordance with ideas first put forward by V. A. Petrovsky, one can correspondingly examine the personality in three aspects.[1]

[1] V. A. Petrovsky, "Towards an Understanding of the Personality in Psychology", *Voprosy Psikhologii*, No. 2, 1981.

In the first aspect or dimension, the personality is interpreted as a kind of property submerged in the sphere of the subject's individual life. The personality stands out, above all, by its individuality, in the ways it differs from other people. In the same dimension, one finds social and cultural variants of the conception of personality which underline the social determination of the specific features of behaviour and consciousness. This dimension also includes the conception of the personality as the subject of activeness. These interpretations express various ways of understanding the unique and the universal within the individual. Within his own unique and distinctive features the individual stands out by virtue of his non-identity with the universal, thus manifesting his personality through his non-merging with the universal. At the same time, the personality manifests itself positively in the idea of assimilation by the individual of elements of culture and of the objective life of society as a whole: through the assertion of its community with the social whole. As for activeness, the individual as a personality is, as it were, above the barriers of his own inborn or normative limitations ("supersituational" activeness).[1]

The second dimension is a conception of the personality according to which the "sphere of interpersonal links" represents the sphere of the personality's determination and existence. It is not the individual himself, capable of activity and communication, but the very processes in which at least two individuals are involved (in fact usually a group or collective), that are regarded as the bearers of the personality of each individual. Thus, it follows that the personality, as it were, acquires a special existence separate from the corporeal existence of the individual: "The materialist philosopher who understands the 'corporeality' of personality in a broader sense, and who sees it, above all, in the sum-total of objective, materially-tangible relations between a given individual and another individual (or individuals), mediated via the things created by their labour, or more precisely, via activity with these things (including language), will seek the answer to the question of the structure of the personality in a sphere *outside the organic body of the individual*, and therefore

[1] See: V. A. Petrovsky, "Psychology of the Individual's Activeness", *Voprosy Psikhologii*, No. 3, 1973.

however paradoxically it may appear, *inside the inner sphere of the personality.*"[1]

It is worth noting that by transferring our examination of the personality into this interpersonal sphere, it becomes possible to say what many phenomena of the collective, studied in social psychology, represent. Are collectivist self-determination and identification, etc., strictly group or personal phenomena? Evidently in the interpersonal dimension of the personality, this false alternative (personal or group) is overcome. The personal manifests itself through the group and vice versa. This issue thus becomes clear.

Finally we come to the third dimension. The necessity of considering this dimension is dictated by certain practical limitations which must be borne in mind. What happens, one may ask, to the personality of an individual outside the interpersonal sphere? Does the personality continue to "exist" as a system quality of individuals engaged in interaction, beyond the limits of this common situation, beyond the actual communication? A second question. Till now, the personality was supposed to exist, i.e., to develop and be established mainly in the material or functional-positional, object-related side of interrelations between individuals. But perhaps there are strictly subject-related forms of establishing the existence of a given individual within other people? Lastly, interpersonal notions of the personality result from the implicit assumption of the identity of social activeness and its ultimate effects. But this is not always the case. An individual can cause significant changes for another individual, but ones which are not directly dependent on his own first-hand motives, and which arise, as it were, apart from, and sometimes even against his will.

There is no need to mention all the obvious opposite cases of futile activeness. Therefore, should one not single out the effects of actions as a special category of psychological phenomena related to, but not identifiable with, manifestations of the social activeness of acting individuals?

It is the third dimension of the personality which provides the answers to all these questions. So, evidently,

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[1] E. V. Ilyenkov, "What Is Personality?", in: *Where Does the Personality Begin?*, Moscow, 1979, p. 216 (in Russian).

there is one other sphere in which the personality develops as a systems quality of the individual. Here, the personality is taken not only beyond the framework of the individual himself, but also outside the limits of that individual's actual interrelations with other individuals, beyond the actual joint activity conducted with them. Here again, the personality is submerged, as it were, in the sphere of individual existence, but this time another individual's (or other individuals') existence. In this case, at the focus of the psychologist's attention lie the *contributions* to other people which a subject inevitably makes through his activity. The individual acts as the subject of these active transformations of people related to him in some way. Thus, we can already see the personality from a new angle: it is suggested that the most important characteristics of the personality, traditionally seen as a set of immanent qualities of the individual, should be sought not only within the individual himself, but also in other people. Leontiev noted down an interesting remark in this respect following a discussion with the writer Tendryakov on August 8, 1974: "I discover, I possess my own 'Self' not within myself (others find it in me!), but in others, in something other, existing outside me—in an interlocutor, a beloved person, in nature and ... in a computer..."[1]

Thus emerges a new way of interpreting the personality; it appears as the *ideal representation* of an individual in other people, as his *other existence* in them (and, incidentally in himself as in "another"), as his *personalisation*.

The essence of this ideal representation, of these "contributions", lies in the actual changes of meaning and effective changes in the intellectual and emotional spheres of the personality of another person, which the individual produces by his activity or by his participation in joint activity. An individual's [illegible] existence in other people is not a static imprint [illegible] active process, a kind of "continuation of the [illegible]". Here one grasps the most important feature [illegible] personality (if it is indeed a personality), i.e. [illegible] a second and dynamic life in other people and [illegible] lasting changes within them.

The phenomenon of [illegible]alisation makes it possible

[1] Cited according to the journal *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 3, 1982, p. 47.

to explain the eternal problem of personal immortality. If an individual's personality is not reducible to its representation in a corporeal subject, but continues in others, then the personality does not "completely" vanish when the individual dies. Remember, for example, Pushkin's famous words:

"I shall not wholly die...
And honour shall I have, so long the glorious fire
Of poesy flames on one single scutcheon."[1]

As the bearer of a personality, the individual disappears from life but he continues, personalised in other people and causing them grave suffering as a result of the tragedy of the rift between the ideal representation of the individual and his material disappearance. There is nothing mystical or metaphorical about the words "he lives on in us after death". It is an establishment of the destruction of the integrity of the psychological structure while preserving one of its parts.

Of course, one can fully characterise the personality only by combining the investigation data in all three dimensions as the ideal representation of an individual mediated by social activity and manifested in other people, in the individual's interrelations with other people and finally, in himself as a representative of society as a whole. The determining characteristic of the personality is its *activeness*, which is manifested in the intrapersonal sphere in phenomena outside the limits of situational requirements and role expectations (reactiveness), i.e., in "supersituational" and "supernormative" activeness going beyond the expected role; in the interpersonal sphere, in actions and social acts; and in the metapersonal sphere, in acts or rather in actual contributions to other people. The concept "deed" is used here in a sense close to the Hegelian: "The deed is generally the accomplished change and determination of being. To the action, on the other hand, belongs only that of the deed which comes into resolution, or was in consciousness, and which, consequently, is recognised by the will as its own."[2]

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[1] Alexander Pushkin, "A monument I've raised not built by hands...", *Selected Works* in two volumes, Vol. I, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p. 61.

[2] G.W.F. Hegel, *Sämtliche Werke*, Bd. 3, Suhrkamp Verlag, Stuttgart, 1927, p. 27.

Following the logic of this approach, one can assume that if one were able to establish the significant changes made by a given individual's real objective activity and communication in other individuals, and, in particular, in himself as in "another", which incidentally, forms his ideal representation or "individuality" in others, then we would obtain a very clear picture of his personality. An individual can reach the level of a historical personality in certain socio-historical situation, described in the Marxist conception of the role of the individual in history, only if these changes affect a sufficiently broad section of people and are evaluated not only by his contemporaries but also by history, which can weigh up these personal contributions with adequate precision. Let us remember that, by changing others, the personality alters itself, and that its contributions to others are an alteration and transformation of its own characteristics (as Vygotsky put it: "through others we become ourselves").

If one may interpret the genuine personality metaphorically as a source of powerful radiation which transforms people related to it in conditions of activity-based mediation (radiation, as we know, can be both useful and harmful, it can cure and cripple, accelerate or retard development, and can be the cause of various mutations, etc.), then an individual deprived of personal characteristics, can be compared to a neutrino, a hypothetical particle which penetrates a dense medium producing absolutely no changes, neither harmful nor useful. Impersonality is a characteristic of an individual *of indifference* to other people, a person who causes no significant reactions, whose presence or absence makes no difference to people's lives, who does not alter their behaviour, neither enriches nor impoverishes them, and who thus deprives himself of a personality.

Experimental research was conducted in this field (M. Y. Kondratyev) showing that in the rigidly hierarchical system of interpersonal relations typical of negatively oriented communities (e.g., groups of under-age offenders), the perception of the personal traits of those belonging to lower layers is noted for what can theoretically be called "downward blindness". In other words, perception "from the top downwards" by representatives of the upper layer of the given society lacks "personality vision": an individual belonging to a lower layer is perceived not as manifesting his personality but merely as a bearer of the visual

role and functional marks of his layer. For the "aristocracy" of the society of offenders, he is, in the literal sense of the word "indifferent" (and therefore impersonalised) by virtue of the negligible significance of his transforming influence. In contrast, perception "from the bottom up" (or, for that matter, "horizontally" within any layer) is characterised by "personality vision".

At the same time, it was shown that in a collective, the personality remains a personality for the members regardless of its role and function, its place in the system of "vertical" or "horizontal" interrelations, or its official or unofficial status, etc. Thus, it is in the collective that an individual with an active position has the best opportunities of asserting his personality in the true sense of the word.

Other works based on the stratometric conception have demonstrated sufficiently clearly the fact that if many seemingly important individual traits are not represented in the main forms of activity and consequently in the system of relations of a given group, they become insignificant for the evaluation of the personality (for example of the leader). In other words, intra-group relations in this case do not appear in a transformed state as characteristics of the personality (M. I. Frolova). One gets the impression that only those individual qualities that are most involved in the main activity of the given social group "function" as strictly personal traits. As for other individual traits, they remain "silent" for the time being, until they become necessary components of the system of subject relations, until via activity, they become "deeds" or "contributions" to the personalities of surrounding people. Here is yet one more confirmation of the non-identity of the individual and the personality.

If the personality and the individual are not identical then if it is theoretically possible to have an individual who has not developed his personality, can one assume the possibility of the existence of a personality without an individual? This is possible, but it is only a quasi-personality. If Jesus Christ did not exist as a real individual, his "personality", formed by the biblical legends, has had an immense influence on social life and Christian culture for nearly two thousand years, structuring and deforming the personalities and lives of people, as well as their views, feelings and beliefs. The transforming power of historical

quasi-personalities appears no less effective than that of real historical personalities.

Naturally, the individual "without a personality" is just as exceptional a phenomenon as the quasi-personality "without an individual", but the consideration of this kind of hypothetical situation as a mental experiment is instructive for understanding the problem of the unity and non-identity of the individual and the personality. At the same time, the idea of the three dimensions of the description of the personality dealt with above, cannot, in our view, be reduced to the problem of the correlation of the individual and the personality. It opens up opportunities for answering many other long-standing questions of the psychology of the personality.

Vygotsky and Problems of Personal Psychology

In the latter half of the 1920s and the first half of the 1930s, only a few people were able to see the full significance, even in its most general outlines, of the problem of studying the personality, which began to be fully elaborated much later. One such person was L. S. Vygotsky. Reviewing the state of contemporary psychology, he commented: "...Until now, the central and greatest problem of psychology as a whole, the problem of the personality and its development, has remained hidden," and further on: "Only by going resolutely beyond the methodological boundaries of traditional child psychology can we come to research of the development of the higher psychic synthesis which should with full justification be called the personality of a child."[1]

Referring to Vygotsky's writings, one can pick out at least four ideas or rather four sets of points which are exceptionally constructive, forming, as a whole, certain preconditions for the emergence of a psychological conception of the personality which concerns us today.

The first is the idea of the individual's activeness which stands out very clearly not only in Vygotsky's theoretical work, but also in his construction of an instrumental method for studying the development of higher psychic functions. In his later interpretations and practical applications of the instrumental method, Vygotsky, above all, emphasised

[1] L. S. Vygotsky, *The Development of Higher Psychic Functions*, p. 60.

the constructive significance of tools for the formation of higher psychic functions, and did not pay due attention to the principle of the individual's free use of tools (the use or renunciation of signs, the form of the use of signs, etc.). Meanwhile, in contrast to certain modern-day methods of forming psychic functions (the algorithmic organisation of teaching, the stage-by-stage formation of mental actions, etc.), Vygotsky, in his experimental studies, did not prescribe the use of tools or the method of their use, nor were they in any way compulsory. Vygotsky regarded the tool as a possible object to which the individual can apply force, whereas the individual himself was regarded as the bearer of activeness. Activeness not directly regulated by society clearly manifests itself to the researcher in the initiative of the individual who either uses or does not use a tool, and in the very way in which that tool is used. In our view, this is vital for understanding the personality of the individual.

Certain present-day interpreters of Vygotsky's works obviously neglect this aspect, believing that Vygotsky saw the assimilation of signs or "psychological tools" as virtually a compulsory act of foisting these tools on a subject, and enforcing their use. Nothing could be more unjust than such an interpretation of Vygotsky. The very essence of his instrumental method, at least in the age-group approach, lay in fact in the attempt to establish the active role of the subject, say a child, in using tools. In particular, he aimed to discover the age limits of the phenomenon of a child's reference to external means, as well as the age limits of the disappearance of the need for the external means of organising activity. Vygotsky initially interpreted the transfer from the outside inwards as conditioned by the subject's activeness. One of the most important theoretical preconditions of the instrumental method was precisely this principle of the activeness of the individual—"the active interference of a person in a situation", his "active role, his behaviour comprising the introduction of new stimuli".[1] "The human being has been forgotten," wrote Vygotsky, criticising the mechanistic "stimulus-reaction" theory. Thus, Vygotsky's ideas outlined the return, as it were, of the human individual to psychology, by facing psychology with the problem of the personality as the individual in the process of activity.

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 100.

The second idea which emerged as the naturalistic approach to psychological phenomena was overcome, was Vygotsky's idea of the main feature of a person's psychic properties being their mediated nature. As we know, the function of mediation is fulfilled by signs, with the help of which the assimilation and social determination of behaviour takes place. The use of signs, i.e., the shift to mediating activity, radically restructures the psyche, strengthening and expanding the system of psychic activeness. It was this idea that formed the basis for the elaboration of the more developed branches of psychology, above all, child and educational psychology. Here, the principle of mediation was predominant and actively opposed behaviourist theories.

However, as we will see, the theoretical principle which was so productive in the branches of psychology of special interest to Vygotsky, was extended to the field of social psychology and, in particular, to the study of groups and collectives and to psychology of the personality in the collective. In the seventies, this view determined the direction of the search for an adequate theoretical solution to the problem of interpersonal relations.

The third idea is the theory of the interiorisation of social relations. In the analysis of the genesis of the child's higher psychic functions, this idea was put forward in Vygotsky's works, mainly from the impersonal instrumental point of view. He pointed out that "a sign situated outside the organism, just as a tool, is separted from the personality and is essentially a social organ or social means".[1] Having laid the foundations of the conception of the formation of higher psychic functions, it was particularly important for Vygotsky to reveal social relations from the instrumental point of view. Meanwhile, contained within the framework of these ideas was the possibility of elaborating, alongside and in connection with the question of the interiorisation of instrumental aspects, the problem of the interiorisation of the subject (active, intentional) aspects as such represented in social relations.

As Vygotsky pointed out, acts of interiorisation are carried out mainly in the processes of communication. He regarded communication as a process based on the rational understanding and intentional transmission of thoughts and

[1] L. S. Vygotsky, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

feelings, with the help of a definite system of means. This signifies that social relations, by remaining mediated by a tool, are in actual fact the relations of specific individuals, and consequently bear the imprint of their individuality, thus losing their impersonality. Vygotsky writes of the "transmission of feelings". One can see that the transfer, as it were, of individual characteristics of communicating persons and the formation of their ideal representation in other "Selves" take place within these processes of communication. Is this not where the specific character of teaching lies, as opposed to upbringing? Is the former not related to the predominantly impersonal instrumental quality of the transmission and assimilation of social experience, while the latter is connected primarily to the translation of the personal qualities of individuals? If this is so, then in other words, teaching is the translation of "general meanings" and upbringing is the translation of "personal meanings". However, teaching and upbringing in actual fact function together, only disintegrating in the course of theoretical analysis or didactical explanation.

It appears that if one follows the logic of the elaboration of the ideas of the activeness, mediated nature and interiorisation of social relations, the personality acts (of course for us, and not for Vygotsky) as a unique synthesis of a given individual's own traits and the interiorised personal and intentional qualities of other individuals (translated and assimilated along with the instrumental acts proper, which mediate the relations between individuals). We inevitably reach this conclusion if we take the concept of interiorisation in its full sense and not merely in its practical and utilitarian sense. The "personality" then becomes impossible without the interiorisation in a given individual of other individuals, who form their "representation" in the former, since, as Vygotsky pointed out, "through others we become ourselves".[1] The personality of an individual must also be revealed from the point of view of the latter's existence in other, and for other individuals. It then becomes clear that to describe the personality concretely means to state which other people and how other people are represented "interiorised" in you, but also how and in whom you yourself exist as "another",

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 196.

determining from within, as it were, someone else's consciousness and behaviour.

Here, consequently, a new problem arises: in what way does an individual condition his "presence" in other individuals? In elucidating what a given individual represents "for others" and "in others", as well as what they represent "for him" and "in him", we first of all come across the effects of the "looking-glass", when an individual is, as it were, reflected in the perception, opinions and evaluations of the individuals surrounding him. This line of research is represented in numerous works on social perception (above all in the works of G. M. Andreyeva, A. A. Bodalev and others).

Another path, still merely outlined (to be dealt with later), directs the researcher towards the analysis of the phenomena and mechanisms of the actual representation of a given individual as the subject of activeness in the vital activity of other people. Here, the individual's "existence for others" is relatively autonomous ("separate", "independent") from his own existence. In essence, we are faced with the problem of the individual's "ideal existence".

Finally, we come to the fourth idea, only vaguely outlined by Vygotsky, according to which the formation of the personality lies in the passages between the states of existence "in oneself", "for others" and "for oneself". He illustrated this idea using the example of the entire development of higher psychic functions. In this connection, he wrote, as we know, that "through others we become ourselves", and that "this rule relates not only to the personality as a whole, but also to the history of every individual function".[1] Here he put forward the general formula: "The personality becomes for itself that which it is in itself, through that which it offers to others. This is the process of the formation of the personality."[2] One cannot but agree with this view, but one can ask what exactly it is that the personality "offers to others"? Is it an action or an act, or perhaps something else?

[1] L. S. Vygotsky, *The Development of Higher Psychic Functions*. It is worth noting the similarity to Vygotsky's formulation of a thought expressed by A. A. Ukhtomsky in one of his letters: "Here, if you like is a true 'dialectic': 'only having switched himself and his activity over to others, does a human being discover himself as person!..'" (*Paths into the Unknown*, Issue 10, Moscow, 1973, p. 384, in Russian).

[2] L. S. Vygotsky, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

In his early work *Educational Psychology* (1926), Vygotsky came very close to dealing with this problem, but it was formulated only partially and vaguely. It must be said that the most interesting section of the book deals with the problems of aesthetic perception and emotion, the artistic upbringing of a child. It is in this sphere that Vygotsky, who wrote *The Psychology of Art* not long before the publication of *Educational Psychology*, was most independent in his views and conclusions and tended least to rely on the authority of others.

Vygotsky paid special attention to the study of the "moral aftersensation of art", a subject which had always fascinated him, in which a sensation overflows into an unenvisaged result. "The moral aftersensation of art undoubtedly exists and is manifested in a certain inner clearing of the spiritual world and in a certain easing of intimate conflicts and, consequently, in the liberation of certain constrained and suppressed forces, in particular the forces of moral behaviour."[1]

What is it that transforms the "moral aftersensation of art" into a distinctive "deed" for the person who consumes these products? Vygotsky quotes several examples from fiction to illustrate his thoughts. For example, he recalls Chekhov's story *The Home*, which tells of the unsuccessful attempt by a father by means of dull moral admonition to explain the wrongs of smoking to his seven-year-old son. Only having told a naive tale about an old king and his little son who fell ill and died from smoking, does the father achieve a quite unexpected effect: his son says in a subdued voice that he will never smoke again. The father's tale ensured the "moral aftersensation of art". "The very action of the tale stimulated and awakened new forces in the child's psyche which enabled him to feel both the fear and concern of his father for his health with such force that the moral aftersensation of the tale, on the basis of the father's previous insistence, unexpectedly had the very effect which the father had previously tried in vain to achieve."[2]

Vygotsky refers to this kind of example more than once. He recalls the fact cited in American literature on education about the totally unexpected reaction of schoolchildren

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[1] L. S. Vygotsky, *Educational Psychology*, Moscow, 1926, p. 257.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 258.

to Beecher Stowe's novel *Uncle Tom's Cabin*: American adolescents actually regretted that the times of slavery had passed. He also refers in particular to the unexpected effects of schoolchildren's perception of Krylov's fables (i.e., sympathy for the dragon-fly instead of the ant, and sympathy for the wolf rather than for the hunters, etc.).

One gets the impression that Vygotsky was interested in general in the effects of the non-coincidence of a subject's intentions and the actual result, in other words, that he was concerned with the problem of the personal transformations of meaning in another person as an aspect of the correlation of the individual's existence "in himself", "for others" and "for himself". Having overcome the limitations of the behaviourist, reactological approach to the analysis of human psychology which left its mark on *Educational Psychology*, Vygotsky attempted to interpret psychological acts in the light of ideas of the "activeness of aesthetic emotion",[1] putting forward the hypothesis of the existence of a "special activity" that comprises the "nature of aesthetic emotion". Vygotsky writes: "We still cannot say precisely where this lies, because psychological analysis has not said the last word on its composition, but now we already know that we are dealing with a highly complex, constructive activity, performed by a listener or spectator and which consists in the perceiver building and creating an aesthetic object out of the external impressions offered to him, to which all his subsequent reactions are then related."[2] Vygotsky called this activity "secondary creative synthesis".

Thus, the personality as a system manifests itself twice: first in acts of socially-oriented activeness, in actions and behaviour; and second, in acts completing the action as the deed and having secondary creative synthesis, based on the reciprocal activeness of another person.

Vygotsky's views bring one close to an understanding of the personality as a special form of the organisation of the mutual activeness of a given individual and other individuals, in which the actual existence of an individual is organically related to the ideal existence of other individuals within him (the aspect of individuality), and in which, at the same time, the individual is ideally represent-

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[1] L. S. Vygotsky, *op. cit.*, p. 250.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 252.

ed in the actual existence of other people (the aspect of personalisation).

In this way, Vygotsky's ideas, which were formed mainly in the psychology of cognitive processes and in age-group and educational psychology, have been successfully extended to the sphere of the psychology of the personality and have shown themselves to be of considerable importance for the elaboration of a number of theoretical principles.

The Need and Ability to "Develop a Personality"

One can surmise that at a definite stage of social development, the personality as a system quality of the individual begins to act as a special social value and a unique model to be assimilated and realised in individual activity. No doubt one would need special historical studies of material and spiritual culture in order to reveal the level of social development at which the personality value in the individual is necessarily brought about and reproduced in activity. However, one can already assume that the phylogenetic appearance of such a standard was related to the social division of labour (see: Karl Marx, *Theses on Feuerbach*) and with the emergence on this basis of property inequality and the resulting desire on the one hand to maintain and strengthen the ideal representation of sovereigns as "God-chosen" rulers, and on the other, to remove one's own impersonality, which could only be achieved in the course of class struggle. Thus, this standard of developing a personality had to function as the object of the individual's need. And here, the main source of human activeness is need: "No one can do anything without at the same time doing it for the sake of one or other of his needs..."[1]

The formation of this need (to develop a personality) has acquired various ideological forms, above all the religious. The dominant classes were ensured an earthly existence (in this world) in society as a whole, while the oppressed were ensured an existence "in the next world", in other words immortality of a totally unpersonified soul.

By imprinting and continuing himself in other members of his community, a person secured his existence within it. By ensuring through active participation in activity his

[1] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "The German Ideology", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 255.

other existence in other people, an individual objectively forms the content of his need for personalisation which subjectively can manifest itself in motivations of achievement, desires for attention, fame, friendship, respect and a leading position, and which could be reflected and realised or not, as the case might be. The need of an individual to develop his personality is a condition for the formation in other people of the ability to see the former's personality so vitally important for maintaining the unity, community, and continuity of the transmission of methods and results of activity, and, what is particularly important, for the establishment of mutual trust, without which it is hard to hope for the success of cooperation. In this way, by showing his individuality and by seeking to obtain a differential evaluation of his personality, a person believes himself to be a necessary condition of the existence of his group, since he produces a universal result which makes it possible to maintain that group as a whole. The social necessity of personalisation is obvious. Otherwise the trusting, intimate link between people, between generations, in which those being educated absorb not only the knowledge being transmitted but also the personality of the transmitter, vanishes and becomes inconceivable. At a certain stage of the life of society, this need appears in value-consolidated forms of social need.

A process that is beneficial for society as a whole is no less beneficial for each individual. Metaphorically speaking, there has always been a peculiar system of "social insurance" for the individual in society. By making positive "investments" or contributions to other people through activity and by generously sharing his existence with them, the individual ensures himself attention, care, love and compassion in case of helplessness in old age, disability, etc. One should not understand this in a narrow, pragmatic way. When positing his existence in other people, a person does not necessarily anticipate his future dividends; he acts with the specific aims and objective content of activity in mind, and is by no means motivated by the consideration what his deed will mean for other individuals (although one cannot rule out the intentional and conscious need for personalisation) .

The social need to develop a personality naturally exists in a specific historical form and has a class content. In pre-socialist socio-historical formations, this need could

only be fully satisfied by members of the ruling class and was suppressed by all possible means among the working people. The actions of slaves were not regarded as acts by their master, they had no life within him and therefore had no personalities in the eyes of the master. If personalisation occurred it was merely the ideal representation of acting things. This was the case until slaves rebelled. It is well known that Roman matrons felt no embarrassment at being naked in front of their slaves; a slave was not personalised and one cannot feel shame in front of a thing.

It is significant that the alienation of the results of labour characteristic of pre-socialist formations, caused distorted forms of metapersonal description of the individual. Having imprinted his work in the object produced, the creator could not hope to continue himself in this way in those for whom the object was intended, since it was not he but his master who offered himself to others through this object. This tragic paradox of the depersonalisation of the creator in an exploiter society was superbly expressed in a grotesque form by Ernst Theodor Amadeus Hoffmann, in his short story *Klein Zaches, genannt Zinnober*, in which the little deformed man Zaches is magically attributed all the merits of those around him, while all his own faults and blunders are attributed to someone else.

The position changes radically in socialist society where there is no exploitation or suppression of personality for the sake of anyone's economic advantage or interests. The Report by the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress states: "The Party approach, the political approach to the economy has invariably been based on the programmatic requirement—everything for the sake of man, for the benefit of man."[1] The free and all-round development of the abilities of the Soviet individual enables him by means of socially useful activity to make a positive contribution to other people and to the life of society as a whole.

Thus, the hypothetical "sociogenic need" to develop a personality is evidently realised in a subject's desire to be ideally represented in other people, to live in them by means of searching for the activity-based means of projecting himself into another person. In the same way as the in-

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[1] *Documents and Resolutions. The 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1981, p. 41.

dividual strives to continue himself in another person purely physically (by continuing the human race, and producing descendants), the personality of an individual strives to continue itself by placing its ideal representation, its other being in other people. Is this not, we will go on to ask, the essence of communication, which cannot be reduced merely to the exchange of information, and to acts of communication, since it is a process in which a person shares his existence with others, imprints and continues himself within them and thus possesses a personality in their eyes?

The need to develop a personality, the need for personalisation ensures the active involvement of an individual in the system of social interrelations, at the same time being determined by these social links caused by the division of labour in society and by the social relations which form objectively, regardless of the individual's will. By striving to introduce his "Self" into the consciousness, feelings and will of others, by means of active participation in joint activity, and by making them participate in his own interests and desires, a person by receiving a feedback information about his success, thus satisfies the need for personalisation. However, as we know, the satisfaction of a need gives rise to a greater need and so the process goes on. It continues either in the expansion of the object of personalisation, in the appearance of more and more individuals with the imprint of the given object, or in the deepening of the process itself, i.e., in the strengthening of its presence in the life and activity of others.

When realising the need to develop a personality and transferring himself into another, the individual carries out this "transportation" not by any means in the airless medium of the "communication of souls", but in actual activity, conducted in real social groups. Experimental research has confirmed our hypothesis that the optimal conditions for the personalisation of the individual exist in the collective. In the genuine collective as a highly developed group, the personalisation of each person is a condition of the personalisation of all. In groups of a corporative kind, each person strives to be personalised at the expense of the depersonalisation of all the others. This follows from the main theses of the conception of activity-based mediation of interpersonal relations. For example, altruistic motives, and altruism is the purest case of projecting oneself into someone else, depending on whether or not they are mediated by the

socially valuable content of joint activity, in one case can manifest themselves in the form of collectivist identification and in another as indulgence and tolerance, etc. A person who continues his existence in another by his action, gains the opportunity of satisfying his need for positive personalisation if this action corresponds as fully as possible to the content and values of the activity which unites them both, and finally, the social interests reflected in this activity. The socially justified and valuable means of making the need for personalisation explicit lies in work activity.

When the individual's need to realise his personality exists implicitly, as the hidden motivation of his behaviour and actions, and more often than not this is the case, it becomes an essential characteristic, phenomenologically represented in the numerous, well-studied phenomena of the motivation of achievement, pretensions, affiliation, the tendency to risk, altruism, empathy, etc. It is typical for foreign scholars studying the personality to attempt to derive these phenomena from one another or to reduce one to another, or to find their basis first in the pragmatic, directed nature of human motivation in the spirit of the "postulate of conformity", then in the adaptiveness of psychic processes and behavioural act, and then in the immanent desire for "self-realisation" or "self-actualisation", which has always lacked a determinist substantiation and which failed to receive it in the works of Abraham Maslow and Floyd Allport, which put forward this approach.

The analysis of this problem will enable us to understand and to reinterpret all these phenomena, to bring them into a single theoretical context, to interpret them from the standpoint of Marxist psychology, and to see the very essence of psychological phenomena—the need for personalisation.

The Motivation of Personal Behaviour

Let us attempt to consider the possibility of a similar reinterpretation, for the time being purely theoretical, with regard to the set of motives put forward by the Oxford Professor of Psychology Michael Argyle in his book *The Psychology of Interpersonal Behaviour*, not because this list is particularly interesting or original, but on the contrary,

because of its triviality and typicalness for Western psychology of the personality.

Professor Argyle picks out seven motivations of personal behaviour. 1. Non-social needs, which can produce social interaction (for example, the biological need for food and water which gives rise to the need for money). 2. The desire for dependency—the need for the protection, help and guidance especially for persons in positions of power and authority. 3. The tendency towards affiliation—the desire to communicate with others, come into close contact with them and to reach a certain degree of intimacy. 4. The tendency towards domination, leadership and the desire to take decisions and influence the group. 5. Sexual needs. 6. The tendency towards aggression, threats, and physical or other attacks on other individuals. 7. The need for self-esteem, related to the desire to gain the approval of those around.

Let us state straightaway that the logic of Professor Argyle's classification is far from strict (it is unclear on what it is based and whether this list exhausts the number of motives, etc.). But at this point, we are interested in another aspect of his constructions. What forms the basis of all these motivations? There is no point talking of the "non-social needs" since their origin for the author is obvious. But what about the rest? "Sex, aggression and affiliation also have an instinctive basis,"[1] notes Argyle and cites the data of Harlow and Harlow (1962) which showed that monkeys reared without contact with their mothers later showed little interest in the opposite sex. The motivation of dependency is also illustrated by these famous experiments with baby monkeys, and, consequently, are also interpreted as instinctive. The author's view is the same with regard to domination: "There may be innate, instinctive origins of dominative behaviour."[2] And only the last motivation of self-esteem, the support of the image of the "Self" seems to be free from biological origins or parallels.

The biologically-oriented explanations of human behaviour and the ignoring of the social essence of man are alien to Soviet psychology. If one removes the first social motivation from the brackets (as a strictly non-social), can

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[1] M. Argyle, *The Psychology of Interpersonal Behaviour*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, London, 1970, p. 17.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

one then interpret the six social motivations in a different way? Moreover, can we find an interpretation that does not reduce them to biological foundations and instincts, that is not limited merely to the simple indication of their social origin and nature (as criticism of foreign conceptions of motivations frequently does), but that deals with them comprehensively?

If one accepts that the individual's need to develop a personality is a fundamental and socially-based (by no means instinctive) need of the individual, then all the "social motivations" listed above can be seen as a derivative of this need.

Then, affiliation can be regarded as a motive aimed at removing barriers in the way of individual personalisation. Aggression and domination as the desire to be personalised in others independent of the moral evaluation of the method by which this is achieved, by literally forcing oneself on another. Sexual need can be seen as the ambivalent desire to continue oneself in another "twice": as an individual (the need to continue the family) and as a personality (to acquire another self, an ideal representation in a beloved person). Incidentally, as it figures in American socio-psychological literature, and obviously reflecting sufficiently well the reality of that way of life, sex appears as an extreme simplification of this type of social motivation, and could more than any other be regarded as a non-social motive, similar to the need for food and water, and as their subsequent sublimations. As for self-esteem, it can be seen as the need to discover the successfulness or unsuccessfulness of personalisation. However, an individual evaluates not the fact itself of ideal representation in other people (this is part of the tasks and possibilities of psychological research), but the presence, nature and effectiveness of those means of personalisation which he acquires in activity and communication and through which he asserts himself as the subject of that activity and communication. Evidently, the motivation of dependency should occupy a special position. We could understand it as the individual's need to receive a "contribution", in his socialisation by means of another person's personalisation in him. However, we do not undertake to claim whether or not this need exists as a fundamental "social motivation", since it is possible that this is merely an extension of one of the instinctive forms of animal behaviour to human behaviour.

Of course, we do not assert that one should strictly adhere to the set of motivations put forward by Professor Argyle, indeed, we regard it as rather inadequate. We have merely used it for illustration. But if one does adhere to it, then one should not search for the explanation of the origin of the psychological phenomena described by this catalogue in the same area as Professor Argyle and certain other Western psychologists.

We fully realise the responsibility of placing the individual's need to develop his personality next to narrow, individual (vital) needs as a fundamental motivation of human behaviour. And this is understandable. This place was occupied for so long by instincts, and remained empty for such a long time after the instinctive nature of human behaviour was justly rejected in Soviet psychology, that the search for a kind of first principle, a kind of main root of the leafy tree of heterogeneous, varied and contradictory motives of human actions and acts, really looks rather an extravagant occupation.

Surely we should not regard as productive either the latest or slightly renewed old constructions according to which the foundations of social motivation should be sought in reduction and recapitulation, in the spiritualisation of man and the striving towards the highest spiritual centre, "the Omega point", i.e., towards God, in the long-standing nuances of the interrelations of child and parents which migrate into the adult's subconscious, in the introduction to spirituality and primary religious morality, in self-actualisation, etc.

Without abandoning the Marxist standpoint, we must search for the basis of social motivation not in the dark alleys of phylogenesis or ontogenesis, nor in the esoteric depths of the spirit, but in actual interrelations, in human activity, in the individual's social life. The need of an individual to develop his personality is realised in the sphere in which this search is made (the social life of the individual in which the latter acquires a special, social quality—a personality). This is the principle by which the Marxist scholar is guided when studying the human being within the system of historically conditioned social interrelations.

As shown above, the origin of the need to develop a personality is not determined by biological or even psychological laws, but rather by historical laws, and in class society this need has a distinct class nature. Finally, there

are no grounds for reproaching us for deriving the immense diversity of motives from one need, just as there are no grounds for reproaching the biologist for regarding the cell as a model of living matter. One should not forget that the relation between a need and motives cannot be interpreted as the relation between members of one set. It is more the relation between essence and phenomena. The dependence of the personality on society represented in a need, is manifested in the motives of the personality's actions, but they themselves function as a form of the individual's apparent spontaneity. Whereas in a need, the activity of a person is dependent on its objective-social content, in motives, this dependence is manifested as the subject's own activeness. Therefore the many-sided system of motives contained within the individual's behaviour is richer in signs, more flexible and mobile than the need for personalisation which forms its essence.

If one accepts our hypothesis of motivation as derivative of the need for personalisation, then not one, but a minimum of two cornerstones can be placed in the foundation of the motives of human behaviour and actions. Indeed, the first has always been acknowledged—the vital needs of the human being for his preservation as an individual and for propagation. In social life, these vital needs (hunger, thirst, sexual need, the need for clothing, shelter, rest, etc.) disintegrate into a mass of varied motives of behaviour, in which the means of their satisfaction can appear in transformed state (for example, the motivation of enrichment).

The second basis of human motivation is the need to develop a personality. We see two main forms of human activeness motivated in a similar way. Much has already been said about the first: the need to represent oneself in another. The second should be paid special attention.

Personalisation takes place in activity. In order for a person to be ideally represented in another person in a positive way, he must, at least, have something to do or say of significance for the other person. In order to carry out an act of communication, one must in any case have something to communicate. Evidently, thoughts, knowledge, artistic images, produced objects, solved tasks, etc., serve as means of personalisation. But before they can become means of personalisation they must already have been within that person; he has already to have acquired, invented, produced, constructed, discovered or solved them. Say he

has done all this. For the sake of what? What kind of motivation functioned here? Surely one must suppose that here too lies the same need for personalisation, only it is aimed at its material content, at the acquisition of the means for the forthcoming communication of the self to another, but this other person remains for the moment in the shade, hidden from the ordinary consciousness as an actual object of personalisation.

Let us take a simple case of the artist working on a canvas. Why is he doing it? What motivates him? Perhaps the possibility of selling the picture for money? No doubt this is one reason. But surely we cannot reduce everything to vital motivations. But what else is there? Let us assume that the motivation of creative work as an objective activity is produced by the artist's need to develop his personality, i.e., the need to make a full and effective contribution to other people, to make an impression on them and produce in them significant changes in their reasoning and motivation. In this case, we have yet another derivative of the need for personalisation.

Is the antithesis: either material gain, or the desire to share one's being with others, not too straightforward? Can there not be another element? What about the desire for self-expression and self-actualisation? Or pleasure from the creative process? The latter should be totally excluded. Any case of the satisfaction of any sufficiently intense need is accompanied by emotional relaxation, a mood of excitement and a more or less marked feeling of pleasure. Thus, the indication of aspects of emotionality in the manifestation of social motivation adds nothing to existing explanations. The desire for self-expression and self-actualisation is a different matter and must be dealt with in detail.

On this subject we conducted the following experiment. Young talented artists were asked how they themselves interpret their need for artistic creativity. The need for self-expression and self-actualisation figured in all the answers ("to express myself and my attitude to the world", "to pour myself out onto canvas", "You see, my inner world is overflowing with unpoured paints and unembodied forms, and I want to see what this looks like outside myself, on paper..." and so on). Almost all the artists strove to emphasise the secondary importance of the appraisal of their work by the public. The motive of enrichment was barely mentioned

although it was not denied, and it was rather in the form of a polemic with the psychologist for invading the sacred world of creative work with his questions.

The second part of this casual experiment was conducted a little later. All the artists questioned previously were given the following situation to deal with: "From today you will be given a superb studio of your own (this is usually a great problem for young artists), the best paints, canvases, you will be paid the highest rates for every picture on any theme, in any genre, manner and style, and after a certain period you will be given an important title. In short, express yourselves and receive all possible benefits. The only condition is that not one of your pictures will ever be seen by anyone. They will all remain in your hands. Do you agree?" The artists refused unanimously.

Does this not confirm the thought mentioned above that the need for self-actualisation and self-expression is a superficial motive, beneath which lies a deep social motive, in accordance with which a person not so much expresses himself in the object of creative work, as strives through the object of his art to transmit himself, his attitude and his vision of the world to other people, and that it is these other people (and more broadly, society) that are the ultimate aim of his creative work. The material link between people which is embodied in essentially impersonal social relations, gives rise to personally ideal relations in which other people represent the aim of activity for the creation and in which ideal representation in them, embodied in the wealth of aesthetic perception of the world transmitted to them, represents the only justification of the torment of creative work, the search for perfection, and the efforts spent to accumulate these priceless valuables.

Again and again one has to make the reservation that when we speak of the individual's need to develop a personality, to be *personalised*, we are not talking of the conscious desire of one individual to invade another person's being and force himself on the latter. Of course, this kind of specific motivation can exist, such as domination and other types of offering oneself to another rather than representing oneself in another. But this is merely a special case which is in no way representative of the need to develop a personality. Likewise, it is wrong to interpret the need for personalisation as the willingness to find one's other existence in any other person. In this respect, human

beings are extremely selective and, as a rule, some people possess the necessary qualities to stimulate the need for personalisation in their partners in communication and activity while others not only do not awaken it but, on the other hand, stifle it.

If the need for personalisation in some is situational, while in others it is always sufficiently intensive, and if a person has a certain lack of activity-based means of personalisation (e.g., he has nothing with which to ensure his ideal representation: no original ideas, no ingenuity, no knowledge, no vision of the world rich in images), then frequently he takes the seemingly effective but in fact hopeless path of alcoholic intoxication.

Quasi-personalisation is the realisation of the need to develop a personality, conducted independently of activity, like an attempt using worthless means. Thus, for instance, in many historical towns there is a serious problem in trying to stop a certain section of tourists from writing their names on old walls. The administration of one tourist centre found a clever way out of this difficult situation, on the one hand satisfying this persistent need, and on the other, protecting the walls of architectural monuments from undesirable additional decoration. Wooden boards were set up and it was announced that any person wishing to leave his name for future generations could sign the board and it was guaranteed that the board would be carefully preserved in the cellars of the monastery. Apparently the boards are regularly filled up and changed. How else can one explain this astonishing phenomenon if not by quasi-personalisation?

Activity is the main way, the only effective method of developing one's personality. By his activity a person continues himself in other people. The created object itself (a building, a line of poetry, a planted tree, a finely made component, a book, a suite of music or its performance, etc.) is, on the one hand, the object of activity, and on the other, the means by which a person establishes himself in social life, because this object is produced for other people. The relations between people are mediated by this object, and communication is created as the production of what is common to and what unites people in the process of forming interrelations, of what is common to, and belongs equally to those who create and make, as to those who consume and assimilate.

Today the problem of the correlation of the processes of communication and activity is being discussed in philosophy and psychology. Some maintain that communication is activity or, at least an individual case of activity, while others believe that they are two independent and aqual processes. We agree with neither point of view, not because either is wrong but because both sides are right, but in actual fact there is no contradiction.

Let us start by saying that the question of whether communication is a part (an aspect) of the process of activity or, on the contrary, activity is an aspect of communication, in accordance with the traditional conception of communication (i.e., intercourse in general) as an act of communication, clearly does not have a simple answer. Evidently, if we understand interrelations as a mediated subject-object-subject process, then the relations of two or more people are mediated by the object of activity, and here activity represents an aspect of the communicative act. If, on the other hand one understands them as a subject-subject-object process, as indeed activity-based relations are, then the relation of the subject to the object, to the content and aim of activity, is mediated by interrelations between participants in the activity. The fundamental reversibility of subject-object-subject and subject-subject-object relations makes this question pointless. Attempts to work out the priority in human history of communication or activity would be like trying to solve the classic problem of the chicken and the egg.

But, the question of the correlation of communication and activity can be taken further within the context of the conception we propose.

According to Marxism, in order to produce, a person must unite with other people. Here, communication (intercourse), as already pointed out, functions as a part or an aspect of activity, as its vital informative aspect. But, having created an object in the process of activity which included intercourse as communication, a person does not stop there, but transmits himself, his specific features, and his individuality through the created object to other people, for whom he created the object. Among these other people can be those who participated in the creation, but not necessarily. The creator himself can be among them, but not necessarily. Through the created object a person transcends into the social whole, finding in it his ideal representation, represent-

ing himself in other people and in himself as another. This already is communication of a second order (as distinct from communication in its auxiliary, assisting sense), i.e., communication as personalisation. Here, activity represents an aspect, a part, an essential precondition of communication. Communication in activity produces something common among people which functions twice: in the communication as an informative side and in personalisation as the personal aspect. In this sense, the Russian language (and also the German—*Verkehr*) has an advantage over others: it has two separate concepts "obshcheniye" meaning communication (general intercourse) and "kommunikatsiya" meaning communication (speech, etc.). Thus a long-standing truth is once again confirmed, that many arguments are caused because one and the same object is given various names, or, as in the case of the concept "obshcheniye", because one and the same word is used to designate different things.

Thus, *the need to develop personality* emerges on the basis of the socially generated possibility of realising the corresponding actions: *the ability to develop a personality*. This ability, as one might suppose (at the moment we are talking merely of hypotheses which require testing and confirmation), is in actual fact the individual psychological traits of a person, which enable him to accomplish socially significant acts which ensure his adequate personalisation in other people. In this way, the socially generated and strictly human ability to develop a personality appears in unity with the need for personalisation which is the source of a subject's activeness, as the precondition of that need for personalisation.

Like any other ability, it is above all given to the subject in its exclusiveness as something individual, distinguishing him from those around, and in a certain sense contrasting him to others, as the possibility to convey and impart to them his uniqueness, peculiarity and dissimilarity. The dramatic effect on the life of a person who, by virtue of external conditions and circumstances (we know what their nature is in class society), is deprived of the chance of satisfying his own need for personalisation. But there are also cases when a person's ability to develop his personality is generally atrophied or reduced to a minimum, or when it takes on blatantly ugly forms. A person who merely formally carries out his duties, who evades socially useful acti[illegible]d manifests indifference towards the fate of peo-

ple and work, to a greater or lesser extent loses his ability to be ideally represented in the deeds and thoughts and lives of other people. By consistently adhering to the principle: "I'm fine by myself. I don't touch you, don't touch me. I'm a brilliant individual and don't compare yourself with me", a person will finally be depersonalised and cease to have a personality. This is a paradox: a person emphasises his "selfness", his complete individuality, and by doing so is deprived of his individuality in the eyes of others, he loses his "face" and is effaced in the consciousness of those around, failing to make any really significant contributions to them.

However, the ability to achieve personalisation includes the universal as well as the individual. It is manifested in the transmission by subject of elements of the social whole, models of behaviour, standards, and psychological tools as well as his own extrapersonal activeness, in other words belonging just as much to him as to the other members of the social community.

Here we see a general outline of the closely united characteristics of the need and ability to have a personality. The analysis of the methods and features of their fulfilment opens the way for a new theory of the personality which could, on all points, oppose the conceptions of the personality accepted in psychoanalytic tradition, "humanist psychology", in personological existentialism and other Western psychological theoretical constructions. The principle of activity-based mediation accepted by us remains here a guiding principle for the theoretical elaboration of the problem of the personality.

Hypotheses and a Programme for Further Research

For a hypothetical and deductive conception of individual personalisation to be formed, it is necessary to determine all the main hypotheses which could show the way towards specific psychological research of the personality. For instance, there is the postulate of maximisation or the desire of an individual to attain maximum personalisation, with its resulting theoretical hypotheses: 1) Any experience perceived by the individual as of value to the revelation of his individuality, actualises the need for personalisation and determines the search of a significant other person in whom the individual could find his ideal representation.

2) In any situation of communication a subject strives to determine and realise the aspects of his individuality which, in this specific situation, are open to personalisation. The impossibility of realising personalisation leads to the search for new possibilities within the self or in objective activity. 3) Out of two or more partners in communication, all other things being equal, a subject prefers the person who ensures him the most adequate personalisation. Similarly, preference will be shown to the person who ensures the most long-lasting personalisation. The valency of another person in this respect grows evenly with the increase in the expected adequacy or lastingness of personalisation. The third variable here is the intensity of the need for personalisation. The strictly experimental verification of the empirical results of these hypotheses will help us to outline the future theory of personalisation, point to the areas where it can be applied (child-rearing, management, clinical work, etc.), and to conduct the search and elaboration of methods of research with their subsequent standardisation for applied needs.

The adoption of the principle of maximisation and the verification of related theoretical hypotheses will enable us to construct a broad programme of experimental studies and also to reinterpret a considerable amount of existing empirical data.

Evidently, the empirical development of the idea of the three aspects of personal attribution, requires the singling out of the following special sections of this research programme.

It is necessary to analyse *collective activity, that is, jointly distributed objective activity* as activity stimulating the individual to "develop his personality". The task of the psychologist includes the elucidation of the forms of activity which determine this process and give it social value. This includes the study of the *socially useful activity* of the subject and its collective-forming and personality-forming potential: the *many-sided nature* of joint activity as a means of optimising the process of shaping the individual's personality, and also the indication of the role of *leading activity*; *supernormative activeness and supersituational activeness* as forms and mechanisms of positing the individual existence of a subject into social life. The phenomena of the motivation of selfless risk, pretensions, friendship, altruism, etc., can also be studied here and reinter-

preted as modifications of the main, socially-based need of the subject to develop the personality. Leontiev's idea that "in the basis of the personality lie relations of the joint co-subordination of human activities, engendered by the course of their development",[1] can be fully embodied in the context of the solution of the above-mentioned tasks.

A special place in this part of the programme should be occupied by the consideration of *communicative barriers* which emerge in the course of the realisation of the need for personalisation, as well as the mechanisms of *psychological protection* from the obstacles in the way of satisfying this need. A special study could be conducted into the dependence of the completeness of personalisation on the extent to which the personality is included in the collective or on the nature of its participation in joint substantial activity. It would then be a good idea to understand the mechanisms for overcoming the communicative barriers, much described in literature on communication, which not only hinder the exchange of information but which, in all probability, block the processes of personalisation. Also of relevance here is *the process of the role assimilation*, which under certain circumstances (e.g., role games, work games, intensive language training, etc.) functions rather like the Trojan horse, enabling the individual to attack the communicative barrier and penetrate the relatively enclosed world of another personality, without lowering his psychological degree of protection.

Among the problems needing consideration is what enables the subject to continue to live in another person, or, in other words, *the analysis of the substantially dynamic aspect of a subject's "other existence" in another person.* Evidently, a subject manages to "penetrate" another person and communicate himself, only if the other person is willing to accept these personal "contributions", to assimilate them and "liken" himself in something else to another. At first glance, this willingness depends exclusively on the person's characteristic traits (conformity, trustfulness, etc.) and the powers of influence of the subject communicating himself. But this is only at first glance. The stratometric conception assumes (and as we have already seen, this has been proved experimentally) that the typically individual traits of character always exist in a specific socio-psycholo-

[1] A. N. Leontiev, *Activity. Consciousness. Personality*, p. 188.

gical form and depend on the level of development of the group in which the interaction of individuals takes place. The key to the solution of this problem is to transfer it to the sphere of the inter-individual personal attribution of the subject: the ability of the individual to develop his personality is revealed best of all in the collective.

This part of the programme also includes the study of *the fate of a subject's "other existence" in another individual*, i.e., the dynamics, period of existence, maintenance and decline of a subject's ideal representation in another person. This problem is vital for the practical applications of social psychology, in particular in the sphere of family and marriage psychology. Of equal importance is the question of the initial stages of the formation of ideal representation in another, the applied aspects of which lie in educational psychology and the development of the personality.

Then, it would also be worthwhile to consider *the ways and features of the assimilation by a subject of the existence of another individual.* This could include many phenomena of *social perception* (for example, the above-mentioned phenomenon of "downward blindness"), or the phenomenon of "social apperception", the essence of which lies in the intensification of the personal perception of those qualities which are noticeably manifested in the joint activity which ensures the "transmission" of personal characteristics from individual to individual. The tasks related to the study of the *referentiality, leadership and authority* of the individual also belong here. For example, the basis of authority, understood in the sense of the inner recognition by a subject of the right of another individual to evaluate the significant circumstances of joint activity and to take mutually important decisions, lies in the specific features of the ideal representation of an authoritative individual in the subject's consciousness.

Finally, it is necessary to reveal the method and nature of the attribution of a real "contribution" by the subject to other people. Indeed, a real "contribution" can function in the individual's consciousness as something of his own (made by the subject himself) or as something produced by someone else (and sometimes as something belonging to no one). Once again one recalls Hoffmann's *Klein Zaches.* Over the entire course of human history all the good and all the evil which people have done to one another, was attributed to God and to the Devil, respectively. The ideal re-

presentation of one person in another has formed through this false attribution. However, if one leaves aside the history of religion and turns to the position of the individual among people, then the purely psychological problem arises of reward or punishment for accomplished acts, a situation which has always been sufficiently conflictive.

Thus we get a rough outline of the future trend of research already begun on the *attribution of responsibility* for success or failure in joint activity, which demonstrated the superiority of collectives over all other types of group in securing fairness for the individual. A person's contribution to other people can be most adequately attributed in the collective, and consequently the individual acquires in the collective the optimal opportunities for appearing as a personality both for himself and for others.

Of course, these theories require experimental testing (already begun by a group of my colleagues). Indeed this can be taken to refer to this entire last chapter. We have been talking here not about the results of studies, but about the hypotheses in general and the research programme which still remains to be carried out.

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

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